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Abstract
Many if not most of the core problems studied in operations management fall into the
category of multi-stage stochastic optimization models, whereby one considers multi-
ple, often correlated decisions to optimize a particular objective function under uncer-
tainty on the system evolution over the future horizon. Unfortunately, computing the
optimal policies is usually computationally intractable due to curse of dimensionality.
This thesis is focused on providing provably near-optimal and tractable policies for
some of these challenging models arising in the context of inventory control, capac-
ity planning and revenue management; specifically, on the design of approximation
algorithms that admit worst-case performance guarantees.
In the first chapter, we develop new algorithmic approaches to compute provably
near-optimal policies for multi-period stochastic lot-sizing inventory models with pos-
itive lead times, general demand distributions and dynamic forecast updates. The
proposed policies have worst-case performance guarantees of 3 and typically perform
very close to optimal in extensive computational experiments. We also describe a
6-approximation algorithm for the counterpart model under uniform capacity con-
straints.
In the second chapter, we study a class of revenue management problems in sys-
tems with reusable resources and advanced reservations. A simple control policy called
the class selection policy (CSP) is proposed based on solving a knapsack-type linear
program (LP). We show that the CSP and its variants perform provably near-optimal
in the Halfin- Whitt regime. The analysis is based on modeling the problem as loss
network systems with advanced reservations. In particular, asymptotic upper bounds
on the blocking probabilities are derived.
In the third chapter, we examine the problem of capacity planning in joint ven-
tures to meet stochastic demand in a newsvendor-type setting. When resources are
heterogeneous, there exists a unique revenue-sharing contract such that the corre-
sponding Nash Bargaining Solution, the Strong Nash Equilibrium, and the system
optimal solution coincide. The optimal scheme rewards every participant proportion-
ally to her marginal cost. When resources are homogeneous, there does not exist a
3
revenue-sharing scheme which induces the system optimum. Nonetheless, we propose
provably good revenue-sharing contracts which suggests that the reward should be
inversely proportional to the marginal cost of each participant.
Thesis Supervisor: Retsef Levi
Title: J. Spencer Standish (1945) Professor of Management
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Multi-stage stochastic optimization models have been prevalent in the field of opera-
tions management, whereby operations manager considers multiple, often correlated
decisions to optimize a particular objective function under uncertainty on the system
evolution over the remaining time horizon. Unfortunately, for most of these mod-
els computing the optimal solutions is usually computationally intractable due to
curse of dimensionality. Alternatively, one may resort to designing heuristics that
can generate efficient solutions with possibly good quality. Some of the most suc-
cessful attempts include exact and approximate dynamic programming, stochastic
approximation algorithms, sampling-based methods and robust optimization.
This thesis is focused on constructing provably near-optimal and tractable poli-
cies to several core models in operations management, in particular, in the areas
of inventory control, revenue management and capacity management. These algo-
rithms are computationally tractable and admit worst-case performance guarantees.
The notion of worst-case performance guarantees has been used extensively in com-
puter science in the analysis of approximation algorithms for combinatorial NP-hard
problems (Vazirani (2001)). Put formally, an algorithm is called an a-approximation
algorithm or is said to have a worst-case guarantee of a (for some constant a > 1) if
it is a polynomial time algorithm, and for any instance of the problem the algorithm
is guaranteed to provide a solution with cost that is at most a times the optimal cost.
Traditionally, approximation algorithm techniques have been applied primarily
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to deterministic combinatorial optimization problems. The work on approximation
algorithms for stochastic combinatorial problems goes back to the work on stochastic
scheduling problem of Mdhring et al. (1984a) and Mhring et al. (1984b) and the more
recent work of Mhring et al. (1999). Recently, there has been a growing stream of
approximation results for several two-stage stochastic combinatorial problems. For a
comprehensive literature review, we refer the readers to Stougie and van der Vlerk
(2003), Dye et al. (2003) and Shmoys and Swamy (2004, 2006a). In contrast, this
thesis is focused on the relatively harder multistage stochastic optimization models,
for which there has been relatively little work (for example, see Dean et al. (2004),
Shmoys and Swamy (2006b), Chan and Farias (2009), Levi et al. (2005, 2007, 2008a,d)
and Levi and Radovanovic (2010)).
The concept of approximation algorithms has been applied to several problems in
operations management, but again primarily to deterministic problems; for examples,
see Silver and Meal (1973), Roundy (1993), and Levi et al. (2006, 2008b,c). Until
recently, there have been relatively few examples of worst-case analysis of heuristics for
stochastic optimization models within operations management (Chen (1999)). In fact,
with relatively few exceptions (e.g. Gallego and van Ryzin (1994), Lu et al. (2006),
Halman et al. (2009), Chu and Shen (2010)), most of the heuristics and algorithms
that have been proposed for operations management models were evaluated merely
through computational experiments on randomly generated instances. This does not
necessarily provide strong indications that the proposed heuristics are good in general,
beyond the instances that were actually tested. In contrast, worst-case performance
analysis has the advantage that it provides a priori and posteriori guarantees on the
quality of the solution produced by the algorithm. Moreover, the performance analysis
provides insights on how to design algorithms that have good typical (empirical)
performance, which in most cases is significantly better than the worst-case analysis.
In this thesis, we will present some of the recent work to develop provably near-
optimal approximation algorithms for operations management models. We shall de-
scribe the respective algorithms and their theoretical (worst-case) and typical (com-
putational) performance analysis. In addition, we shall highlight some of the central
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techniques that have been used, and point out interesting future research directions.
As will be demonstrated, the respective techniques span ideas from many disciplines,
such as optimization, computer science, and stochastic analysis. The discussion in this
thesis is focused on three classes of models, specifically, stochastic lot-sizing problems
and their capacitated counterparts ( Levi and Shi (2009, 2010)), loss network systems
with advanced reservations (Levi and Shi (2011b)) and modeling joint ventures in
operations management (Levi et al. (2011)).
Chapter 1: Stochastic Lot-sizing Problems
We address several classical stochastic inventory control models in the presence of
fixed costs. We develop the first provably near-optimal randomized algorithms for
stochastic lot-sizing problems and capacitated stochastic lot-sizing problems which
are core problems inventory theory. The goal is to coordinate a sequence of orders of
a single commodity, aiming to supply stochastic demands over a discrete finite horizon
with minimum total expected cost, including fixed, ordering, holding and backlogging
costs.
These models capture two very important aspects of managing inventory in prac-
tice, the first being uncertainty and the second being economies of scales. First,
uncertainty is a significant aspect in modeling real life situations. However, model-
ing uncertainty in inventory models usually makes them significantly harder to solve
compared to their deterministic counterparts. Our models allow the most general
exogeneous demand processes including auto-correlated and non-stationary demands
as well as dynamic forecast updates. Secondly, in stochastic lot-sizing models, we
also need to consider fixed cost that arises in many real-life scenarios. Fixed cost
reflects the fact that ordering, production and transportation in large quantities lead
to economies of scales.
The models. Stochastic inventory theory provides streamlined models with the
following common setting. The goal is to coordinate a sequence of orders over a
planning horizon of finitely many discrete periods, aiming to satisfy a sequence of
17
random demands with minimum expected cost. The cost consists of a fixed ordering
cost incurred in each period, in which a strictly positive quantity of supply units
is ordered regardless of the size of the order; a per-unit holding cost for carrying
excess inventory from one period to the next; and a per-unit backloqging penalty cost
that is incurred in each period for each unit of unsatisfied demand. Specifically,
at the beginning of each period one needs to decide how many units to order. If
an order is placed then the fixed ordering cost is incurred and the order arrives
after a given lead time of several periods. Then the period demand is observed and
satisfied to the maximum extent possible from the inventory on hand. Excess supply
or unsatisfied demand are carried to the next period incurring appropriate holding and
backlogging costs, respectively. The goal is to find an ordering policy that minimizes
the overall expected costs over the entire horizon. The models studied in this work
capture very general demand structures. In particular, demands in different periods
can be auto-correlated and the information about the joint distribution of future
demands can evolve over time as more information becomes available to the decision
maker. Allowing general demand structures captures many important aspects, such
as forecast updates. However, it usually gives rise to very complex models since the
underlying state space becomes multidimensional, even in simpler models without
fixed ordering costs.
Our contributions. First, we propose a new policy that can be applied under
very general assumptions, i.e., with positive lead times and general demand struc-
tures. The policy is called randomized cost-balancing policy and has a worst-case
performance guarantee of 3. That is, the expected cost of the policy is guaranteed to
be at most 3 times the optimal expected cost., regardless of the specific instance. We
also propose a similar policy for a related model. This model is called the stochastic
lot-sizing problem with uniform capacity constraints. The worst-case performance
guarantee for this model is 6. One of the novel aspects of these policies is the use
of randomized decision rules. Specifically, the policy randomly chooses among differ-
ent ordering quantities. While randomized algorithms have been used extensively for
18
many optimization problems, we are not aware of any applications to inventory con-
trol models. The worst-case analysis of these algorithms employs several novel ideas
that provide new insights on the respective stochastic lot-sizing models; we believe
that this will contribute to the future research on these models.
Secondly, we show how these policies can be parameterized to create a broader
class of policies. A simulation based optimization is used to find the 'best' parameters
per a given instance of the problem. This clearly preserves the same worst-case
guarantees. Moreover, computational experiments that we conducted indicate that
it can lead to near-optimal policies that perform empirically within few percentages
of optimal, significantly better than the worst-case performance guarantees.
Chapter 2: Revenue Management of Reusable Resources with
Advanced Reservations
We consider a class of revenue management problems that arise in systems with
reusable resources and advanced reservations. The work is motivated by both tradi-
tional and emerging application domains, such as hotel room management, car rental
management and workforce management. For instance, in hotel industries, customers
make requests to book a room in the future for a specified number of days. This is
called advanced reservation. Rooms are allocated to customers based on their re-
quests, and after one customer used a room it becomes available to serve other cus-
tomers. One of the major issues in these systems is how to manage capacitated pool
of reusable resources over time in a dynamic environment with many uncertainties.
In particular, one wishes to choose the most profitable customers to maximize the
resulting revenue.
Models with reusable resources and advanced reservations are typically very hard
to analyze, particularly due to the existence of advanced reservations. There has been
relatively little related work both on finding provably good policies for these important
models and structural properties of optimal or even practically good policies. In this
chapter, we analyze the performance of conceptually and computationally simple
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policies. We show that they perform provably near-optimal in the Halfin- Whitt (see
Halfin and Whitt (1981)) heavy-traffic regime. That is, the expected long-run revenue
of the policy is guaranteed to obtain at least a constant fraction of the optimal revenue
regardless of the input instance. Moreover, the analysis builds upon novel approaches
to analyze the important class of loss network models with advanced reservations. The
latter class of models is fundamental in the analysis of many applications in operations
management, communication networks and other domains. There has been very little
known about the structural properties of models with advanced reservations, and we
believe that our work could open new opportunities to analyze additional models.
The models. There is a single pool of resources of integer capacity C that is used to
satisfy the demands of M different classes of customers. The customers of each class
arrive according to an independent Poisson process with a specific class-dependent
rate. Each customer requests to reserve one unit of the capacity for a specified service
time interval in the future according to her class.
Consider a customer of class-k arrives at the system at some random time, re-
questing to reserve a service time interval in the future. The time between her arrival
and her requested start of service is distributed according to a reservation distri-
bution, while her service time is distributed according to a service distribution. In
this model, we assume that the reservation distribution and the service distribution
are arbitrary discrete distributions that could be correlated per each customer, but
are independent of the arrival process and between customers. If the request is ac-
commodated, then upon the arrival of each customer a decision is made whether to
accommodate the request. During the time a customer is served, the requested unit
cannot be used by any other customer; after the service is over, the unit becomes
available again to serve other customers. If the resource is reserved, the customer
pays a class-dependent revenue rate per unit of service time. The resource can be
reserved for an arriving customer only if upon her arrival there is at least one unit of
capacity that is available (i.e., not reserved) throughout her requested service interval
in the future. Specifically, a customer's request can be satisfied if the maximum num-
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ber of already reserved resources over the requested service interval is smaller than
the capacity C. However, customers can be rejected even if there is available capacity.
Rejecting a customer now possibly enables serving more profitable customers in the
future. Customers whose request is not reserved upon arrival are lost and leave the
system. The goal is to find a feasible admission policy that maximizes the expected
long-run revenue rate.
Like many stochastic optimization models, one can formulate this problem using
a dynamic programming approach. However, even in special cases (e.g., no advanced
reservations allowed and with exponentially distributed service times), the resulting
dynamic program seems computationally intractable because the corresponding state
space grows very fast. This is known as the curse of dimensionality. Thus, finding
provably good policies is a very challenging task.
Our contributions. The contributions of this chapter are two-fold. First, we em-
ploy a simple knapsack linear program (LP) to devise a conceptually simple policy
that is called the class selection policy (CSP). The optimal solution of the LP guides
the policy regarding which classes of customers should be admitted service and which
ones should be declined service. A similar policy has been analyzed before by Levi
and Radovanovic (2010) for models without advanced reservations that are signifi-
cantly easier. In fact, the analysis in Levi and Radovanovic (2010) does not carry
through to models with advanced reservations. Instead, we develop an entirely new
analysis that shows the policy performs provably near-optimal in the Halfin-Whitt
heavy-traffic regime (C = p + 3#/p + o(p) - oc, where 3 > 0 is a scaling factor.)
In particular, the CSP is guaranteed to obtain at least <b(#) of the optimal long-run
revenue in the Halfin-Whitt regime, respectively. (Note that <b(.) is the cumulative
density function of a standard norminal. Thus, <b(#) approaches 1 when # is large.)
Moreover, we propose a modified version of CSP that is guaranteed to asymptotically
obtain 1 - e fraction of the optimal revenue, for every fixed e > 0.
Secondly, the analysis approaches we develop are based on modeling the prob-
lem as a loss network system with advanced reservations (specifically, a M/G/C/C
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loss system with advanced reservations). These models are concerned with the set-
ting in which customers arrive to the system according to a stochastic process and
are being served as long as there is available capacity. Customers who find a fully
utilized system are lost (see, for example, the survey paper by Kelly (1991)). We
are able to derive explicit upper bounds on the steady state blocking probability, i.e.,
the probability that a random customer at steady state will find a fully utilized sys-
tem, and analyze them asymptotically in the above regimes. To the best of our
knowledge, there have been very few successful attempts to characterize the blocking
probabilities for loss network models with advanced reservations (see, for example,
Coffman-Jr et al. (1999) and Lu and Radovanovic (2007a) that studied several special
cases). The assumptions in our model are fairly general: a time-homogeneous Pois-
son arrival process. a general finite discrete service distribution and a general finite
discrete reservation distribution. Models with advanced reservations are significantly
harder to analyze than those without advanced reservations. One of the major dif-
ficulties in models with advanced reservations is the fact that a randomly arriving
customer effectively observes a nonhomogencous Poisson process that is induced by
the already reserved service intervals. Moreover, analyzing the blocking probability
of an arriving customer requires considering the entire requested service interval in-
stead of the instantaneous load of the system. Analyzing the load over an interval
immediately introduces correlation that is challenging to analyze. The upper bound
on the blocking probability is obtained by considering an identical system with in-
finite capacity, where all customers are admitted (a M/G/oo system with advanced
reservations). The probability of having more than C customers reserved in the in-
finite capacity system provides an upper bound on the blocking probability in the
original system; we call this the virtual blocking probability. Through an innovative
reduction to a random walk setting, we obtain an exact analytical expression for this
virtual blocking probability and then analyze it asymptotically. The analysis of the
virtual blocking probability is tight and constitutes a contribution for the analysis of
M/G/oo systems with advanced reservations.
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Chapter 3: Joint-ventures in Operations Management
A proliferation of joint ventures has been witnessed across the globe since last decade
(see Bamford et al. (2004)). A joint venture is when two or more business partners
pool their resources and expertise to achieve a particular goal for a contractual pe-
riod of time. Joint ventures stand in the middle ground between non-cooperative
competition and merging. They provide companies with the opportunities to gain
new capacity and expertise, enter related businesses or new geographic markets, gain
new technological knowledge access to greater resources, and share risks with other
venture partners.
The models. We consider settings where n players take part in a joint venture of
capacity pooling seeking to satisfy random demand. Each player contributes one type
of resource. We distinguish two types of resource pooling in joint ventures, depending
on whether the resources are heterogeneous or homogeneous. When resources are
heterogeneous, they are not substitutable. Thus, the effective capacity of a joint
venture is limited to the the minimum level of resource contributed among all the
players. In other words, the lowest contribution by one player becomes the bottleneck
in planning the capacity for the joint venture. On the other hand, when resources are
homogeneous, the resources pooled from all the entities are perfectly substitutable
and the overall effective capacity of the joint venture is determined by summing up
the individual contributions.
Consider n players building capacity (according to the different resource pooling
schemes) to meet stochastic demand in a newsvendor-type setting. That is, stochastic
demand is satisfied by the pooled capacity to the maximum extent possible. Each
satisfied unit of demand incurs a revenue. Revenue-sharing contracts are very common
in practice, whereby each player receives a fixed fraction of the expected collective
revenue. The profit of each player is the fraction of the revenue allocated to her minus
the cost. In addition, each player incurs a cost that is convex and increasing in her
investment level.
For a. pre-fixed revenue-sharing contract, we examine the capacity investment
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problem by using the concepts of Nash equilibrium from non-cooperative game the-
ory and also Nash Bargaining Solution from cooperative game theory. These are
compared to the system optimum that is obtained if all the players would act as one
centrally coordinated unit. We are interested in finding an optimal revenue-sharing
contract that aligns the selfish objectives and incentives of the n separate players
and induces the system optimum. We also quantity the loss of efficiency (price of
anarchy) if such a contract does not exist. Finally we study the setting in which both
the revenue sharing and capacity investments are negotiated simultaneously.
Our contributions We have shown that in joint ventures with heterogeneous re-
source pooling, any Nash equilibrium induces an equal contribution from every player,
despite of them being asymmetric. The intuition is that since the revenue received
by each player depends solely on the bottleneck capacity (minimum capacity con-
tributed by some single player) when resource-sharing is heterogeneous, any further
investment beyond the bottleneck capacity only increases her cost and decreases her
profit.
Although multiple Nash equilibria could exist, we show that there always exists
a unique Strong Nash equilibrium. Next, we focus on a Nash Bargaining model
which is a natural framework to define and design fair assignment of the capacity
investment levels between multiple players. We conclude that there exists a unique
revenue sharing contract such that the corresponding Nash Bargaining Solution, the
Strong Nash equilibrium, and the system optimal solution coincide. This revenue
sharing contract indicates that the award each party receives must be equal to the
ratio of her marginal cost to the total marginal cost bore by all partners evaluated at
the optimal investment level.
For joint ventures with homogeneous resource pooling, we first prove some struc-
tural properties on the effective capacity under any demand distribution with convex
costs. The analysis is challenging as the investment of each player could only be
determined by solving a system of implicit equations. We show that joint venture al-
ways underinvests as the effective capacity is always lower than that of a coordinated
24
setting.
We then focus on quadratic-linear cost functions and show that, through an
intercept-argument, the effective capacity in a joint venture with respect to any rev-
enue sharing ratio is at least 1/n of the optimal level. Moreover, the ratio between
the capacity level could be upper bounded in terms of the cost asymmetry between
the two players and the revenue sharing ratio. While we show that there does not
exist a fixed marginal revenue sharing contract which can coordinate the players, we
propose an interval for the revenue sharing ratio which induces an outcome that is
guaranteed to achieve at least 50% of the optimal profit for a 2-player model. This
interval depends on the cost asymmetry between the two players and the demand
concentration.
Next, we consider general convex cost in the homogeneous resource pooling model
with an arbitrary number of asymmetric players. We show that a lower bound to the
efficiency of the original setting with the nonlinear convex costs is that of a modified
setting with linear costs, where the coefficients are equal to the marginal cost of each
player evaluated at the Nash equilibrium of the original problem. As a result, we
show that the comparative analysis on profit can be reduced to analyze the joint
investment level made in the Nash and the system in the setting with linear costs.
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Chapter 2
Stochastic Lot-sizing Problems
2.1 Introduction
In this paper, we develop new provably near-optimal algorithms for stochastic in-
ventory control models with fixed costs, general demand distributions and dynamic
forecast updates. Fixed costs arise in many real-life scenarios, and reflect the fact that
ordering, production and transportation in large quantities lead to economies of scales.
Specifically, we study several general variants of the classical stochastic lot-sizing prob-
lem. Finding optimal policies in these settings is often computationally intractable.
Instead, we develop new algorithmic approaches that yield a 3-approximation, i.e.,
they have a worst-case performance guarantee of 3. This implies that the algorithms
are guaranteed to have expected cost at most three times the optimal expected cost,
regardless of the input instance.
2.1.1 Contributions
The new algorithmic and performance analysis approaches that are developed in this
paper depart from the previous work of Levi et al. (2007), and provide multi-fold
contributions to the study of stochastic inventory control as well as more generally
to the design and analysis of randomized algorithms. The paper extends the recent
stream of work to develop cost-balancing algorithmic techniques for computationally
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challenging multi-period stochastic inventory control problems. This stream of work
has been initiated by Levi et al. (2007) and subsequent work ( Levi et al. (2005,
2008a, 2007, 2008d)), which primarily studied stochastic inventory control problems
with no fixed costs. The conceptual idea underlying cost-balancing based algorithms
is a repeated attempt to balance opposing costs, for example, in models without fixed
ordering cost one seeks to balance the cost of over-ordering (holding cost) and the cost
of under-ordering (backlogging cost) based on the notion of marqinal cost accounting
schemes ( Levi et al. (2005, 2007, 2008d)) (see also the discussion in Section 2.4.1).
The existence of fixed costs adds a third nonlinear component to the cost, and
makes the cost balancing more subtle. Levi et al. (2007) did study a very special
case of the model studied in this paper, in which orders arrive instantaneously and
demand in each period is known deterministically at the beginning the period before
the ordering decision is made. They proposed the triple-balancing policy that aims to
balance the fixed ordering cost, the holding cost and the backlogging cost over each
time interval between consecutive orders. Their policy is a 3-approximation. However,
the algorithm and the worst-case analysis can be applied effectively only to models,
in which there is no lag, commonly called lead time, from when an order is placed
until it arrives. In fact, in models with positive lead times the assumption in Levi
et al. (2007) is equivalent to knowing deterministically the cumulative demand over
the lead time. This is clearly a very restrictive assumption, since in many scenarios
forecasting the demand over the lead time is the major challenge. Moreover, in Section
2.3.2, we show that if this assumption does not hold, the triple-balancing policy can
perform arbitrarily worse than an optimal policy. This stands in contrast to most
of the analytical work done on inventory models with backlogged demand, for which
the extensions from models with no lead time to models with positive lead time are
often immediate.
To address the nonlinearity induced by the fixed costs, a novel randomized deci-
sion rule is employed to balance the expected fixed ordering costs, holding costs and
backlogging costs, in each period. In particular, the order quantity in each period
is decided based on a carefully designed randomized rule that chooses among vari-
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ous possible order quantities with carefully chosen probabilities. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first randomized policy proposed for stochastic inventory con-
trol policies. Levi et al. (2007) used a straightforward randomized rule for the model
with no fixed costs, but merely as a 'rounding' technique to address the constraint to
order in integer quantities. Unlike the triple-balancing policy that balances the costs
over intervals, the newly randomized policy balances the costs in each period. Like
the triple-balancing policy, the randomized cost-balancing policy proposed in this pa-
per has a worst-case guarantee of 3, but this holds under very general assumptions,
i.e., general demand distributions and positive lead times . The worst-case perfor-
mance analysis of the randomized policy employs several fundamental new ideas that
depart from the previous work of Levi et al. (2007). Like the previous work, the anal-
ysis is based on an amortization of the cost incurred by the balancing policy against
the cost of an optimal policy. However, all of the previous work is entirely based
on sample-path arguments. In contrast, the analysis in this paper is based on more
subtle averaging arguments. We believe that the new algorithmic and analysis tech-
niques developed in this paper will turn out to be effective in the design of provably
near-optimal algorithms for other stochastic inventory control problems.
Our proposed randomized policies can be parameterized to create a broader class
of policies. A simulation based optimization is used to find the 'best' parameters
for a given instance of the problem. This preserves the same worst-case guarantees.
Moreover, relatively extensive computational experiments that we conducted indicate
that it typically leads to near-optimal policies that perform empirically within few
percentages of optimal, significantly better than the worst-case performance guaran-
tees.
In addition, the work in this paper contributes to the body of work on randomized
algorithms. The last two decades have witnessed a tremendous growth in the area
of randomized algorithms. During this period, randomized algorithms went from
being a tool in computational number theory to finding widespread applications in
other fields, such as data structures, geometric algorithms, graph algorithms, number
theory, enumeration, parallel algorithms, approximation algorithms and online algo-
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rithms. Part of the reason why randomized algorithms are attractive is the fact that
they are usually conceptually simple and computationally fast. Randomized decision
rules have been used extensively to obtain approximation algorithms with worst-case
guarantees for many deterministic NP-hard optimization problems, including several
examples of deterministic inventory management problems (see for example, Teo and
Bertsimas (1996); Levi et al. (2008c)). In addition, randomized decision rules are
very common in the field of online algorithms (see Borodin and El-Yaniv (1998)),
in which there are used to obtain algorithms with competitive ratios. However, in
spite of the increasing use of randomized algorithms, there have been relatively few
successful attempts to incorporate randomized decision rules to obtain algorithms
for multistage stochastic control problems. Rust (1997) proposed random versions of
successive approximations and multi-grid algorithms for computing approximate so-
lutions to Markovian decision problems. Prandini et al. (1999) designed a randomized
algorithm to obtain an estimate of the probability of aircraft conflict. Bouchard et al.
(2005) studied a maturity randomization technique for approximating optimal con-
trol problems to price American put options. Shmoys and Talwar (2008) proposed
a randomized 4-approximation algorithm of the a priori Traveling Salesman Prob-
lem. Shmoys and Swamy (2006b) gave a fully polynomial randomized approximation
scheme for solving 2-stage stochastic integer optimization problems. However, the
techniques developed in this paper are different and we believe they have a promising
potential to apply in other multistage stochastic optimization models.
2.1.2 Literature review
The dominant paradigm in most of the existing literature has been to formulate
stochastic inventory control problems (including the models studied in this paper)
using a dynamic programming framework. This approach turned out to be effective
in characterizing the structure of optimal policies. For many of these models, it can
be shown that state-dependent (s, S) policies are optimal. The ordering decision in
each period is driven by two thresholds. Specifically, an order is placed if and only
if the inventory level falls below the threshold s. In addition, if an order is placed
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the inventory level is brought up to the threshold S. The thresholds s and S are
determined based on the state of the system at the beginning of the period. Scarf
(1960) and Veinott (1966) have established the optimality of (s. S) policies in models
with independent demands. Clieng and Sethi (1997) have extended the optimality
proof to exogenous Markov-modulated demands that capture cycles and seasonality
to some extent. Callego and Ozer (2001) have shown that (s, S) policies are optimal
under advance demand information, a demand model that allows correlation and
forecast updates.
Unfortunately, the rather simple forms of these optimal policies do not usually lead
to efficient algorithms for computing the optimal policies. There are very few cases, in
which there are efficient algorithms to compute the optimal policies. Federgruen and
Zipkin (1984) proposed an algorithm to compute the optimal stationary (s. S) policy
in a model with infinite horizon and independent and identically distributed demands.
Federgruen and Zheng (1991) described a simple and efficient algorithm to compute
the infinite horizon optimal policy in a continuous-reviewed system with demand that
is generated by a renewal process. (In this setting, (s, S) policies are equivalent to
(R., Q) policies, in which one places an order of Q units, whenever the inventory level
drops below U.) For other more complex variants of the model, there are currently
no known exact algorithms, but only heuristics. Bollapragada and Morton (1999)
proposed a simple myopic policy, assuming that the demands in different periods have
the same form of distribution function with the same coefficient of variation but with
different means. Gavirneni (2001) designed an efficient heuristic to compute (s. S)
policies for nonstationary and capacitated model. Song and Zipkin (1993) considered
uncapacitated models with exogenous Markov-modulated Poisson demand. They
developed an algorithm to compute the optimal (s, S) policy using a modified value
iteration approach. However, they impose strong assumptions on the structure and
the size of the state space of the underlying Markov process. Gallego and Ozer (2001)
and Ozer and Wei (2004) considered uncapacitated and capacitated inventory models
with advance demand information, respectively. They proposed backward induction
algorithms to numerically solve problems with a relatively short planning horizon,
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and conducted computational experiments to study the impact of advance demand
information on the optimal policy. (In the computational experiments in Section
5, we have applied the newly proposed policies to the instances they considered.)
Guan and Miller (2008b) proposed an exact and polynomial-time algorithm for the
uncapacitated stochastic economic lot-sizing problem if the stochastic programming
scenario tree is polynomially representable. Guan and Miller (2008a) extended these
algorithms to allow backlogging. Huang and Kiigkyavuz (2008) considered similar
problems with random lead times. These models allow stochastic and correlated
demands. The main limitation comes from the fact that the number of nodes in the
stochastic programming scenario tree (the size of input) is likely to be exponentially
large in the size of the planning horizon. To the best of our knowledge, all of the
existing heuristics and algorithms, either lack any performance guarantees or can be
applied under restrictive assumptions on the demand distributions or the input size.
2.2 The Periodic-Review Stochastic Lot-Sizing In-
ventory Control Problem
In this section, we provide the mathematical formulation of the stochastic lot-sizing
inventory control problem. We consider a finite planning horizon of T periods indexed
t = 1,..., T. The demands over these periods are random variables, denoted by
D...., D, and the goal is to coordinate a sequence of orders over the planning
horizon to satisfy these demands with minimum cost. As a general convention, from
now on we will refer to a random variable and its realization using capital and lower
case letters, respectively. Script font is used to denote sets.
In each period t = 1,. . . T, four types of costs are incurred, a per-unit ordering
cost ct for ordering any number of units at the beginning of period t, a per-unit holding
cost ht for holding excess inventory from period t to t + 1, a per-unit backlogging
penalty bt that is incurred for each unsatisfied unit of demand at the end of period
t, and a fixed ordering cost K that is incurred in each period with strictly positive
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ordering quantity. Unsatisfied units of demand are usually called backorders. Each
unit of unsatisfied demand incurs a per-unit backlogging penalty cost bt in each period
I until it is satisfied. In addition, we consider a model with a lead time of L periods
between the time an order is placed and the time at which it actually arrives. We
assume that the lead time is a known integer L. Following the discussion in Levi
et al. (2007), we assume without loss of generality that the discount factor is equal
to 1, and that ct = 0 and ht, bt 2 0, for each t.
At the beginning of each period s, we observe what is called an information
set denoted by f. The information set f, contains all of the information that is
available at the beginning of time period s. More specifically, the information set f.
consists of the realized demands di. . . , d,_ 1 over the interval [1, s), and possibly some
exogenous information denoted by (wi, .... w,). The information set f, in period s
is one specific realization in the set of all possible realizations of the random vector
F
, 
- (D 1 , .. D 1 , W1, ... , W,). The set of all possible realizations is denoted by
,F,. The observed information set f, induces a given conditional joint distribution
of the future demands (D ,..., DT). For ease of notation, Dt will always denote the
random demand in period t according to the conditional joint distribution in some
period s < t, where it will be clear from the context to which period s it refers. The
index t will be used to denote a general time period, and s will always refer to the
current period. The only assumption on the demands is that for each s = 1,..., T,
and each f. E F,, the conditional expectation E[Dt I f,] is well defined and finite for
each period t > s. In particular, we allow non-stationary and correlation between the
demands in different periods.
The goal is to find an ordering policy that minimizes the overall expected dis-
counted fixed ordering cost, holding cost and backlogging cost. We consider only
policies that are nonanticipatory, i.e., at time s, the information that a feasible pol-
icy can use consists only of f, and the current inventory level. The superscripts PL
and OPT will be used to refer to a given feasible policy PL and an optimal policy,
respectively.
Given a feasible policy PL, the dynamics of the system are described using the
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following notation. Let D[,,t] to denote the cumulative demand over the interval
[s, t], i.e., D[s,t] - = , Dj.In addition, let NIJ denote the net inventory at the end
of period /. Thus, NI+ = max(NIt, 0) and NI- = max(- NIt,0) are net holding
inventory and net backlog quantities in period t, respectively. Since there is a lead
time of L periods, one also considers the inventory position of the system, which
is the sum of all outstanding orders plus the current net inventory. Let Xt be the
inventory position at the beginning of period t before the order in period t is placed,
i.e., X Nh:=  _1 + L Q (for t = 1, . . . , T), where Qj denotes the number of
units ordered in period j. Similarly, let Y be the inventory position after the order in
period [ is placed, i.e., Y = Xt + Qt. Note that for every possible policy PL, once the
information set ft E Ft is given, the values nit-, x and yt are known, where these
are the realizations of NJta, Xt and Y, respectively. At the end of each period t,
the costs incurred are htNIt+ holding cost and btNI- backlogging cost. In addition,
if the order quantity Qt > 0, then the fixed ordering cost K is incurred. Thus, the
total cost of a feasible policy PL is
~ 
2PL ->3(hNJPL + N PL + t K (QPL > 0)) (2.1)W(PL) (htN~tu+ +btNI L + K -1Qt
t= 1
2.3 Triple-Balancing Policy - Bad Example
In this section, we briefly discuss the triple-balancing policy proposed by Levi et al.
(2007) for a special case of the stochastic lot-sizing problem. The discussion sheds
light on the limitation of this policy, and motivates the newly proposed randomized
cost-balancing policy discussed in section 5. Levi et al. (2007) considered a model
in which in each period / - 1,. . . , T, conditioning on some information set ft E t,
the conditional distribution of future demands (Dt,.. . , DT) is such that the demand
Dt is known deterministically (i.e., with probability one). This implies that the
order in period t is placed after the demand in that period is already known. The
underlying assumption here is that at the beginning of period t, our forecast for
the demand in that period is sufficiently accurate, so that we can assume that it is
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given deterministically. A primary example is make-to-order systems. However, this
assumption does not hold if there is a positive lead time and one considers Dt+L
instead.
2.3.1 Description of the policy
First we briefly discuss the original triple-balancing policy in Levi et al. (2007), de-
noted by TB. This policy is based on the following two rules.
(I) When to order. At the beginning of period t, let s be the last period in which
an order is placed before t. An order is placed in period t if and only if by not placing
it in period t, the cumulative backlogging cost over the interval (s, t] will exceed K.
Once a new order is placed, s is updated to be equal to t. Observe that since, at
the beginning of each period t, the conditional joint distribution of future demands
is such that Dt is known deterininistically, this procedure is well-defined. Notice that
an optimal policy will never incur any backlogging costs in a period when an order is
placed, since the cumulative backlog quantities are known prior to placing the order.
(II) How much to order. Suppose that an order is placed in period t < T. Focus
on the holding cost incurred by the units ordered in period t over the interval [t, T].
The order is set to the maximum quantity q[, such that the conditional expected
marginal holding cost incurred does not exceed K. (The exact definition of marginal
holding cost is provided in Section 4.1.)
Worst-case Analysis. The analysis in Levi et al. (2007) showed that the triple-
balancing policy has a worst-case performance guarantee of 3. In particular, one
can show that, for each time interval between two consecutive orders of the triple-
balancing policy, the expected cost incurred by an optimal policy over that interval
is at least one-third of the expected cost incurred by the triple-balancing policy over
the same interval. However, this is only valid under the restrictive assumptions of no
lead times and period demand known at the beginning of the period.
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If the period demand is not known at the beginning of the period (or there is a
positive lead time), then (I) above is enforced on expectation. It turns out that this
policy can perform arbitrarily bad compared to an optimal policy and does not have
a worst-case performance guarantee where the assumptions are dropped. As a result
this policy may not be applicable in more general and realistic settings. The example
that shows this fact is discussed in section 3.2.
2.3.2 A bad example
The triple-balancing policy can be applied in general settings and one might hope
to obtain a worst-case performance guarantee in general. However, the following
example shows that such guarantee fails to exist in general. Consider the following
instance with infinite horizon T = oc, let ht - h = 0, b= b = 1, Vt E Z+, L = 1 and
K E Z+, and
AK with probability
Dt = A K(2.2)
0 otherwise
where c is a positive number satisfying 0 < e < K. Moreover, the demand drops to 0
in all periods after the first positive demand. Note that the per-unit holding cost is
h = 0, and therefore there is no penalty for holding extra units in the inventory. The
optimal policy orders AK units at the beginning of period 1. The demand AK will
eventually come in some period with probability 1. Thus, the optimal cost incurs fixed
ordering K only. However, if no demand has arrived, the cumulative backlogging cost
is 0, and the expected backlogging cost upon not ordering is K - E. This implies that
the policy does not place any orders before the positive demand AK occurs. Thus, the
policy incurs a cost of K + AK. If we let A -a oc, the cost ratio goes to 0G, indicating
that the triple-balancing policy can perform arbitrarily bad compared to the optimal
cost, and does not admit a worst-case guarantee. This example illustrates that the
policy fails to make a good ordering decision, when there is a potential impulse in
demand with a positive but small probability. Thus, the policy may incur potentially
a very high backlogging cost.
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2.4 Randomized Cost-Balancing Policy
One of the difficulties in the stochastic lot-sizing problem is the need to balance the
nonlinear fixed ordering cost against the backlogging cost that may have large spikes
because of the variability of the demands. The new policy we propose aims to strike a
better balance between these costs by randomization. The policy is called randomized
cost-balancing policy. To strike this balance the policy employs randomized decision
rules. That is, in each period, the decision whether to order and how much to order
is based on a suitably chosen randomized decision rule; the policy chooses among
various order quantities with certain respective probabilities. Before the description
of the new policy, we briefly discuss a marginal cost accounting scheme that is used to
employ the policy. This cost accounting scheme was introduced by Levi et al. (2007).
2.4.1 Marginal cost accounting scheme
Following Levi et al. (2007), we next describe an alternative cost accounting scheme
that is called marginal cost accounting scheme. Unlike (2.1) that decomposes the
cost by periods, the main idea underlying this approach is to decompose the cost by
decisions. That is, the decision in period t is associated with all costs that, after that
decision is made, become unaffected by any future decision, and are only affected by
future demands. This may include costs in subsequent periods.
Focus first on the holding costs and assume, without loss of generality, that units in
inventory are consumed on a first-ordered first-consumed basis. This implies that the
overall holding cost of the q, units ordered in period s (i.e., the holding cost they incur
over the entire horizon [s, TI) is a function only of future demands, and is unaffected by
any future decisions. Specifically. the total marginal holding cost associated with the
decision to order qs units in period s is defined to be Ejs+L hi (q- (D,, -z)+)+
Note that at the time the order q, is made, the inventory position x. is already
known and indeed the marginal holding cost is just a function of future demands.
In addition, once the order in period s is determined, the backlogging cost a lead
time ahead in period s + L, i.e., bs+L (D[s,s+L] - (Xs+L + qs))+, is also affected only
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by the future demands. This leads to a marginal cost accounting scheme. For each
feasible policy PL, let HFL be the holding cost incurred by the Q/L units ordered
in period I (for I = 1, .. , T) over the interval [t, T], and let fPL be the backlogging
cost associated with period t, i.e., the cost incurred a lead time ahead in period t + L
(t = 1 - L, .. ., T - L). That is,
T
HPL = Ht(QfL) = h (QPL - (Dit,j] - X+ (2.3)
j=t+L
U PL fit(QPL) = bt+L (D[t,t+L - (Xt + QfL))±+ (2.4)
Let %(PL) be again the cost of the policy PL. Clearly, we have
0 T-L
W(PL) = 3 yjPL + (-,o] +H( (K 1(QrL > 0) + H/)L P urL) (2.5)
t=1-L t=1
where H(_oo,ol denotes the total expected holding cost incurred by units ordered be-
fore period 1. We note that the first two expressions Et HfL and H(_o are
not affected by any decision (i.e., they are the same for any feasible policy and each
realization of the demands) and, therefore, we will omit them. Since they are nonneg-
ative, this will not affect our approximation results. Also, observe that without loss
of generality, we can assume that QPL HL= 0 for any policy PL in each period
t - T - L + 1,... , T, since nothing ordered in these periods can be used within the
given planning horizon. We now can write the effective cost of a policy PL as
T-L
W(PL) = (K. 1(Qft >0) + HfL L (26)
t-=1
2.4.2 Description of the policy
To describe the new policy, we modify the definition of the information set ft to also
include the randomized decisions of the randomized balancing policy up to period
t - 1. Thus, given the information set ft, the inventory position at the beginning of
period t is known. However, the order quantity in period t is still unknown because
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the policy randomizes among various order quantities. We denote the randomized
cost-balancing policy by RB. The decision in each period, whether to order and how
much to order, is based on the following quantities.
" Compute the balancing quantity 4t which balances the conditional expected
marginal holding cost incurred by the units ordered against the conditional
expected backlogging cost in period t + L. That is, St solves
[HRB() fl FIRB(4t) Ift] ,(2.7)
E (Ht I ft]=E(UBt t, -
where II/B and flRB are defined as in Section 4.1, respectively. Let Ot = Ot(ft) 
E[IH 4B(t) t] = Ej[UB(S) ft] denote the balancing cost. The solution to
(2.7) is unique and can be computed efficiently via bi-section search (Levi et al.
(2007)).
" Compute the holding-cost-K quantity 4t that solves E[HB( jt) ft] = K, i.e.,
4t is the order quantity that brings the conditional expected marginal hold-
ing cost to K. Note that ijt can be computed readily since E[//B(' t] is
monotonically increasing.
* Compute E[HfB(qt) ft], i.e., the resulting conditional expected backlogging
cost in period t + L if one orders the holding-cost-K quantity 4t units in period
t.
* Compute E [UHB(0) ft], i.e., the conditional expected backlogging cost in
period I + L resulting from not ordering in period I.
Based on the above quantities computed, the following randomized rule is used in
each period t. Let Pt denote our ordering probability which is a priori random. With
the observed information set ft, the ordering probability pt = Pt I ft in period t is
defined differently in the two cases below.
39
Case (I)
If the balancing cost exceeds K, i.e., Ot > K, the RB policy orders the balancing
quantity qftB = 4t with probability pt 1. The intuition is that when Ot > K, the
fixed ordering cost K is less dominant compared to marginal holding and backlogging
costs. Moreover, if the RB policy does not place an order, the conditional expected
backlogging cost is potentially large. Thus, it is worthwhile to order the balancing
quantity qt? - qt with probability pt = 1.
Case (II)
If the balancing cost is less than K, i.e., Ot < K, the RB policy orders the holding-
cost-K quantity (i.e.. q 4t = ) with probability pt and nothing with probability
1 - pt. That is,
qB _ f with probability pt (2.8)
0, with probability 1 - pt
The probability pt is computed by solving the following equation
ptK - pt - E [FB(4t) ft] + (1 ~ pt) -ELYIB(0) ft (2.9)
The underlying reason behind the choice of this particular randomization in (2.9)
is that the policy perfectly balances the three types of costs, namely, the marginal
holding cost, the marginal backlogging cost and the fixed ordering cost associated
with the period t. In particular, since we order the holding-cost-K quantity with
probability pt and nothing with probability 1 - pt, the conditional expected marginal
holding cost in this case is
E[HB (qB) t ptE[HB t ft] + (1 ~ Pt)E[HPB t ptK. (2.10)
By the construction of pt in (2.9), the conditional expected backlogging cost is
E[URB (qPB) ft] ptEH1RB (4t) ft] + (1 - pt)E[1-ItRB(0) ft] = ptK. (2.11)
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Since pt is the ordering probability in Case (II), the expected fixed ordering cost is
ptK. It can be shown that (2.9) has the following solution,
E[IIRB(0) 1 ft]0 < Pt E ft < 1. (2.12)
-EK - E[fJB(Qt) ft] + E[11JfB (0) ft]
The inequalities in (2.12) follows from the fact that Ot < K and 4t > 4t, which implies
that E[HfIB (4t) I ft] < E[FJHR(dt) I ft] - t < K. Figure 2-1 illustrates how the RB
policy computes the ordering probability pt in Case (II) where Ot < K.
This concludes the description of the RB policy. In the next section, we shall
show that the RB policy has an expected worst-case performance guarantee of 3.
Cost )kmarginal holding cos Cost)k
E n(0) ftj Etn(0)|fti
marginal backlogging cost Pt E [ n(q) Ift]+ (1-Pt)E [ n(o)| fti
K ------ ------------------------------ K ----------- ------------------------
Pt K
E n(q)|Ift=------------ - -- - - - - -- - ---- E n(q)| ft -------- ----------------------------
holdin6-cost-K quantity
0 balancing holding-cost-K Size of order (q) 0 pt Probability
Figure 2-1: A graphical depiction of how the RB policy computes the probability of
ordering pt when the balancing cost 0 is below the fixed ordering cost K (Case (II)).
2.4.3 Worst-case analysis
To obtain a 3-approximation, one wishes to show that on expectation the cost of an
optimal policy can 'pay' for at least one-third of the expected cost of the randomized
cost-balancing policy. The periods are decomposed into subsets in which we will
define explicitly. For certain well-behaved subsets, we want to show that the holding
and backlogging costs incurred by an optimal policy can 'pay' for one-third of the
cost incurred by the RB policy. The difficulty arises in analyzing the remaining
subset of problematic periods, for which it is not a priori clear how to 'pay' for their
cost. These problematic periods are further partitioned into intervals defined by each
two consecutive orders placed by the optimal policy. It can be shown that the total
41
expected cost incurred by the RB policy in problematic periods within each interval,
does not exceed 3K. This implies that the fixed ordering cost incurred by an optimal
policy can 'pay' on expectation one-third of the cost incurred by the randomized cost-
balancing policy in problematic periods. Next we discuss the details of this approach,
and we defer all proofs to Electronic Companion for ease of presentation.
Let ZPB be a random variable defined as
ZRB. q RB QRB) | Ft] -M a(B t-213Z/?:~114JJB(QB)Ft [I{IR (QRB) I U]. (2.13)
Note that ZPB is a random variable that is realized with the information set in period
t. Observe that by the construction of the RB policy, the random variable ZPB is
well-defined since the expected marginal holding costs and the expected marginal
backlogging costs are always balanced. That is, the conditional expected marginal
holding cost is always equal to the conditional expected backlogging cost. In the
following lemma we show that the expected cost of the RB policy can be upper
bounded using the ZPB variables defined in (2.13).
Lemma 2.4.1 Let W(RB) be the total cost incurred by the RB policy. Then we have,
T-L
E[W(RB)]<3- E[ZR B214
ti
To complete the worst-case analysis, we would like to show that the expected cost
of an optimal policy denoted by OPT is at least t_1 E[ZB]. This will be done
by amortizing the cost of OPT against the cost of the RB policy. In particular,
we shall show that on expectation OPT pays for a large fraction of the cost of the
RB policy. In the subsequent analysis, we will use a random partition of periods
t = {1, 2, ... T - L} to the following sets:
The set 371H O{t > 8 ; K and YOPT > YRB} consists of periods in which the
balancing cost 89 exceeds K and the optimal policy had higher inventory position
than that of the RB policy after ordering (recall that if 8t > K then the RB pol-
icy orders the balancing quantity with probability 1 and the value Yj is known
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deterministically (i.e., realized) with F).
The set in A {t : Ot 2 K and YOPT - YtB consists of periods in which the
balancing cost exceeds K and the inventory position of the optimal policy does not
exceed that of the RB policy after ordering (see the comment above regarding 31iH).
The set 2H t: Ot < K and Yt < + consists of periods in
which the balancing cost is less than K and, in such periods, the inventory posi-
tion of the RB policy after ordering would be either X/IB if no order was placed, or
X/B _ RB if the holding-cost-K quantity is ordered, depending on the randomized
decision of the RB policy. However, the inventory position of OPT after ordering ex-
ceeds even XRB + QB. (Note again that the quantity QB is known deterministically
(i.e., realized) with Ft.)
Analogous to 2H, the set 2n A {t : 8t < K and <B 2 Yf'T} consists of
periods in which the inventory position of OPT after ordering is below XJ?.
The set 2 {t <K and XB <yOPT < XB +Q } consists of peri-
ods in which the balancing cost is less than K and the inventory position of OPT
after ordering is within (XB, XB + QjB). Thus, whether the RB policy or OPT
has more inventory depends on whether the RB policy placed an order.
Note that the sets (1H - _2M) are disjoint and the union makes a complete set.
Conditioning on ft, it is already known which part of the partition period t belongs.
Next we will show that the total holding cost incurred by OPT is higher than the
marginal holding cost incurred by the RB policy in periods that belong to 1H U 2H,
and that the total backlogging cost incurred by OPT is higher than the backlogging
cost incurred by the RB policy associated with periods within 91m1 U 2n.
Lemma 2.4.2 The overall holding cost and backlogging cost incurred by OPT are
denoted by HOPT and UlOPT, respectively. Then we have, with probability 1,
HOPT > ( HyRB '_(t C $1H U 2H), HOPT > R - 1(E 1n U 2n.
Note that the periods in the set 2M introduce some uncertainties in the relation
between the inventory positions after ordering of the RB policy and OPT. Thus,
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we are unable to carry out an analysis similar to Lemma 2.4.2. For this reason, we
call Y2M a problematic set of periods. Naturally, we also define the non-problematic
set of periods to be 9N - '1H U -7 m U 2n U "2H. The analysis of the problematic
periods in the set 2M will be done in two steps. In the first step, we will conceptually
create a bank account A that will be used to pay some of the cost of the RB policy
in these problematic periods. In particular, for each period t E /2m, we borrow an
amount of ZRB from the bank account. Thus, the total amount of borrowing from
the bank is given by A = , Zt, and so E[A] = [ Z - 1(t E 2M.
The following lemma shows that, with the borrowed amount A from the bank,
the overall holding cost and backlogging cost incurred by OPT exceed ZTL E[Z?BJ.
The next step will be to show that E[A] is at most the expected fixed ordering cost
incurred by OPT. That is,
~T 
- L I( O TE[A] < E [ K1(QPT>) . (2.16)
t=1
Lemma 2.4.3 The expected holding cost and backlogging cost incurred by OPT plus
the expected amount borrowed from the bank account A are at least z_ E [ZpB]
That is, the following inequality holds
T-L
E (HOPT + HOPT ) + A] > E E [Z?B]. (2.17)
t= 1
By Lemmas 2.4.1 and 2.4.3, the overall holding and backlogging costs incurred by
OPT, plus the borrowed amount A from the bank, account on expectation for one-
third of the overall expected costs incurred by the RB policy. To complete the worst-
case analysis, we will show in Lemma 2.4.4 that the expected amount borrowed from
the bank account does not exceed the expected fixed ordering cost incurred by OPT,
i.e., E [ T-/ K. 1(QOPT > 0)]. We will highlight the key steps involved in proving
this lemma. We decompose the problematic periods in the set 2M into intervals
between ordering points of OPT, and we want to show that, for each such interval,
the fixed ordering cost K incurred by OPT will cover the expected amount borrowed
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from the bank in periods that belong to set 2M. Conditioning on f- (the entire
evoluation of the system excluding the randomized decisions of the RB policy), we
construct a decision tree based on the randomized decisions of the RB policy. We then
show that, by a tree traversal argument and Lemma 2.4.5, the expected borrowing
from the problematic nodes (which belong to the set 2m) within an interval between
ordering points of OPT does not exceed K.
Lemma 2.4.4 The following inequality holds
E[A] E K. 1I(QPT >0)1 . (2.18)
t=1 .
In other words, the expected borrowing E[A] is less than the total expected fixed or-
dering cost incurred by OPT.
Lemma 2.4.5 Let {p,} 1 satisfy the condition 0 < pi < 1 for all 1. Then the
following inequality holds,
p2 + N < 1-p)p k 51 (2.19)
1=2 S=1 (k=1
As an immediate consequence of Lemmas 2.4.3 and 2.4.4, we obtain the following
lemma and theorem.
Lemma 2.4.6 Let W(OPT) be the total cost incurred by the cost-balancing policy
RB. Then we have,
T-L
E[W(OPT)]'> E[Z B1P1[%(O(IT) ]  L-RI (2.20)
t-=1
Theorem 2.4.7 For each instance of the stochastic lot-sizing problem, the expected
cost of the randomized cost-balancing policy RB Zs at most three times the expected
cost of an optimal policy OPT, i.e.,
E[(RB)] < 3 - E[W(OPT)]. (2.21)
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2.5 Numerical Experiments
The randomized cost-balancing policies described above can be parameterized to ob-
tain general classes of policies, respectively. The worst-case analysis discussed above
can then be viewed as choosing parameter values that perform well against any pos-
sible instance. In contrast, find the 'best' parameter values, for each given instance.
This gives rise to policies that have at least the same worst-case performance guar-
antees, but are likely to work better empirically, since we can refine the parameters
according to the specific instance being solved. Using simulation based optimiza-
tion, we have implemented this approach and tested the empirical performance of
the resulting policies. The policies were tested under the model of advanced demand
information proposed by Gallego and Ozer (2001) and Ozer and Wei (2004). To the
best of our knowledge, these are the few papers that report computational results (by
brute-force backward induction algorithm) on the stochastic lot-sizing problem with
correlated demands.
2.5.1 Parameterized policies.
We describe a class of parameterized policies involving parameters 3, -y and Ti where #
controls the holding-cost-j3K quantity, -y controls the ratio of marginal holding costs
and backlogging costs and q controls the level of expected backlogging cost resulting
from not ordering.
* The balancing quantity 4t that solves E[HtB(4t t] = Y -E[rflB(4t) ft t
* The holding-cost-#K quantity q, that solves E[HB(it) | f 3 = K.
* Compute E[17"(4) I ft], and r0. E[HB ftl-
(I) If Ot > # - K, the R13 policy orders q/?B = 4 with probability pt - 1 in period
t.
(II) If O6 < 3 - K, the RB policy orders q B with probability pt and or-
der nothing with probability 1 - pt in period t, where the probability pt -
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r; [R -tIj,+r_ E [UIR t
3 - K - E [UB t t + 1[B ( t
Since T is relatively small, we also introduce an end-of-horizon rule. Suppose we are
in period t, we estimate the total expected cumulative backlogging cost (assuming no
orders are placed) over the interval [t, T]. If this amount is less than K, we do not
order in period t.
2.5.2 Experiment design
Under advance information model, the demand vector in each period I is observed as
D= (Dt,, . .. , Dt,t+N) where Dt,, represents order placed by customers during period
t for future periods s E {t,. .. , t + N} and N is the length of the information horizon
over which we have advance demand information. Note that Dt is a random vector
and is realized only at the end of period t. At the beginning of period t, the demand
to prevail in a future period s (s > t) can be divided into two parts: the observed
demand vector .- 1 D,, and the unobserved demand vector E"_, Dr,s. As a
result, this introduces a correlation between period demands (however the conditional
joint distribution of the future demands is known in each period t). The state space
of the proposed dynamic programming formulation contains the inventory position
and the observed demand vector which explodes exponentially with the length of the
information horizon N when N > L + 2. Gallego and Ozer (2001) verified some
structural properties of the dynamic program via numerical studies for a number of
small instances. The experiments that we performed expand their numerical studies
by incorporating non-zero lead times as well as longer planning horizons. Following
the methodology of Aviv and Federgruen (2001), we generated a total of 90 instances
to test the quality of the randomized-balancing heuristics compared to the optimal
cost. The instances we used have the following combination of parameters: T =
12,15, L = 0,1, 2, N = L + 2, K - 0.5,50,100, h = 1, 2, 3.6, p - 1, 3,6.9 and
(Dtt, Dt,t+1, Dt,t+2) are modeled by Poisson random variables with mean Ao, Ai, A2 .
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2.5.3 Algorithmic complexity
We describe the procedures of finding the optimal parameters for a specific instance
of the problem. First, assume that there exists a positive constant U such that the
optimal parameters #3*, f*, i* are upper bounded by U. In addition, we discretize U
with some step-size A, i.e., [3, E, [0, U] can only take values as integer multiples of
A. Then we conduct an exhaustive search on a cube of U x U x U for the parameters
/3, 'y and 7. In our numerical studies, U = 10 and A = 0.1 are chosen to be the
upper bound and the resolution for discretization, respectively. The algorithm runs
on every point on this cube, simulates the cost of each parameterized policy and
returns the best possible (#*, -y*, *) that minimize the cost. Secondly, assume that
there exists a positive constant U that serves an upper bound on the balancing and
hold-cost-K quantities. For each t = 1,... , T, the complexity for evaluating marginal
holding cost is 0(T) and the complexity for carrying out bisection search is 0(log U).
The algorithm runs in O(T2 log U), for each set of parameters (13, 'y, 77). Hence,
the algorithm that returns both the optimal parameters and the lowest cost runs
in O(U 3A-T 2 logUg) O(T2 ) since U3 A-a logg is some positive constant. For all
tested instances with T = 12, the average CPU time per test instance on a Pentium
1.58GHz PC is 233s. In contrast, the dynamic programming algorithm takes 1840s
on average per test instance.
2.5.4 Numerical results
The numerical results with (T, L) = (12. 0), (T, L) = (12, 2) and (T, L) = (15, 0) are
tabulated in Table A.1, Table A.2 and Table A.3, respectively (refer to Electronic
Companion). The (*) in both tables indicates that the designated parameters can
take arbitrary numbers without affecting the optimal values of the parameterized
policy. It is observed that (/3*. r*) = (*, *) in all instances where K = 0, since the
holding-cost-#0*K quantity is trivially 0 and therefore the algorithm only considers the
balancing quantities. In some instances where K is relatively large and the holding-
cost-/*K quantity is near-optimal, it is observed that y* = (*) implying that the
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algorithm only orders the holding-cost-#*K quantities. For the rest of instances, the
algorithm uses both the balancing quantity and the holding-cost-K quantity.
In the case where L = 0, on average the parameterized RB policy performs
within 4.6% and always within 7% of the optimal cost for T - 12,15. The numerical
results show that the performance of the parameterized RB policy is insensitive to
the planning horizon T. Moreover, the optimal parameters in the parameterized
RB policy are intuitive: # controls the quantity of each order; -y controls the ratio
in which the marginal holding cost is balanced against the marginal backlogging
cost; q controls the weight put on the do-nothing backlogging cost resulted from riot
ordering. The optimal q* = 9 coincides with the ratio of p to h, which implies that
more weight should be put on backlogging cost so that the ordering probability can
be increased. The optimal * = 2 suggests that the marginal holding cost should be
twice the backlogging cost. The optimal 3* is close to 1 when K is large, implying
that using the holding-cost-K quantity is near optimal. The unparameterized RB
policy (i.e., (#, X, q) = (1, 1, 1)) performs on average within 27% and always within
50% error of optimal cost, which is significantly better than the theoretical worst-
case performance guarantee of 3. The cost ratio is observed to be decreasing in the
magnitude of fixed ordering cost K. In the case where L = 2, the parameterized R13
policy performs on average within 10% and always within 16% error of the optimal
cost. The optimal parameters are similar to those in L = 0. The deviation from the
optimal cost is resulted from stocking more inventory units by the RB policy, as the
lead time induces more uncertainty in future demands. The unparameterized RB
policy performs within 50% (on average 29%) error of optimal cost. It is also noted
that the average CPU time of running the RB policy is insensitive to the planning
horizon T.
2.6 Capacitated Stochastic Lot-sizing Problem
We develop new algorithmic approaches to compute provably near-optimal policies for
multiperiod, uniform-capacitated, stochastic lot-sizing inventory models with stochas-
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tic, non-stationary and correlated demands that evolve over time. Our approach is
computationally efficient and guaranteed to produce a policy with worst-case perfor-
mance guarantee of 6. We also characterize a class of parameterized policies based
on this approach. Empirical studies show that these policies perform close to opti-
mal in computational experiments, which is significantly better than the worst-case
guarantees.
2.6.1 Marginal backlogging cost accounting
In capacitated model, it is no longer true that a mistake of ordering too little in the
current period can always be fixed by decisions made in the future periods. Levi,
Roundy, Shmoys and Truong Levi et al. (2008d) proposed a new backlogging cost
accounting that associates with decision of how many units to order in period t what
is called forced backlogging cost resulting from this decision in future periods.
Consider some period t. Suppose that x is the inventory position at the beginning
of period t and that the number of units ordered in period is qt < u. Let q, be the
resulting unused slack capacity in period t, i.e., qt = u - qt > 0. Focus now on some
future period s > t + L when this order arrives and becomes available. Suppose that
for some realization of the demands. We have that
d[t,,] - (xt + qt + E U) > 0. (2.22)
jG(t,s-L]
This implies that there exists a shortage in period s, and moreover, even if in each
period after period t and until period s - L the orders placed were up to the maximum
available capacity, this part of the shortage in period s would still exist and incur the
corresponding backlogging cost. The actual shortage may be even bigger and equal
to
d[t,s] - (xt + qt + q1) > 0, (2.23)
jE(t,s-L]
(recall that q < u for each period j). In other words, given our decision in period t,
this part of the shortage could not be avoided by any decision made over the interval
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(t, s - L] (clearly, any order placed after period s - L will not be available by time
s). We conclude that, if more units had been ordered in period t, then at least some
of the shortage in period s could have been avoided. More precisely, the maximum
number of units of shortage that could have been avoided by ordering more units in
period t is equal to
min t, d[ts] - (xt + qgt L U) . (2.24)
j(t,s-L]
The intuition is that by ordering more units in period t, we could have averted part
of the shortage in period s, but clearly not more than the unused slack capacity qt,
since we could not have ordered in period t more than additional qt units. In this
case, we would say that this part of the backlogging cost in period s was forced by
the decision in period 1, and hence period / is associated with a backlogging penalty
of
b, imin q, d t,, - (xt + q + ( u) . (2.25)
jE(t,s-L|
This is significantly different from the traditional backlogging cost accounting, in
which this cost would be associated with period s - L. Denote Ws,[p,t] as the back-
logging cost in period s associated with periods [1., t]. Then we can write
W. = 1min { W4,p,t], s(U - qt)} (2.26)
= Iin PS (D[t s] - (Xt + Qt + 1:u) ,P(u - Qt)}.
j=t+1
The miarginal backlogging costs that are incurred by any feasible policy P is given by
T
-i = 3 W. (2.27)
s=t+ L
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2.6.2 Description of the policy
We consider the forced marginal backlogging cost accounting and the corresponding
cost it associates with period s. let E[fB (qRB)|f,] be the expected backlogging cost
associated with period s by the forced marginal backlogging cost accounting scheme
described above, again conditioned on the observed information set fs.
The decision in each period, whether to order and how much to order, is based on
the following quantities.
" Compute the balancing quantity qt which balances the conditional expected
marginal holding cost incurred by the units ordered against the conditional
expected backlogging cost in period / + L. That is, dt solves
E[HRB(gt t] E[flRB(4t) | ft ] A Ot, (2.28)
where HPB and fJ/B are defined as in (2.4) and (2.27), respectively. Let Ot -
t(ft ) A E[HFB(Q) |ft] = E[FJB(~t t denote the balancing cost. Since
fB(u) = 0, it follows that the quantity 4t < u. The existence and uniqueness
of solution to (2.7) have been shown in Levi et al. (2008d). It has also been
shown in Levi et al. (2008d) that p, can be computed efficiently via bi-scction
search.
" Compute the holding-cost-K quantity it that solves
E[HB 4t) I ft] = K. (2.29)
That is, qt is the order quantity that brings the conditional expected marginal
holding cost to K. Since E[IIB(qt) I ftis monotone and continuous and goes
to infinity as qt goes to infinity, it is straightforward to compute i. Note that
in computing 4t, we temporarily ignore the capacity constraint u in each period
t.
* Compute the resulting conditional expected marginal backlogging cost in period
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t + L if one orders the minimum of 4t and the capacity u in period t, denoted
by #t. That is,
Ot= [fl"B(iinnfjj, a}) Ift]. (2.30)
* Compute the conditional expected marginal backlogging cost in period t + L
resulting from not ordering in period t, denoted by Vt. That is,
t0 Eflf'(0) ft]. (2.31)
Based on the above quantities computed, the following randomized rule is used in
each period t (we assume ft is the observed information set).
(I) If the balancing cost exceeds K, i.e., O6 > K, the RB policy orders the balancing
quantity qt? = 4t with probability pt = 1.
(II) If the balancing cost is less than K, i.e., Ot < K, the RB policy orders in period
t the holding-cost-K quantity (i.e., g RB = t) with probability pt and nothing
with probability 1 - pt. That is,
RB minqt, u}, with probability pt 2.32
0, with probability 1 - pt
The probability pt = pt I ft is computed by solving the following equation
ptK = ptot + (1 - pt)t. (2.33)
It can be shown that Equation (2.33) has the following solution,
0 < pt = t < 1. (2.34)
K - #t + Vt
The inequalities in Equation (2.34) follows from the fact that Ot < K and
qt > qt, which implies that #t < Ot < K. Note that pt is a priori random and
is realized with the information set ft E Ft. Following our convention we will
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use Pt to denote this a priori random probability.
This concludes the description of the RB policy. In the next section, we shall show
that the above the RB policy has an expected worst-case performance guarantee of
6. Following the same argument in the uncapacitated case, this randomized decision
rule almost balances, up to the uniform capacity constraint, the three types of costs
associated with the period.
2.6.3 Worst-case analysis
Let ZRB be a random variable defined as
zRB OBt. if 0- > K
ZRB A - (2.35)
PtK, otherwise
Note that ZRB is a random variable that is realized with the information set in period
t. In the following lemma we show that the expected cost of the RB policy can be
upper bounded using the ZPB variables defined in (2.35).
Lemma 2.6.1 Let W(RB) be the total cost incurred by the RB policy. Then we have,
T-L
E[We(RB)] < 3 - E[ZRBI.(.6
To complete the worst-case analysis, we would like to show that twice of the
expected cost of an optimal policy denoted by OPT is at least Zt. E[ZpB]. This
will be done by armotizing the cost of OPT against the cost of the RB policy. In
particular, we shall show that on expectation OPT pays for a large fraction of the
cost of the RB policy. In the subsequent analysis, we will use the following random
partition of the periods I = {1, 2,... T - L} to the following sets:
3I1H = {t Et > K and YtoPT > t }. (2.37)
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The set 31H consists of periods in which the balancing cost Ot exceeds K and the
optimal policy had higher inventory position than that of the RB policy after order-
ing (recall that if 0- > K then the RB policy orders the balancing quantity with
probability 1 and the value YtRB is realized with F).
Ji - {t : t > K and Yt < (2.38)
The set gilm consists of periods in which the balancing cost exceeds K and the in-
ventory position of the optimal policy does not exceed that of the RB policy after
ordering (see the comment above regarding 1H).
2 H t: < K and Yt RB + min R U}. (2.39)
The set 2H consists of periods in which the balancing cost is less than K and, in
such a period, the inventory position of the RB policy after ordering would be either
XPB if no order was placed, or X 1B min tB, '} if minimum of the holding-cost-K
quantity and the uniform capacity u is ordered, depending on the randomized decision
of the RB policy. However, the inventory position of OPT after ordering exceeds even
XB + min "t, u}. (Note again that the quantity Q4 B is known deterministically
(i.e., realized) with Ft.)
2n {t Ot < K and B > OPT (2.40)
Analogous to 2H, the set 2m consists of periods in which the inventory position of
OPT after ordering is below XB.
7 21 = t : Ot < K and X/?B <. (2.41)
/2M consists of periods in which the balancing cost is less than K and the inventory
position of OPT after ordering is within (XB, XRB B minW R . u}). Thus, whether
the RB policy or OPT have more inventory depends on whether the RB policy placed
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an order.
Note that the sets (2.37) - (2.41) are disjoint and the union makes a complete
set. It is also straightforward to check that conditioning on ft, it is already known
which part of the partition period t belongs.
Lemma 2.6.2 The overall holding cost
denoted by HOPT and 11OPT respectively.
and backlogging
Then we have
cost incurred by OPT are
E[HoPT ] > E (
t
E[J1OPT] > E [
t
E [ K -(QPT > 0) > E
E[HO+PT(K.(QPT >0) >
Z B1H) (2.42)
ZB_ 1(t E in U21)] (2.43)
ZR B I1(t C 2M)] (2.44)
Z/?B 2(t E g2H) . (2.45)
It can be readily verified by summing up inequalities (2.42) to (2.45) that
T2L
t= 1
(2.46)
Following (2.46) and Lemma 2.6.1, we have established that the RB policy has an
expected worst-case performance guarantee of 6.
Theorem 2.6.3 For each instance of the stochastic lot-sizing problem under uniform
capacity constraint, the expected cost of the randomized cost-balancing policy RB is
at most six times the expected cost of an optimal policy OPT, i.e.,
E[C(RB)] < 6 - E[e(OPT)]
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(2.47)
2.6.4 Numerical Experiments
The policies were tested using the demand model of advance demand information
proposed by Gallego and Ozer (2001) and Ozer and Wei (2004), similar to the coun-
terpart model without capacity constraints.
Parameterized policies. We describe a class of parameterized policies involving
parameters 3, -y and q, where / controls the holding-cost-#3K quantity, -y controls
the ratio of marginal holding costs and backlogging costs and r, controls the level of
expected backlogging cost resulting from not ordering. The parameterized policy first
computes several quantities.
* The balancing quantity qt that solves E[Ht"( t) I ft] = y -E[Ilf"(4t) I ft) 6 t.
" The holding-cost-#K quantity 4t that solves E[H/?B(4t) ft] = 0 - K.
" The resulting conditional expected backlogging cost if one orders min{it, u}
units in period t, denoted by #t. That is, #t = E[nlRB(min{jqt. u) I ft].
" The conditional expected backlogging cost resulting from not ordering in period
t, denoted by Vt. That is, Ot = - E[flIB(0) ft].
Based on the above quantities computed, the following randomized rule is used in
each period t.
(I) If t ;> # - K, the RB policy orders qf = 't with probability pt = 1 in period
I.
(II) If O6 < 3 - K, the RB policy orders q/? = min{Qt.a} with probability Pt and
order nothing with probability 1 - pt in period t. That is,
RB min{t, u}, with probability pt , (2.48)
0, with probability I - pt
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where the probability
0 < pt = ' < 1. (2.49)
< - K - pt + pt
End-of-horizon rule. To prevent the policy from over-ordering too much near the
end of horizon, we also incorporate the following end-of-horizon rule. Suppose we are
in period t, we estimate the total expected cumulative backlogging cost (assuming no
orders are placed) over the interval [t, T]. If the amount is less than K, we do not
order with probability 1 in period t.
Numerical results. We have conducted computational experiments under the cost
and demand structure used in Gallego and Ozer (2001) and ozer and Wei (2004).
In this section, we focus on the uniform capacitated model, and the empirical results
are tabulated in Table A.4. The RB policies perform around 30% of the error from
the optimal cost, which significantly better than the worst-case performance guar-
antee. The parameters embedded in the capacitated model have the same intuitive
interpretations as in the uncapacitated case.
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Chapter 3
Revenue Management of Reusable
Resources with Advanced
Reservations
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider a class of revenue management problems that arise in
systems with reusable resources and advanced reservations. This work is motivated by
both traditional and emerging application domains, such as hotel room management,
car rental management and workforce management. For instance, in hotel industries,
customers make requests to book a room in the future for a specified number of days.
This is called advanced reservation. Rooms are allocated to customers based on their
requests, and after one customer used a room it becomes available to serve other cus-
tomers. One of the major issues in these systems is how to manage capacitated pool
of reusable resources over time in a dynamic environment with many uncertainties.
In particular, one wishes to choose the most profitable customers to maximize the
resulting revenue.
Models with reusable resources and advanced reservations are typically very hard
to analyze, particularly due to the existence of advanced reservations. There has been
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relatively little related work both on finding provably good policies for these important
models and structural properties of optimal or even practically good policies. In this
chapter, we analyze the performance of conceptually and computationally simple
policies. We show that they perform provably near-optimal in the Halfin- Whitt (see
Halfin and Whitt (1981)) heavy-traffic regime. That is, the expected long-run revenue
of the policy is guaranteed to obtain at least a constant fraction of the optimal revenue
regardless of the input instance. Moreover, the analysis builds upon novel approaches
to analyze the important class of loss network models with advanced reservations. The
latter class of models is fundamental in the analysis of many applications in operations
management, communication networks and other domains. There has been very little
known about the structural properties of models with advanced reservations, and we
believe that our work could open new opportunities to analyze additional models.
3.1.1 The model
This chapter is focused on models concerning the revenue management of a single pool
of reusable resources used to serve multiple classes of customers through advanced
reservations. The details of the model are as follows. There is a single pool of resources
of integer capacity C < oo that is used to satisfy the demands of M different classes
of customers. The customers of each class k - 1,... , Al, arrive according to an
independent Poisson process with respective rate Ak. Each class-k customer requests
to reserve one unit of the capacity for a specified service time interval in the future.
Let Dk be the reservation distribution of a class-k customer, and Sk be the re-
spective service distribution with mean pk (see Figure 3-1). In particular, upon an
arrival of a class-k customer at some random time t, the customer requests to reserve
the service time interval [I + d, / + d + s], where d is distributed according to "k and
s is distributed according to Sk. Note that Dk and Sk are independent of the arrival
process and between customers; however, per customer, Dk and Sk can be correlated.
(We assume that both Dk and Sk are finite discrete distributions.) During the time
a customer is served (i.e., [t + d, t + d+ s]), the requested unit cannot be used by any
other customer; after the service is over, the unit becomes available again to serve
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other customers. If the resource is reserved, the customer pays a class-specific rate of
rk dollars per unit of service time. The resource can be reserved for an arriving cus-
tomer only if upon arrival there is at least one unit of capacity that is available (i.e.,
not reserved) throughout the entire requested interval [t + d, t + d + s]. Specifically,
a customer's request can be satisfied if the maximum number of already reserved
resources throughout the requested service interval is smaller than the capacity C.
However, customers can be rejected even if there is available capacity. Rejecting a
customer now possibly enables serving more profitable customers in the future. Cus-
toiers whose requests are not reserved upon arrival are lost and leave the system.
The goal is to find a feasible admission policy that maximizes the expected long-
run average revenue. Specifically, if R,(T) denotes the revenue achieved by policy 7
over the interval [0, T], then the expected long-run average revenue of ir is defined as
7Z(r) A lim infT,,(E[R,(T)]/T), where the expectation is taken with respect to the
probability measure induced by 7r.
Poisson rate X k reward rate rk
arrival requested service
time
Dk Sk
Figure 3-1: Reservation distributions and service distributions
Like many stochastic optimization models, one can formulate this problem using
dynamic programming approach. However, even in special cases (e.g., no advanced
reservations allowed and with exponentially distributed service times), the resulting
dynamic programs seem computationally intractable because the corresponding state
space grows very fast. This is known as the curse of dimensionality. Thus, finding
provably good policies is a challenging task.
3.1.2 Our Contributions
The contributions of this chapter are two-fold. First, we employ a simple knapsack
linear program (LP) to devise a conceptually simple policy that is called the class
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selection policy (CSP). The optimal solution of the LP guides the policy regarding
which classes of customers should be admitted service and which ones should be
declined service. A similar policy has been analyzed before by Levi and Radovanovic
(2010) for models without advanced reservations that are significantly easier. In fact,
the analysis in Levi and Radovanovic (2010) does not carry through to models with
advanced reservations. Instead, we develop an entirely new analysis that shows the
policy performs provably near-optimal under the Halfin-Whitt heavy-traffic regimes.
In the Halfin-Whitt regime C = p+#3y +o(p) -+ oc, where # > 0 is a scaling factor.
In particular, the CSP is guaranteed to obtain at least <b(#3) > i of the optimal long-
run revenue in the Halfin-Whitt regime. (Note that <b(-) is the cumulative density
function of a standard normal. Thus, <(#) approaches 1 when # is large.) Moreover,
we propose a modified version of CSP that is guaranteed to asymptotically obtain
1 - E fraction of the optimal revenue, for every fixed E > 0.
Secondly, the analysis approaches we develop are based on modeling the prob-
lem as a loss network system with advanced reservations (specifically, a A/G/C/C
loss system with advanced reservations). These models are concerned with the set-
ting in which customers arrive to the system according to a stochastic process and
are being served as long as there is available capacity. Customers who find a fully
utilized system are lost (see, for example, the survey paper by Kelly (1991)). We
are able to derive explicit upper bounds on the steady state blocking probability, i.e.,
the probability that a random customer at steady state will find a fully utilized sys-
tem, and analyze them asymptotically in the above regimes. To the best of our
knowledge, there have been very few successful attempts to characterize the blocking
probabilities for loss network models with advanced reservations (see, for example,
Coffman-Jr et al. (1999) and Lu and Radovanovic (2007a) that studied several special
cases). The assumptions in our model are fairly general: a time-homogeneous Pois-
son arrival process, a general finite discrete service distribution and a general finite
discrete reservation distribution. Models with advanced reservations are significantly
harder to analyze than those without advanced reservations. One of the major dif-
ficulties in models with advanced reservations is the fact that a randomly arriving
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customer effectively observes a nonhomogeneous Poisson process that is induced by
the already reserved service intervals. Moreover, analyzing the blocking probability
of an arriving customer requires considering the entire requested service interval in-
stead of the instantaneous load of the system. Analyzing the load over an interval
immediately introduces correlation that is challenging to analyze. The upper bound
on the blocking probability is obtained by considering an identical system with in-
finite capacity, where all customers are admitted (a M/G/oo system with advanced
reservations). The probability of having more than C customers reserved in the in-
finite capacity system provides an upper bound on the blocking probability in the
original system; we call this the virtual blocking probability. Through an innovative
reduction to a random walk setting, we obtain an exact analytical expression for this
virtual blocking probability and then analyze it asymptotically. The analysis of the
virtual blocking probability is tight and constitutes a contribution for the analysis of
AI/G/oo systems with advanced reservations.
The analysis approaches that are developed in this chapter significantly depart
from previous work, and provide multi-fold contributions to queueing theory. We
believe that these new approaches will be very effective in analyzing other important
models in operations management and other application domains.
3.1.3 Literature Review
Levi and Radovanovic (2010) used a simple knapsack-type linear program (LP) to
devise a conceptually simple admission control policy called class selection policy
(CSP) for the model in the absence of advanced reservations (i.e., customers start
service upon arrival). The optimal solution obtained by solving the LP guides the
policy to select the more profitable classes of customers. The LP provides an upper
bound on the optimal expected long-run average revenue and can be used to analyze
the performance of CSP. The analysis is based on the fact that the CSP induces a
stochastic process that can be reduced to a classical loss network model without ad-
vanced reservations. They were able to develop explicit expressions for the resulting
blocking probabilities induced by the CSP, and then showed that the CSP is guar-
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anteed to achieve at least half of the optimal long-run revenue. Also, the CSP was
shown to be asymptotically optimal when the capacity goes to infinity with no other
assumptions.
The knapsack-type LP considered by Levi and Radovanovic (2010) has been pre-
viously discussed by several other researchers (see, for example, Key (1990) and Hunt
and Laws (1997)). In fact, a variant of the CSP has been discussed by Key (1990) and
Kelly (1991), who analyzed the randomized thinning policy. Moreover, Key (1990)
has shown that the variant of the CSP for the single resource case without advanced
reservations is asymptotically optimal in the critically loaded regime. Iyengar and
Sigman (2004) have also used an identical LP to devise a heuristic called exponential
penalty function control for a finite-horizon variant. All of these works have considered
models without advanced reservations.
Loss network models without advanced reservations are well known; they were
introduced over four decades ago and have been studied extensively, primarily in
the context of communication networks (see, for example, the survey paper by Kelly
(1991)) and recently other application domains. Two of the major issues in the lit-
erature on loss networks have been the study and design of heuristics for admission
control (see, for example, Miller (1969), Ross and Tsang (1989), Key (1990), Kelly
(1991), Hunt and Laws (1997), Puhalskii and Reiman (1998), Fan-Orzechowski and
Feinberg (2006)), and the development of approximations and bounds as well as sen-
sitivity analysis of loss (blocking) probabilities with respect to input parameters and
resource capacities (see, for example, Erlang (1917), Sevastyanov (1957), Kaufman
(1981), Burman et al. (1984), Whitt (1985), Kelly (1991), Ross and Yao (1990),
Zachary (1991), Louth et al. (1994), Kumar et al. (1998) and Adelman (2006)).
However, there have been relatively few successful attempts to characterize the
blocking probabilities for the loss network models with advanced reservations. In
particular, all the results mentioned above do not carry through. Coffman-Jr et al.
(1999) derived explicit formulas for the limiting blocking probabilities in several spe-
cial cases, for instance, in a setting where the reservation distribution is uniform and
all requested intervals have unit length. They extended the result to more general
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reservation distributions by relating the problem to an on-line interval packing prob-
lem. Lu and Radovanovic (2007a) studied the asymptotic blocking probabilities when
the capacity of the system approaches infinity with subexponential resource require-
ments. Some papers are devoted to study the transient behavior or approximations
of blocking probabilities for the Mt/G/oo queue as well as MIt/G/C/C loss systems
(without advanced reservations) where the arrival process is nonhomogeneous Poisson
(see Eick et al. (1993b), Eick et al. (1993a)), Massey (1985) for the details on some
of the results along these lines). The deterministic counterpart of this problem with
advanced reservations has been considered in the scheduling and parallel computing
literature, which is not the main focus of this chapter.
3.2 An LP-based Approach
In this section, we describe a simple linear program (LP) that provides an upper
bound on the achievable expected long-run average revenue. The LP conceptually
resembles to the one used by Levi and Radovanovic (2010), Key (1990) and Iyengar
and Sigman (2004) who study models without advanced reservations. It is also similar
in spirit to the one used by Adelman (2007) in the queueing networks framework with
unit resource requirements again without advanced reservations. We shall show how
to use the optimal solution of the LP to construct a simple admission control policy
that is called class selection policy (CSP). This type of policy was first analyzed by
Levi and Radovanovic (2010) in models without advanced reservations.
At any point of time t, the state of the system is specified by the entire booking
profile consisting of the class, reservation and service information of each customer in
the booking system as well as the customers currently served. Without loss of gener-
ality, we restrict attention to state-dependent policies. Note that each state-dependent
policy induces a Markov process over the state-space. Moreover, by following simi-
lar arguments as in Lu and Radovanovic (2007b) and Sevastyanov (1957), one can
show that the induced Markov process has a unique stationary distribution which
is Ergodic. (Though it is not the main focus of this chapter, for completeness the
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detailed proof of Ergodicity is provided in the electronic companion.) Since any state-
dependent policy induces a Markov process on the state-space of the system that is
ergodic, for a given state-dependent policy ir, there exists a long-run stationary prob-
ability aek for accepting a class-k customer who wishes to start service in i units of
time for j units of time, which is equal to the long-run proportion of accepted cus-
tomers of this type while running the policy 7r. In other words, any state-dependent
policy 7r is associated with the stationary probabilities ak for all possible reservation
time i, service time j and class k. Let Aijky AkIP(Dk = i, Sk = j) be the arrival rate
of class-k customers with reservation time i and service time .j. Therefore the mean
arrival rate of accepted class-k customers with reservation time i and service time
j is aj ijk. By applying Little's Law and PASTA property (see Gallager (1996)),
the expected number of class-k customers with reservation time i and service time
j being served in the system under state-dependent policy 7r is aiyJA'skj. It follows
that under policy 7 the expected long-run average number of resource units being
used to serve customers can be expressed as E_13 aiyjAsJj. This gives rise to
the following knapsack LP:
M
max 3 37 1 jkAijkji (3.1)
M
s.t. ZZ ykAkj C, (3.2)
k=i i,j
0 < aYk < 1, Vi, j.k. (3.3)
Note that for each feasible state-dependent policy 7r, the vector a = {f jk} is a
feasible solution for the LP with objective value equal to the expected long-run average
revenue of policy 7r. In fact, the LP enforces the capacity constraint (3.2) of the system
only in expectation, whereas in the original problem this constraint has to hold, for
each sample path. It follows that the LP relaxes the original problem and provides an
upper bound on the best obtained expected long-run average revenue. The LP can
be solved optimally by applying the following greedy rule. Without loss of generality,
assume that classes are re-numbered such that r 1 > r 2 > ... > rm. Then, for each
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k 1... M, we sequentially set aij= 1 for all i and j as long as constraint (3.2)
is satisfied. If there exists a class A' < A such that
M'-1 M
C =(I-x) Z Z Aijkj +XZZ Aikj
k=1 ij k=1 ij
for some x E (0, 1), we set ajJM, = x for all and j Note that for each class k, the
values of aijk are all equal regardless of i and j. We abuse the notation and drop
the subscripts i and j of Vijk. Then the optimal solution reduces to the following
structure: for k 1, ... , ' -1,ak = 1; am = x ; and for k = Ai' + 1, .. I.. A, we
have ak = 0.
Next, we shall use the optimal solution of the knapsack LP to construct a very
simple admission policy. Let a* - {a4} be the optimal solution of the knapsack LP.
We propose a simple policy that is called class selection policy (CSP). Consider an
arrival of a class-k customer (k = 1, . . . , M). For each k = 1, ... , M' - 1, accept the
customer upon arrival (regardless of the reservation time and the service time) as long
as there is sufficient unreserved capacity throughout the requested service interval. If
k - A', accept the customer with probability x (regardless of the reservation time
and the service time) and as long as there is sufficient unreserved capacity throughout
the requested service interval. For each k = +1,.... Al, reject.
The CSP has a very simple structure. It always admits customers from the classes
for which the corresponding value a* in the optimal LP solution equals to one as long
as capacity permits. It never admits customers from classes for which the correspond-
ing value a* equals to zero, and it flips a coin for the possibly one class with fractional
value a*, = x. The CSP is conceptually very intuitive in that it splits the classes
into profitable and nonprofitable that should be ignored. In fact, we can assume,
without loss of generality, that there is no fractional variable in the optimal solution
a*, i.e., for each k = 1, .... ', ac* = 1. (If a* , = x is fractional, we think of class
Ml' as having an arrival rate A', XAm, and then eliminate the fractional variable
from a*.)
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3.3 Performance Analysis of the CSP
In this section, we discuss performance analysis of the CSP under models with ad-
vanced reservations. The CSP induces a well-structured stochastic process called loss
networks with advanced reservations (i.e., a M/G/C/C loss system with advanced
reservations). Each class k = 1, . . . , M induces a Poisson arrival stream with respec-
tive rate a*Ak, 1 k K M. Thus, for each class k with a* = 1, the arrival process is
identical to the original process, and each class k with (* = 0 can be ignored. For each
class k 1. Al', let Sk (discrete with finite support [1, vp]) and Dk (discrete with
finite support [1, Un]) be the service and reservation distributions of class-k customers,
respectively. We are interested in characterizing the long-run blocking probability of
class-k customers with reservation time i and service time j under the CSP, i.e., the
stationary probability that a class-k customer with reservation time i and service time
j arrives at a random time to the system and is rejected by the CSP because there
is no available capacity at some point within the requested service interval. For each
k = 1, .. l.. A', let Qijk be the stationary probability of blocking a class-k customers
with reservation time i and service time j under the CSP. Since the corresponding
stochastic process is Ergodic, Qijk is well-defined. Thus, the expected long-run aver-
age revenue of the CSP can be expressed as ZA__ rkAikj4l - Q1 3 k). However,
k=1 Zj rkAsjkj is the optimal value of the LP, which is an upper bound on the
best achievable expected long-run average revenue, denoted by R(OPT). Thus, a
key aspect of the performance analysis of the CSP is to obtain a lower bound on the
probabilities (1 - Qijk)'s or, equivalently, an upper bound on the probabilities Qijk's.
Specifically, if 1 - Qijk (, for each 1, j, and k, it follows that
M' M'
R(CSP) = E r Ajj(l - Q17 k) (3( rkAijkJ > R(OPT). (3.4)
k=1 ij k=1 ij
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We want to obtain upper bounds on the probabilities Qijk's and analyze their asymp-
totic behavior under the Halfin-Whitt regime. The traffic intensity
M M
P A AijkJ - ZAkIk-
k=1 ij k=1
Under the Halfin-Whitt regime (see Halfin and Whitt (1981)), the capacity C and
the arrival rates Ak as well as the traffic intensity p are scaled together to infinity
while keeping the service and the reservation distributions fixed (i.e., C = p + #fp +
o(V7-) -+ oc, for some scaling factor # > 0). We next formally state one of the main
theorems of this chapter.
Theorem 3.3.1 Consider the revenue management model with a single pool of ca-
pacitated reusable resources and advanced reservations under the CSP. Let D(.) be the
cumulative density function of a standard Normal distribution. Then:
(a) For each k and j, the blocking probability Qijk has the following asymptotic upper
bound,
lini QOjk < @(N--); lim Qijk - 0, Vi > 1.
(b) The CSP is guaranteed to obtain at least half of the optimal expected long-run
average revenue in the critically loaded limit, and at least 1 - 4(-#) = >() ;2
in the Halfin- Whitt heavy-traffic limit, where # > 0 is the scaling factor in the
Hal/in- Whitt regime.
For the sake of clear exposition, we merge the M'-class arrival process, and the
merged arrival process has an aggregate rate A = Ek1 Ak. A customer upon arrival
has probability of Ak/A to be a class-k customer. Define v = maxk Vk and u - maxk Uk.
Let S (discrete with finite support [1. v] and mean i) and 1) (discrete with finite
support [I. u]) be the 'merged' service and reservation distributions. The joint density
of S and D is fD,S(i, j) A P(D = i, S = j) E - IP(Dk = i, S = j), for
i E [0, u] and j E [1, v]. Similarly, the marginal density functions of S and D are
fs~j) A kP(S = j) = ZA 1 IP(Sk j) and fD(i) _ P(D ==i) = 9 -P(Dk =
respectively, for i C [0, u] and j E [1, v].
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An arriving customer at some random time t requests to reserve the service interval
[t + d, t + d + s], where d and s are drawn according to joint density of D and S.
Thus, I + d is the starting service time. This customer will be blocked if and only if
the maximum reserved capacity over the requested service interval [t + d, t + d + s]
just prior to time t is already C. This system captures the stochastic process induced
by the CSP, and we are interested in deriving upper bounds on the induced blocking
probabilities of this loss network system.
3.3.1 Main Challenges
We consider the counterpart system with infinite capacity (i.e., a M/G/oo system
with advanced reservations) while keeping all other problem parameters fixed. In this
counterpart system, all customers are admitted since there is an infinite number of
resources. Also it is readily verified that, for each sample path and each time t, the
admitted customers reserved to get service in the capacitated system are a subset of
those reserved in the infinite capacity counterpart system. Consider now a customer
arriving at some random time t in the counterpart system with infinite capacity
requesting service interval [t + d, t + d + s]. Define the virtual blocking probability
to be the probability that the maximum reserved capacity over the requested service
interval [t + d, t + d + s] just prior to time t is larger than C. Since the set of served
customers in the infinite capacity system is always a superset of that served in the
original capacitated system, it follows that the virtual blocking probability is in fact
an upper bound on the blocking probability in the capacitated system. Next we shall
analyze the asymptotic behavior of the virtual blocking probabilities under the Halfin-
Whitt regime. In turn, this will provide asymptotic upper bounds on the blocking
probabilities in the original capacitated system.
The major challenges in analyzing the blocking probabilities in loss network sys-
tems with advanced reservations lie in the fact that we need a complete character-
ization of the booking profile (the pre-reserved arrival and departure processes) to
obtain the maximum reserved capacity over a particular requested service interval.
As shown in Figure 3-2 (the capacity C - 2), in the models without advanced reser-
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Models without Adv. Res. - suffices to check the instantaneous load
C = 2
pre-arrivals
arrival requested service
time
s k
point of check
Model with Adv. Res. - needs to scan the entire service interval
C=2
pre-arrivals 0
arrival requested service
time
interval of check
Figure 3-2: Challenges in analyzing the blocking probabilities in loss network systems
with advanced reservations
vation, it suffices to check the instantaneous load of the system upon arrival of a
customer. However, in the models with advanced reservation, we cannot guarantee
one's request by merely checking the instantaneous load of the system at her start-
ing service time upon her arrival, because her request may be potentially blocked by
reserved slots of those customers who booked prior to her but will start services after
her. This introduces much difficulties in handling this correlation issue between the
incoming requests and the booking profiles.
One may suggest regarding the original system with advanced reservation as a
tandem queueing model of two stations, where the first station has infinite capacity
and the second station has finite capacity, customers first enter the system from the
first station, but if the second station is full when customers arrive, they will be re-
jected or lost. When we relax the finite capacity assumption on the second station,
the blocking probability can seemingly be approximated by the probability that the
number of customers in the second station is bigger than C (see Boxma (1984) and
Schmidt (1987)). However, the dynamics of tandem queues of two stations is very
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different from the loss network systems with advanced reservation. From the example
in Figure 3-2, the incoming request will be accepted in the infinite tandem queucing
model of two stations while the request will be virtually blocked in our model. More-
over, the tandem queueing model of two stations checks the instantaneous load of
the second server upon arrival of a customer and therefore cannot be used to upper
bound the blocking probabilities in our system. It may serve as an approximation
of the blocking probabilities but we are unsure how good the approximation is, since
the stationary distribution can no longer be expressed as a product-form.
3.3.2 The Simplest Non-trivial Case
We will start the asymptotic analysis with the simplest non-trivial case, and then
extend it gradually to the more general case. Suppose that S takes only one value
s = 1 deterministically. Then the traffic intensity p = Ap = A. In addition, assume
that D follows a two-point distribution,
0 w. p.
1 w.p. 1 - -Y,
i.e., fD(O) =y and fD(1) = 1 - . That is, an arriving customer either wants to
start the service immediately or in 1 unit of time. Consider the counterpart system
with an infinite number of servers in steady state (note that the steady state exists
due to the induced semi-Markov process). Upon a customer arrival to the system
at some time t, all the starting service times of the customers who had arrived prior
to t are already known in the booking profile. For ease of exposition, we call these
starting service times pre-arrivals. Similarly, we call all the starting service times of
the customers, who will arrive after t post-arrivals. (Note that the pre-arrivals and
post-arrivals are always defined with respect to the current time.) It is important to
note that the virtual blocking probability at time t (as well as the blocking probability
in the original capacitated system) is independent of post-arrivals. Without loss of
generality, we can assume t = 0.
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Lemma 3.3.2 below characterizes the pre-arrival processes observed by a customer
arriving at time 0 in steady state.
Lemma 3.3.2 Consider the counterpart system with an infinite number of servers,
then a customer arriving at the system at time 0 in steady state, observes that the
pre-arrivals follow a non-homogeneous Poisson process with piecewise rate r(r) at
time r
A, if r 0,
TI(r) (1- )A, if 0< r <1
0, if r > 1.
Proof of Lemma 3.3.2. If r < 0, we focus on the interval ([r] - 1, [r]] and its
preceding interval ([r] - 2, [r] - 1]. The arrival process in ([r] - 2, [r] - 1] follows
a Poisson process with rate A. Each arrival has 'y probability of starting services
immediately in ([r] - 2, [r] - 1], and 1 - y probability of starting services in 1 unit of
time in ([r] -1, [r]]. By the splitting argument, the pre-arrivals in ([r] -1, [r]] follow
a Poisson process with rate (1 - 'y)A. By a similar argument, the pre-arrival process
in ([r] -1, [r]] induced by customers arriving to the system in ([r] -1, [r]] follows a
Poisson process with rate '}A. Note that these two processes are independent of each
other since they are generated by customers arriving in disjoint intervals. Now merge
these two pre-arrival processes, and the resulting pre-arrival process in ([r] - 1, [r]]
follows a Poisson process with rate (1 - 7)A + yA = A.
If 0 < r < 1, focus on the interval (0, 1] and its preceding interval (- 1, 0]. By the
similar argument above, there is a Poisson process of pre-arrivals with rate (1 - 'y)A
induced by customers arriving in (-1,0]. There is also a Poisson process with rate
-yA induced by customers arriving in (0,1]. However, the latter process consists of
post-arrivals. Thus, the resulting pre-arrivals at time 0 over (0, 1] follow a Poisson
process with rate (1 - -y)A.
Since the maximum reservation time is 1, it is impossible for customers arriving
prior to 0 to start service at any time greater than 1. Thus, the rate of pre-arrivals
from 1 onwards is 0. 0
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Figure 3-3: One-class departure and pre-arrival processes
Let B be the event that a customer arriving at time 0 in steady state is virtually
blocked. The conditional long-run virtual blocking probability Pi P(B I D) i),
for each i = 0, 1. In Lemma 3.3.3 below, we show how to obtain exact analytical
expressions to PO and P1. Moreover, we analyze the asymptotic behavior of these
expressions under the Halfin-Whitt regime.
Let Ni (i = 1.2, 3) denote the Poisson counting process (see Gallager (1996))
induced by the pre-arrivals over [i - 2. i - 1] as seen from time 0. Also, let Ni(r), for
r E [0, 1], be the number of events over [0, 1]. Next, we introduce the notion of mirror
image of a Poisson counting process. The mirror image of a Poisson counting process
N, denoted by N, is a backward counting process of N. Let N(r) and R(r) be the
number of counted events over [0, r] of the respective processes (r < 1). More formally,
if N is a Poisson counting process from time 0 to 1, then R(r) = N(1) - N(1 - r)
for each r E [0, 1]. It is evident that N is also a Poisson process with the same rate
as N.
Lemma 3.3.3 below characterizes Po and P1 based on the counting processes in-
troduced above. More generally, we will use N(-; A) to denote a Poisson counting
process with rate A.
Lemma 3.3.3 Consider the counterpart system with an infinite number of servers,
if a customer arrives at time 0 in steady state and requests service S = 1 determin-
istically to commence in D units of time (D = 0 or 1 with probabilities ' and 1 -
respectively), the conditional virtual blocking probabilities are given by
Po  P(B D = 0) AIP max N1(1 - r) + N2 (r)} C) (3.5)
(rE[o,1) ]
Pi A P(B D = 1) AP (niax 2 (1 - r) + N3 (r) C (3.6)
r [,1J
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where the process Ni (i = 1. 2, 3) is a Poisson counting process with respective rate
A2, with A1 = A, A2 =(1 - y)A and A3 = 0. The process N (i = 1, 2) is the mirror
image of Ni with rate A2.
Proof of Lemma 3.3.3. Suppose that a customer arrives at time 0 in steady state
and requests the service to commence immediately (D = 0), i.e., requesting the
service interval (0, 1]. Focus solely on the pre-arrivals as seen from 0. By Lemma
3.3.2, the pre-arrivals over the time interval (-1, 0] follow a Poisson process with
rate A, denoted by N 1 . However, this implies that, over the time interval (0, 1], the
customers depart the system following a Poisson process with rate A (a shift of N1
by 1 unit of time). Let N1 be the mirror image of the departure process induced by
N1 over (0, 1]. (See Figure 3-3.) By Lemma 3.3.2, we also know that the pre-arrivals
over (0, 1] (namely, customers starting service within the interval) follow a Poisson
process with rate (1 - -y)A. We denote this pre-arrival process by N2 .
Consider now the number of customers in the system at some time r. These
fall exactly into one of the two types; customers that started service over (0, r] and
customers that started service over (r - 1, 0] and will depart over (r, 1]. It follows that
the number of customers in service at time r E (0, 1] can be expressed as N1 (1 - r) +
N 2(r). Specifically, in time r the number of departures over (r, 1] (equal to N1 (1 - r))
captures customers starting service before 0, and still in the system at time r. In
addition, the number of pre-arrivals over (0. r] (equal to N 2 (r)) captures customers
arriving before 0, starting service over (0, r] and still being served in time r. The sum
of the two is exactly equal to the total number of customers in the system at time r.
Note that by Poisson splitting arguments it follows that N1 and N2 are independent
of each other. The virtual blocking probability is expressed in terms of the maximum
of the sum of these two Poisson counting processes running towards each other (see
Figure 3-4), i.e., Po -P (maxr[o,1j {N1(1- r) + N2 (r) ;> C)
Consider now the case that the arriving customer requests the service to commence
in D = 1 unit of time, i.e., the service will cover the interval (1. 2]. The departure
process in (1, 2] is a shift of the pre-arrival process N2 in (0, 1] by 1 unit of time, and
its mirror image is denoted by N2 . Moreover, by Lemma 3.3.2, the pre-arrival process
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Pre-arrivals over [O,r] Departure over (rI]
(present in system at time r) L - . ." (present in system at time r)
0 r1(at the 4th occurance ofN 2)
Figure 3-4: Two Poisson counting processes running towards each other
in (1, 2] has rate 0. Thus,
P1AP max N 2 (1- r) +N 3 (r) > C =P (max N2 (1 -r) > C).
rE[0,1) rE[o,1)
The second equality follows from Lemma 3.3.2 above. E
Observe that P and P1 are expressed through rather complex random variables.
However, inl the next lemmas, we show how to analyze the limits Po and P1 under
the Halfin-Whitt regine. We first assume that the probability that an arriving cus-
tomer seeks to start service immediately is positive (i.e., -y > 0), and then relax this
assumption.
Assuming that y > 0, we shall show that under the Halfin-Whitt regime where
C - A + 03VAX+ o(x/N) -± oc and 0 > 0, the conditional virtual blocking probabilities
Po and P1 have the following asymptotic limits limAm Po = <D(-0) and limA. Pi =
0. In fact, we shall prove a more general statement that will be useful in the analysis
of the general case.
Theorem 3.3.4 Let N 1 , N2 and N3 be Poisson counting processes (mutually inde-
pendent) with rates A, 01A and 02 A, respectively, where 1 > 01 > 02 > 0 are fixed
constants. Let N1 and N2 be the mirror images of N1 and N2 , respectively. Let
X A max N1 (1 - r; A) + N 2 (r; 01A)l.
r [0,1 Jl
Y A max N 2 (1 - r; 0iA) + N3 (r; 0 2 A)-
rC[o,1]1 J
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For each 3 > 0, we have linA\ ?(X > C) = 4(--0) and limA+ P(Y > C) = 0.
Note that Po and P1 can be obtained by setting 01 = (1 - -y) and 02 = 0 in X and
Y above. We observe that only customers with zero reservation time are blocked.
This stems from the fact that for a given time slot and unit capacity, these customers
are the last to arrive. Since we have a system where accepted demand is close to
supply, these are the customers that will most likely be blocked.
To prove Theorem 3.3.4, we provide an alternative characterization of X and Y
above based on a downward-drifting asymmetric random walk that takes a down-step,
for each departure, and an up-step, for each pre-arrival. We would like to show that
in the asymptotic heavy-traffic regimes, the maximum level of the random walk stays
relatively close to its starting position by showing that the rate of the random walk
going up is sublinear in v A.
Consider the merged process induced on [0,1] by the two Poisson counting pro-
cesses N1 and N2 . Let Ar = N1 (1; A) + N2 (1; OA) denote the total number of occur-
rences over [0, 1] of the two independent Poisson counting processes of N1 and N2 .
Note that since N1 and N2 are independent of each other, IV is a Poisson random
variable with rate (1 + 0)A. Conditioning on AN - n, the induced merged process
has n points uniformly distributed over the interval [0. 1]. By splitting argument
applied to the merged process, each of these n points has independent probability
p 0 A ( < 1 to be fron the process N 2 and probability q - 1 - p fromP (1±O)A - 1±0 2
the process N1. If we associate +1 with each point from N2 , and -1 with each
point from N1 , then each configuration of these n points induces a downward-drifting
asymmetric random walk of length n. The random walk starts at the origin 0, with
up probability p and down probability q. Let R, denote the corresponding random
walk of length n, Al denote the maxiiumn level attained by R,, and Gr denote the
overall number of down-steps taken by R,. Also let X,, (X | M - n). Then,
we claim that, almost surely, X, = G, + M. Note again that for each r E- [0, 11,
N 1 (1 - r; 61 A) + N 2 (r; A) is equal to the number of occurrences of N1 over (1 - r, 1]
and the number of occurrences of N2 over [0, r). Also observe that the value of X is
obtained either at time 0 or upon on occurrence of N2 . Now condition on R, =- on
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(a specific realization of the random walk R,), and consider the l1 h occurrence of N 2
(l E {0, ... , n}), at time, say r. Then we have (see Figure 3-4),
N1 (1 - r; A) + N 2(r; 01A)
- (# up-steps before and including I + # down-steps after 1)
(# up-steps before and including 1 - # down-steps before and including 1)
+(# down-steps before and including I + # down-steps after 1).
The first term is exactly the location of the random walk after I steps and the second
expression is exactly G,. Since X is the maximum of the above sum over all arrivals
/ = 0,1, . . . , n, it follows that indeed X, I (R, - Wn) = (G + M,) I (R, = w,), from
which the claim follows. However, it should be noted that A, and G, are correlated.
To address the correlation between MI, and G,, we will replace A,, by M.
However, first we would like to obtain an expression for the hitting probability of
a downward-drifting asymmetric random walk. This is done in Lemma 3.3.5 given
below. (Lawler (2006) provided a proof in Chapter 2, Section 2.2; for completeness,
we present a shorter proof in the electronic companion.)
Lemma 3.3.5 Consider a random walk defined by a sequence of independent random
variables E, 1 with probability p and -1 with probability q - 1 - p. Let S,=
Z7_1 Ej. Define M,, C [0, oc) U{oo} to be maximum level attained by the random
walk (i.e., A,, - max,, Srt). Given that 0 < p < q < 1 (downward drifting), then the
probability that the random walk ever hits above level b is P (M,),, > b) = (p/q)b
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.3.4.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.4. First we shall prove that, for / 0, limA, P(X > C) -
<b(-#3). Let M, be the maximum level attained by the infinite-step random walk
defined above. Since the random walk has a, negative drift, it follows from Lemma 3.3.5
above that IP(M,. > -log A/log 0) < 1/A. (Note that 0 < 1, so -log A/log 0 > 0.)
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Now, we have
P(Xr > C)
=P (Gn + Mrt >C)
=P (Gn + Ml > C Mn > A + P (G, + M > C f lA, <
logA )
log A
+ P (Gil
+ P (G log A
>- logo)
+ P (G, > C+ log Alog 0 )
>0C + log A
- log )
The third inequality follows from the fact that Al_ > MA almost surely. The fourth
inequality follows from Lemma 3.3.5 above. Since G,' is distributed as (Ni(1; A)
= n), we get from (3.7) that,
= P(X > C)P( = n) <1
S+ P (N1(1; A) > C + AS+logo)
+ P Gi
1
SC + AP(N = n)
- log 0 )I( n
+ P (Poisson( A) > C+ .logA
By virtue of Central Limit Theorem, we have
lim P(X C)
A-40o-
< lim P Poisson(A)
lim P Poisson(A)A--o
log A
> C + logOA
-logo)
log A
logo)
= lim P Poisson(A) > A + OV#5A + o(V?)) < b(-#). (3.10)
On the other hand, from the definition of X, under the Halfin-Whitt regime, we have
limA IP(X > C) > liixo iP(N 1 (1; A) > C) = limnx P(Poisson(A) > A + # -+
o(VIA)) = <b(--#).
Now, we are ready to prove the second part of Theorem 3.3.4, i.e., limo IP(Y >
C) = 0. Since 01 C [0, 1), we can always find a 01 such that 01 < 01 < 1. Then 01 >
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(3.7)
< MO >
1
-logA
logo0)
P(X > C)
(3.8)
(3.9)
01 2 02, and define Y = maxE[o,1] {N 2 (1 - r; 61A) + N 3 (r; 02 A)} . It is easy to see that
Y stochastically dominates Y. Therefore, without loss of generality, we simply drop
the bar of 01 and Y, and assume that 02/01 = 0 < 1. Following the same argument as
in the first part of the proof, we have P(Y > C) K - + P (Poisson(OA) > A + 1) ,
and again by virtue of Central Limit Theorem, we have
( logs Alim P(Y > C) < lim P Poisson(OA) > C+ (3.11)AAo Aoo log f
= lim P Poisson(A) > A + 3A + o(VN) + log A (3.12)
Ao log (.2
= lim P Poisson(OA) > A + #A + o(VA-) -0. (3.13)
This completes the proof. E
The observation that limA, P1 = 0 < limAs, P suggests us that a customer,
who requests to start service immediately than in the future in these asymptotic
regimes, is more likely to be blocked. We have shown that if 0 <7 1, limsAI Po <
<)(-/3), and limA , P1 = 0. Next consider the case where 7 0 implying that no
arriving customer will start service immediately. Thus, we have limnA, P1 = <D(--
3.3.3 Arbitrary Finite Discrete Reservation Distributions
Next we extend the simple model to allow an arbitrary finite discrete reservation
distribution D with marginal probability mass function fD(i). We still assume that
the service distribution remains fixed at S = 1, deterministically. Now let fD(i) -
for i E [0, u], 0 < -y, < 1 and Z 17 = 1. Lemma 3.3.6 below is a generalization of
Lemma 3.3.2. (The proof is given in the electronic companion.)
Lemma 3.3.6 Consider the counterpart system with an infinite number of servers,
a customer arriving at the system at time 0 in steady state, observes that the pre-
arrivals follow a non-homoqeneous Poisson input process with piecewise rate q(r) at
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time r
A. if r<0,
A(1 - FD(r - 1)), if r > 0,
where FD is the cumulative probability mass function of D and FD( r -- 1
E=O JD 0i~
Departure &2  b 3  N 4
Pre-arrival N N 2  N 3  N 4  NS
-1 0 1 2 3 4
Figure 3-5: One-class departure and pre-arrival processes with general reservation
distribution
Define N (for i E [1, u]) to be the process of pre-arrivals prior to t over (i-2, i-1].
This process induces a departure process over the interval (i - 1, i], and let I denote
its mirror image. (An example is shown in Figure 3-5.) The conditional virtual
blocking probabilities are given in Lemma 3.3.7 below, which is a generalization of
Lemma 3.3.3. (The proof is given in the electronic companion.)
Lemma 3.3.7 Consider the counterpart system with an infinite number of servers,
if a customer comes at time 0 in steady state and requests service (S = 1) determin-
istically to commence in D units of time (D e [0, u]), the conditional virtual blocking
probability is given by, for all i E [0, U],
P P(B | ) = i) --L P max JNi+1(1 -r; Ai+ 2 ) + Ni+2 (r; Ai+ 3 ) > c)(rc[o,1)
where N, is a Poisson counting process with rate Ai = A(1 - FD(i - 2)), and N1 is a
mirror image of Ni with the same rate.
Theorem 3.3.8 is a generalization of Theorem 3.3.4 with general reservation distri-
bution. (The proof is given in the electronic companion.) The traffic intensity p = A
since the service distribution S - 1 deterministically.
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Theorem 3.3.8 The conditional long-run virtual blocking probabilities have the fol-
lowing asymptotic upper bounds: for each i e [0, u] (the service distribution S = 1
deterministically), P K <I(-3).
3.3.4 Arbitrary Finite Discrete Service Distributions
Next we extend the model further to allow an arbitrary finite discrete service dis-
tribution. The total arrival rate is A, and the reservation distribution D is defined
on [0, u] defined as in Section 3.2. Now assume that the service time S is a general
finite discrete distribution on [I. v]. More specifically, let fs( ) be the marginal service
distribution with .fs(j) = P(S = j) - Kj, where E'=1 ii = 1 and 0 K < 1, for
each j E [1, v].
We partition the arriving customers according to their requested service time,
i.e., the customers are partitioned into o disjoint sets numbered 1, .. . , r according to
their requested service time. For each j E [1, v], the arrival process of customers in
set j follows a thinned Poisson process with rate rjA. Moreover, these processes are
independent of each other. Now, for each set j E [1, v], let the conditional reservation
distribution be fh(i) = P(D = i S - j) =y for i E [0, u]. Note that UJ '/ 1,
for each j E [1, v].
Consider the counterpart system with an infinite number of servers, if a customer
of set j (j E [1, v]) arrives at time 0 in steady state and requests j units of service
time to commence after i units of time (i E [0, u]), the conditional virtual blocking
probability is defined as PA "- P(B | =i, S =j). In addition, the traffic intensity
is p - > jtyA - pA, where y. = _V jy is the mean service time.
Let Ni' (for E  [1. v] and i E [1, u]) denote the pre-arrival process of set-
j customers over (i.e., customers requesting j units of service time) the interval
(i - - 1. i - j]. This induces a departure process over the interval (i - 1, i], and let
Ni' denote its mirror image. The rate of N/ ( and N!) is given in Lemma 3.3.9 below.
(The proof is given in the electronic companion.)
Lemma 3.3.9 Let N and Nj' be defined as above. Then, for each j c [1, v] and each
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i e [1,a], N/ and N/ are Poisson processes with the same rate
i-j-1
A = rA 1 - 7 = Aj(1 - F(i -j - 1)). (3.14)
1=0
Moreover, N/ is independent of N/, for o I' r J".
Departure
Pre-arrival N N N N N
Departure 2 2 2
Pre-arrival N N N N N N
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Figure 3-6: Two-service-set departure and pre-arrival processes
First assume that Ej C [1, v] such that -yd > 0, i.e., the probability of an arriving
customer requesting to start the service immediately upon arrival is strictly positive.
Later we will show that this assumption can be relaxed. Let Ai be the maximum
number of customers in the system over the interval (i, i + 1] for i E [0, a]. In fact,
one cani derive an exact mathematical expression of each A2 for i C [0, U],
e i+j
Ai - > S N (1; A ) + m N+1(1 ~ r; Aj) + E N +1( A++1)
j=2 1=i+2 j =1 j=l
(3.15)
For r E [0, 1], the term J_ N +1(1 - r; Aj+1 ) captures all the departures over (i +
r I the term _, Nj+ (r; Aj+ai) captures all the pre-arrivals over (i, ir), and
the term - -+ Nj(1; Aj) captures all the customers being served over (i, i + 1].
The sum captures exactly all the customers being served at time i + r. It is important
to note that since Rj/ and N/ do not appear together in Aj, for each I C [1, u] and
j E [1, u], all the Poisson counting processes in the expression of Ai are independent
of each other (see Lemma 3.3.9).
We shall further explain (3.15) by providing the following example when v - 2
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(refer to Figure 3-6),
Ao - N2(1; A') + max SN'(1 - r; A') + N(1 - r; A2) + N2(r; A') + N (r; A 2)
rE([0,1}A1, N32(1; A 2) + max Ni 2(1 - r; A') + Sj2(1 - r; A 2) + Ni(r; A') + N42(r; A 2)l
More specifically, Ao represents the maximum customers in the system over the inter-
val (0. 1] (refer to Figure 3-6). At time r E (0, 1], the number of departures over (r, 1]
is equal to N(1 - r; A') + N?(1 - r; A2), capturing customers in both sets starting
before 0 and still in the system at time r. (Note that the service time is at least 1.)
In addition, the number of pre-arrivals over (0. r] is equal to N2(r; A') + N3(r; A2),
capturing pre-arrivals of customers with service time 1 and 2, respectively, starting
service over (0, r]. Finally, N2 captures set-2 customers with service time 2 who
started service within (-1, 0]. These customers will continue service over the entire
interval (0. 1]. Therefore N2(1; A2) appears in the expression AO outside the max.
The same reasoning applies to Ai for each i E [1. u).
Now for each i E [0. u] and j E [1, v], we have P = P(max(Aj, . .. , Ai+j_1) > C).
It should be noted that Ai and Ag can be correlated. To analyze the limiting behavior
of P/, we first analyze the limits of P(Aj > C), for each i E [0, u].
Lemma 3.3.10 Assume that there exists j e [1. v] such that -yj > 0. Let Ai be
defined as in (3.15). The traffic intensity is p = E _jr j A = ]1 jA. Under the
Halfin- Whitt regime,
lim P(Ao > C) = <D(-/3); lim P(Aj 2 C) 0, i E [1. u]. (3.16)A-*cx ~
Proof of Lemma 3.3.10. The assumption 'y7 > 0 for some j E [1, v] implies that in
the interval (0, 1], the total departure rate is strictly greater than the total pre-arrival
rate, i.e., E _ Aj > E7_= Aj+j. For subsequent intervals (i. i + 1] for i > 1, we have
= + > E= A-+j+i. Therefore the conditions of Theorem 3.3.4 are satisfied.
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Theorem 3.3.4 implies that
lim P(Ao > C)
A--+Cx
= limP
( =2 1=
(3.17)
N (1; A) + RN(1; A)
V
=- li P Poisson Ai
x-+o(j=2 1=2
( (n A(imP oisson Y SJA )
j=1
+)
j=1
> C)
)SC)
= lim P(Poisson(p) > C) = (-3),A--+oC
and similarly limA+I P(A > C) = 0 for i E [1, u]. The third equality of (3.17) follows
from (3.14) in Lemma 3.3.9. D
Theorem 3.3.11 Assume that there exists j E [1, v], such that 'yo > 0. The traffic
intensity is p = jKJA = (" jX . Then we have, for each j E [1, ],
lin Po- 4= (-#) him P/ = 0,A ---oc
Proof of Theorem 3.3.11. For each j C [1, v], by union bound and Lemma 3.3.10,
we have
lim I = lim P(inax(Ao,.... A j1)
A-oD A-+o
j-1
< lim ZIP(Aj > C)
i-O
i-1
> C) < lim IP(J As > C)
A-+o=O
- lim IP(Ao > C) = -)
On the other hand, it is obvious that, for each j E [Li v),
Him Po= lii IP(max(Ao, . .. , A 1) > C) > lim P(Ao > C) = @(-#),
A--->c A-+oo A-* oo
Similarly, limni,\ P/ = 0 for each i E [1. u] and j E [1, v]. E
As discussed previously, we can relax the assumption that 'yj > 0 for some j C
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i E [1, U]. (3.18)
(3.19)
Aj > C
[1, v]. Suppose now '.yj = 0 for all j E [1, v]. This implies that no arriving customers
at time 0 will start the service over (0, 1], and hence we can ignore the blocking
probability over this interval. Let /' be the minimal index such that 4, > 0 for
some j E [1. v] and 'j = 0 for i < i' and all j E [1, v]. Observe that no arriving
customers at time 0 will start the service over (0, i' + 1]. For the subsequent interval
(i' + 1, ' + 2], the total departure rate is strictly greater than the pre-arrival rate,
i.e., Q'_J 1 A6 +=1 >A +. Thus, it suffices to show that for each j E [1, v],
limA P, = limA, P(max(A , ... , A+j-1) > C) = 4)(-/3) and limA, P = 0
for each i E [i' + 1, u] and j c [1, v]. The same arguments in Theorem 3.3.11 carry
through.
3.4 An Improved Policy
In this section, we propose a variant of the CSP that improves the asymptotic worst-
case performance guarantee. Fix a small (E < mink(Ak/UkC 1), the variant solves the
following LP:
max rkairjk Aijkj, (3.20)
s.t. a kA ijkj < (1 - )C, 0 < aj, 1, Vi,j. k.
k=1 i,j
Note this LP defined in (3.20) differs from the original LP defined in (3.1) by changing
the right hand side of the capacity constraint to (1-c)C. Suppose the optimal solution
of the original LP defined in (3.1) is {a? }. Now consider {ijk} = {(1 - Elazjkl'
Since
M M
S ijkAijk = (1 - ) ajk ijkJ (1 -)C
k=1 ij k=1 i,j
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{adjk} is a feasible solution to (3.20). Let {&ijk} be the optimal solution of (3.20).
Then we have
M M M
rk>ijkA ij k rkijkJ (ijk -) >jk ijk = (1 - E)R(OPT)
k=1 ij k=1 ij k=1 i,j
It is easy to verify that the optimal solution (again omitting i and j) to (3.20) is
61 = ... = aM'-f 1 1, 6M' = 1 - EC(AM'pMu M') daJ+1 - 0. This
solution then gives rise to the modified CSP: for each k = 1,... , - 1, accept
the customer upon arrival if there is sufficient unreserved capacity throughout the
requested service interval. If k = M', accept with probability 1 - eC(AM/pM'>i if
there is sufficient unreserved capacity throughout the requested service interval. For
k = M1'+ 1, .. ,M, reject.
Theorem 3.4.1 Consider the revenue management model with a single pool of ca-
pacitated reusable resources and advanced reservations under the modified CSP. For
any e such that 0 < e < mink(AkIkC-1),
(a) The blocking probabilities Qijk 's are asymptotically zero, i.e., limp,, Qijk = 0.
(b) The CSP is guaranteed to obtain at least 1 - e of the optimal long-run expected
revenue in the Halfin-Whitt heavy-traffic limit.
3.5 Price-Driven Customer Arrivals
In this section, we follow Levi and Radovanovic (2010) and consider an extension of
the model discussed in previous sections, in which the arrival rates of the different
classes of customers are affected by prices. Specifically, consider a two-stage deci-
sion. At the first stage, we set the respective prices ri, . .. , rM for each class. This
determines the respective arrival rates A1(ri),... , Am(rM). (The rate of class-i cus-
tomers is affected only by price re.) Then, given the arrival rates, we wish to find
the optimal admission policy that maximizes the expected long-run revenue rate. In
particular, we assume that Ai(ri) is nonnegative, differentiable, and decreasing in ri
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for each 1 < i < M. In addition, we assume that all prices are nonnegative real
numbers and that there exists a price r, such that, for each i = 1, . .. , M, we have
Ai(ro) - 0. (The latter condition is required to guarantee that the problem has an
optimal solution.)
Using arguments analogous to the discussion in Section 2, we construct an upper
bound on the achievable expected long-run revenue rate through a nonlinear program,
and then use it to construct a similar policy with the same performance guarantees.
The detailed discussion and analysis can be found in the electronic companion.
Using some of the techniques developed in this chapter, in follow up work (Levi
and Shi (2011a)), we study a dynamic pricing model and derive provably near-optimal
policies.
3.6 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we conduct some numerical experiments to find out the empirical
blocking probabilities in the original capacitated system. We run tests on four differ-
ent reservation distributions and six different service distributions. The four reserva-
tion distributions considered are as follows,
Di ~ Uniform(10)/1000, D2 ~ Binomial(10, 0.5)/1000,
D3 ~ Poisson(10)/1000, D4 ~ Hypergeometric(100, 40, 50)/1000.
The six service distributions considered are as follows,
31 ~1, S 2 ~ Exponential(1),
Sa~ Uniform(10)/10, S 4 - Binomial(10, 0.5)/10.
S5 ~ Poisson(10)/10, S6 ~ Hypergeometric(100, 40, 50)/10.
The arrival process follows a Poisson process with rate A ranging from 1 to 100, and
the capacity is pegged with the traffic intensity. The total number of experiments
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ran is 100 x 4 x 6 - 2400. The computational results are shown in Figure 3-7. We
observe that the blocking probabilities in the original capacitated system go to zero
in the two heavy-traffic limits. This implies that the blocking probabilities converge
to zero asymptotically under the Halfin-Whitt regime (see graphs in the appendix),
and perhaps the asymptotic analysis could be tightened in the future.
3.7 Conclusion and Future Directions
This chapter derives asymptotic upper bounds on the blocking probabilities in loss
network systems with advanced reservations under the Halfin-Whitt regime. The
theoretical results find applications in a class of revenue management problems in
systems with reusable resources and advanced reservations. A simple control policy
called the class selection policy (CSP) is proposed based on solving a knapsack-type
linear program (LP). It is shown that the CSP and its variants perform provably
near-optimal under the Halfin-Whitt regime.
There are several issues that still remain open. From the comparison of the upper
bounds and the simulation results, it is clear that there is a gap between the empirical
blocking probabilities and the theoretical bounds. This gap is due to the approxima-
tion using infinite capacity systems. It opens an opportunity to tighten the upper
bound using another fictitious system between the original capacitated system and
the infinite capacity counterpart.
There are also several plausible extensions into pricing models. The follow-up
work (Levi and Shi (2011a)) will study both the static and dynamic pricing model of
reusable resources with advanced reservations. The static pricing model allows the
arrival rates being affected by prices. Specifically, consider a two-stage decision. At
the first stage, we set the respective prices ri, . . ., rM for each class. This determines
the respective arrival rates A1(ri), . .. , Am(rm). (The rate of class-i customers is
affected only by price r1 .) Then, given the arrival rates, we wish to find the optimal
admission policy that maximizes the expected long-run revenue rate. In particular,
we assume that Ai(ri) is nonnegative, differentiable, and decreasing in r for each
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1 < i < M. In addition, we assume that all prices are nonnegative real numbers
and that there exists a price r, such that, for each i = 1,. .. , M, we have Ai(r.) =
0. (The latter condition is required to guarantee that the problem has an optimal
solution.) We construct an upper bound on the achievable expected long-run revenue
rate through a nonlinear program, and then use it to construct a similar policy with
the same performance guarantees.
In the dynamic pricing model, consider a single-class time-homogenous Poisson
arrival process with rate A. Each customer's reservation and service-time are drawn
from D and S, respectively. The system offers a price from a fixed price menu
r', . . , rn] to an arriving customer with d and s, depending on the current state.
The state is characterized by the booking profile, d, and s. Moreover, we introduce
a reservation price distribution denoted by R. The customer only accepts the offer
if the price offered falls below the reservation price. We construct a different linear
program, and use it to obtain provably near-optimal randomized policies.
90
10.8
- 0.6
0.4
0.
0.2
Deterministic Service, # samples 1000
Uniform Res.
Binomial Res.
Poisson Res.
Hypergeometric Res.
0 20 40 60 80 100
Arrival Rate (lambda)
Uniform Service, # samples = 1000
Uniform Res.
Binomial Res.
0.8 Poisson Res.
Hypergeometric Res.
Ca 0.6
0-
0.4
0.2
0
0 20 40 60 80 100
Arrival Rate (lambda)
1
0.8
. 0.6
0-
0.4
0 .
0.2
Poisson Service, # samples= 1000
Uniform Res.
Binomial Res.
Poisson Res.
Hypergeometric Res.
1
0.8
0.6
0,
S 0.4
0.2
Exponential Service, # samples = 1000
Uniform Res.
Binomial Res.
Poisson Res.
Hypergeometric Res.
0 20 40 60 80 100
Arrival Rate (lambda)
0)
Arrival Rate (lambda)
1
0.9
- 0.8
0- 0.7
0.6
0.5
01
0 20 40 60 80 100
Arrival Rate (lambda)
Hypergeometric Service, # samples = 1000
Uniform Res.
Binomial Res.
Poisson Res.
Hypergeometric Res.
0 20 40 60 80 100
Arrival Rate (lambda)
Figure 3-7: Computational Results
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Chapter 4
Joint-ventures in Operations
Management
4.1 Introduction
A proliferation of joint ventures has been witnessed across the globe in the recent
years (see Bamford et al. (2004)). A joint venture takes place when two or more
business partners pool their resources and expertise to achieve a particular goal for
a contractual period of time. Joint ventures stand in the middle ground between
non-cooperative competition and merging. They provide companies with the oppor-
tunities to gain new capacity and expertise, enter related businesses or new geographic
markets, gain new technological knowledge access to greater resources, and share risks
with other venture partners.
In this work, we consider a setting where multiple entities take part in a joint
venture and each of them contributes one type of resources. We distinguish two
types of resource pooling in joint ventures, depending on whether the resources are
heterogeneous or homogeneous. When resources are heterogeneous, they are not fully
substitutable. Thus, the effective capacity of a joint venture is limited to the minimum
level of an individual contribution. In other words, the lowest contribution by one
partner becomes the bottleneck in planning the capacity for the joint venture. This
is in contrast with homogeneous resource pooling, where the resources are perfectly
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substitutable and the overall capacity of a joint venture is determined by aggregating
all individual contributions.
One example that demonstrates the success of a joint venture with heterogeneous
resource sharing is Massachusetts Eye and Ear Infirmary (MEEI), a hospital special-
ized in providing patient care for disorders of the eye, ear, nose, throat, head and
neck in downtown Boston. With the vast majority of its services is outpatient in
nature, MEEI experiences lower profit margins than a regular hospital and has been
pressured to increase its patient volume so as to strengthen its financial status. Since
2005, MEEI has established five satellite clinics through joint ventures by collabo-
rating with community hospitals in the suburbs. A typical agreement specifies that
MEEI provides expertise (physicians and nurses) and its brand name' while the com-
munity hospital is responsible for providing facility and other necessary hardware.
The two types of resources, i.e., expertise and facility, are not interchangeable. The
maximum number of services that can be supported in such a satellite clinics is lim-
ited by MEEI's input as well as the space constraints such as the number of operating
rooms available in the new location.
In 2003, US-based car rental firm Avis has set up a joint venture in Shanghai,
China. The new company named Anji Car Rental and Leasing, 50-50 owned by Avis
Europe and Shanghai Automotive Industry Sales Corporation, takes over the existing
fleet of 1,000 vehicles from Shanghai Anji Car Rental and operates it under the Avis
brand name. The venture expects to establish more than 70 outlets nationwide. This
is a typical joint venture with homogeneous resource sharing, where the capacity in
the new company is supported by aggregating the number of vehicles from the two
companies.
Besides the healthcare industry and car-rental industry, another sector which has
been a flurry to establish joint ventures is the airline industry. An airline alliance is
an agreement between multiple independent partners to collaborate in various activ-
ities to streamline costs while expanding global reach and market penetration. The
presence of alliances in the airline industry has followed an increasing trend since
'The satellite clinic located within the community hospital is labeled as a MEEI branch.
94
the first large airline alliance was formed in 1989 between Northwest and KLM. By
March 2009, the three major alliances (Star, Sky Team and Oneworld) combined flew
around 73% of all passengers worldwide (Hu et al., 2012). On the cost side, there are
strong incentives for airlines to operate large networks as the evidences on economies
of scale have been well documented (Caves et al., 1984, Brueckner and Spiller, 1994,
Keeler and Formby, 1994, etc). On the revenue side, one of the fundamental attrac-
tions of an airline alliance is the ability to offer codeshare fights. Code sharing is
ai agreement between two carriers whereby one carrier allows a different carrier to
market and sell seats on some of its flights. Based oin empirical evidences, Brueckner
(2003) conclude that codesharing among Star Alliance partners yielded an annual
benefit of around $20 million. Morever, the information comes with codesharing can
be tremendously beneficial. Jain (2010) show that sharing information on bid prices
yields higher revenues of the order of $100 million for every big partnering carrier in
the alliance.
4.1.1 Results and Contributions
In this work, we study both types of joint venture models and address some issues
pertinent to the success of joint ventures. When several companies agree to a part-
nership, disparate interests often exist as each participant is more concerned with his
or her own gain. Given the misalignment in incentives and uncertainties in demand,
we are interested in measuring the performance of a joint venture by quantifying
the difference in the investment level and the total profit attained with respect to a
system optimal outcome.
We have shown that in joint ventures with heterogeneous resource pooling, any
Nash equilibrium induces an equal contribution from every player, despite of them
being asymmetric. The intuition is that since the revenue received by each player
depends solely on the bottleneck capacity (minimum capacity contributed by some
single player) when resource-sharing is heterogeneous, any further investment beyond
the bottleneck capacity only increases her cost and decreases her profit.
Although nultiple Nash equilibria could exist, we show that there always exists
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a unique Strong Nash equilibrium. Next, we focus on a Nash Bargaining model
which is a natural framework to defiuc and design fair assigmnent of the capacity
investment levels between multiple players. We conclude that there exists a unique
revenue sharing contract such that the corresponding Nash Bargaining Solution, the
Strong Nash equilibrium, and the system optimal solution coincide. This revenue
sharing contract indicates that the award each player receives must be equal to the
ratio of her marginal cost to the total marginal cost bore by all partners evaluated at
the optimal investment level.
For joint ventures with homogeneous resource pooling, we first prove some struc-
tural properties on the effective capacity under any demand distribution with convex
costs. The analysis is challenging as the investment of each player could only be
determined by solving a system of implicit equations. We show that joint venture al-
ways underinvests as the effective capacity is always lower than that of a coordinated
setting.
We then focus on quadratic-linear cost functions and show that, through an
intercept-argument, the effective capacity in a joint venture with respect to any rev-
enue sharing ratio is at least 1/n of the optimal level. Moreover, the ratio between
the capacity level could be upper bounded in terms of the cost asymmetry between
the two players and the revenue sharing ratio. While we show that there does not
exist a fixed marginal revenue sharing contract which can coordinate the players, we
propose an interval for the revenue sharing ratio which induces an outcome that is
guaranteed to achieve at least 50% of the optimal profit for a 2-player model. This
interval depends on the cost asymmetry between the two players and the demand
concentration.
Next, we consider general convex cost in the homogeneous resource pooling model
with an arbitrary number of asymmetric players. We show that a lower bound to the
efficiency of the original setting with the nonlinear convex costs is that of a modified
setting with linear costs, where the coefficients are equal to the marginal cost of each
player evaluated at the Nash equilibrium of the original problem. As a result, we
show that the comparative analysis on profit can be reduced to analyze the joint
96
investment level made in the Nash and the system in the setting with linear costs.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We begin with a review on related
literature in Section 4.1.2. Section 4.2 describes the two models and assumptions.
We analyze and present the main results on capacity sharing and substitution model
in Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 respectively.
4.1.2 Related Literature
This paper studies strategic capacity management under uncertainty. In the opera-
tions management literature, there is a vast body of work using the classic newsvendor
model or some variations to capture uncertainties. Federgruen and Zipkin (1986) is
the classic reference for capacitated inventory management. Papers including Ka-
puscinski and Tayur (1998), Angelus and Porteus (2002), Bradley and Glynn (2002),
Van Mieghem and Rudi (2002) consider capacity investment decisions in capacitated
Newsvendor networks. Van Mieghem and Dada (1999) take a different approach at
capacity management and address how the relative timing of the decisions on capac-
ity, inventory, and price impact the sensitivity and profitability. We refer readers
to Van Mieghem (2003) for an excellent survey paper on the recent development on
capacity management. In this work, the capacity of a joint venture depends on the
contribution of multiple participants. Depending on the nature of the resources, the
effective capacity can be the minimum or the sum of individual contributions.
In many settings, capacity-investment decisions are the results after interacting
with other economic agents. Thus, it seems natural for capacity investment models
to incorporate the strategic behavior of self-interested agents. Cachon and Lariviere
(1999) consider the manufacturer's capacity investment and allocation decisions to
several downstream retailers that have private information. Caldentey and Wein
(2003) present contracts that are linear in backorder, inventory, and capacity levels
to coordinate a manufacturer and retailer production-inventory system, including
the capacity decision. Examples on single-resource, multiple-agent also include Carr
and Lovejoy (2000), Porteus and Whang (1991), Kouvelis and Lariviere (2000), etc.
Bassok et al. (1999) and Netessine and Rudi (2003) explore the impact of substitution
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in an inventory context, and its effects are likely to be similar in capacity problems.
In this work, the strategic behavior of participants involving in a joint ventures is
captured in a noncooperative game, as each entity determines his level of contribution
with the goal to maximize his profit. While the revenue each party receives depends
on the effective capacity of the joint venture, the incentive of each entity might not
be correctly aligned to one which maximizes the collective return. We consider a
fixed rate revenue sharing contract described in Cachon and Lariviere (2005) to split
revenue among the participants. To capture the high capital investment incurred in
joint ventures in the healthcare industry, we consider general convex cost function
so as to capture the diminishing returns, in contrast to linear cost function which is
common in the operations management literature (e.g.., Bernstein and Federgruen,
2007, Cachon, 2003, Corbett et al., 2005, Martinez-de Alberniz and Simchi-Levi,
2009). In this setting, we show that an "optimal" coordinating contract which enables
the parties with self-interests to behave as a coordinated entity does not necessarily
exist with homogeneous resources. We then propose a range for fixed revenue sharing
ratio which induces reasonably good outcomes.
Standing in the middle ground between non-cooperative competition and merg-
ing, one of the most fundamental building blocks of joint ventures is negotiation.
Empirical studies suggest that "the power of a joint venture is only as strong as the
negotiation behind it" (Luo and Shenkar (2002), Lin and Germain, 1998). The topic
on negotiation has gained a lot of attraction in the economics literature since Nash
(1950) (e.g., Myerson, 1979, Binmore et al., 1986, Rubinstein, 1982, etc). In the fast
few years, more results on negotiation have become known in the field of operations
management (see for example, Reyniers and Tapiero, 1995, Miller, 1992, Chod and
Rudi, 2006, etc). Nagarajan and Sosic (2008) present an excellent survey paper on
cooperative game theory in the field of supply chain management. In this work, uti-
lizing the bargaining model, we propose a revenue sharing scheme which induces an
outcome which is coincides with the system optimum.
Our work which measures the performance of an unregulated setting with respect
to a centralized system is related to a stream of literature on price of anarchy, pop-
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ularized by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999). It compares the performance of
the worst-case Nash equilibrium with respect to the centralized system. The concept
has been used in transportation networks (Roughgarden and Tardos (2002), Correa
et al. (2004, 2007), Roughgarden (2005)), network pricing (Acemoglu and Ozdaglar
(2007), Weintraub et al. (2010)), oligopolistic pricing games in a single tier (Farahat
and Perakis (2010a,b)), and supply chain games with exogenous pricing (Perakis and
Roels (2007), Martinez-de Alberniz and Simchi-Levi (2009); Martinez-de Alberniz
and Roels (2010)).
4.2 Model Formulation
In this section, we first present the model for a joint venture with n players as an
uncoordinated game. As a benchmark, we also present the model in the system
setting, i.e., n entities were merged and coordinated as a single entity with the goal
to maximize the total return.
4.2.1 Joint-venture: an uncoordinated game
Consider a joint venture with nt profit-maximizing players with asymmetric cost func-
tions. The joint venture generates a joint revenue R(p, K) where p is the fixed price
and K = (K 1 , ... , K,) captures the resources contributed by each player. A revenue-
sharing contract dictates that player i receives revenue /3iR(p,K). Let fi(Ki) be
the convex cost associated with investing Ki resources by player i. Based on a pre-
negotiated revenue-sharing ratio # = (#1, . . . , #7), player i tries to maximize her profit
7ri(#) #i R(p. K) - fi(Ki) by choosing her own investment level Ki, which leads to
a Nash equilibrium (NE).
4.2.2 Merger: the system optimum
Consider the centralized system in which n players are merged and coordinated as
a single player. The merger generates the highest possible profit 7ry ' R(p. K) -
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Ei_1 fi(Ki) by collectively choosing the resource investment K. This yields the first-
best or system optimal solution.
4.2.3 Resource-sharing models
We consider two types of resource-sharing models depending on the nature of the
resources pooled from different players. The nature of the resources determines the
effective capacity in a joint venture, which in turn affects the revenue function R(p, K).
We formally define them as follows:
Definition Heterogeneous resource-sharing. The aggregate revenue generated
by the joint venture is given by R(p, K) = pE(min(D, mini(Ki))).
The type of resource provided by each player is heterogeneous and not fully sub-
stitutable. A service can only be performed with a complete portfolio of resource
types. The effective capacity supported by the joint venture is therefore limited to
the minimum capacity level invested by the players.
Definition Homogeneous resource-sharing. The aggregate revenue generated
by the joint venture is given by I?(p, K) = pE(min(I), Z71 (Ki))).
The type of resource provided by each player is homogeneous to each other and hence
fully substitutable. A service can be performed by using the resource contributed by
any (possibly single) player. The effective capacity supported by the joint venture is
therefore the sum of capacity level invested by each player.
In the next two sections, we will study both types of resource-sharing models and
present the differences in the capacity investment and the total profit generated in a
joint venture to those in a system optimum.
4.3 Heterogeneous Resource-sharing Models
With heterogeneous resources, the effective capacity is limited by the minimum ca-
pacity invested among all players, which becomes the bottleneck capacity. Consider
100
the merger setting, the central planner tries to maximize the aggregate revenue by
collectively choosing the capacity investment K, i.e.,
wr*± max pE[min(K, D)] - fi(Ki), s.t. K < Ki, i - 1, . n. (4.1)
K,K, i
Let K* and K*,..., K* be the system optimal solution.
Lemma 4.3.1 At system optimality, the capacity invested by each player is the same,
i.e., K* = K for all I1, ... , n, where K* solves P(D < K* ) = 1 - _ ( f j(K*)/p.
Proof of Lemma 4.3.1. Without loss of generality, if there exists a pair of players
i and j such that K2 < K, we can decrease the capacity invested by player j from
K* to K7. By doing so, the profit increases by reducing the cost while maintaining
the same revenue. Hence, we reach a contradiction. At system optimality, K* = K
for all i = 1,... , n, and (4.1) reduces to a single variable optimization in which K*
can be obtained by the first-order condition. E
In the system optimum, each individual capacity investment K* must be reduced
to the bottleneck capacity K* when resource-sharing is heterogeneous, since any fur-
ther investment beyond the bottleneck capacity only increases the total cost and
decreases the total profit.
In a joint-venture with a pre-negotiated revenue-sharing contract #, player i tries
to maximize her profit by choosing her profit-maximizing capacity investment level
K based on other players' strategies K_, which leads to a Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
7rN max /3ipE[min(K, D)] - fi(Ki), s.t. K < K. j 1, ... n,
K,Ki;K_,
Now, let KN and KN,..., KN be the Nash equilibrium solutions.
Lemma 4.3.2 In joint-ventures, any
KN(0) = K1N( ) ... K N(/) min (Ak)
1<k<n
101
are Nash Equilibria, where Ak solves
P(D < Ak) = 1 .k Ak
fkP
In particular, KSN(3) = KiSN _ K.. S() = min11k<n(Ak) is a unique
Strong Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 4.3.2. Without loss of generality, if there exists a pair of players
i and j such that KN(#) < K7(3), player j can decrease its capacity investment
from K(3) to KN() lowering her cost and improving her profit. Thus, at Nash
equilibrium, all players must have the same capacity investment level, i.e., KN(O)
KN(O) for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Now assume that minlk<n(Ak) = A,. Now if Am < KN() = K (3), player m
always has incentives to unilaterally lower her investment level to Am since Amr, is her
profit-maximizer. This forces all players to invest at Am,. Any capacity investment
level Am such that 0 < Am A, is also a Nash equilibrium since no player has
incentives to unilaterally deviate from Am,,. In particular, KSN(3) _- KN(
KSN m() - A, is a unique Strong Nash equilibrium in which no coalition, taking the
actions of its complements as given, can cooperatively deviate in a way that benefits
all of its members. l
Lemma 4.3.2 indicates that the capacity invested by each player must be the
same in a joint venture. Since the revenue received by player i depends solely on
the bottleneck capacity KN(#) when resource-sharing is heterogeneous, any further
investment beyond the bottleneck capacity only increases her cost and decreases her
profit. Lemma 4.3.2 also implies that Ak is the profit-niaximnizing capacity for player
k. Since the resource-sharing is heterogeneous, the player m with the lowest profit-
maximizing capacity (i.e., Am = mii1k<n(Ak)) can unilaterally choose to invest
at her profit maximizing capacity, forcing all other players to invest at the same
capacity level. Note that any capacity investment level no greater than Am is a Nash
equilibrium whereas any capacity investment level above Am is not. As a result, it is
102
easy to see that with the existence of multiple Nash equilibria, it is possible for a joint
venture to achieve an arbitrarily bad outcome compared to the system optimum.
So far, we have modeled the decision making process in a joint venture as a Nash
Equilibrium. Next, we will propose an alternative model where the players participate
a Nash bargaining game to determine their respective investment decisions for a given
revenue sharing ratio 0.
Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). The Nash Bargaining Solution (see Ap-
pendix C) is a natural framework that allows us to define and design fair assignment
of the capacity investment levels between n players, which can derive desirable proper-
ties such as Pareto efficiency and proportional fairness. Based on a particular revenue
sharing contract #, n players choose their capacity investment levels according to a
Nash Bargaining game, i.e.,
max f r (#), s.t. K <K, j 1 n,
K,Ki
which is equivalent to solving
Tt
max log 7rF (#). s.t. K < K ,j = 1, . .. , n. (4.2)
K,Ki
Let KB and K, ... , K. be the Nash Bargaining Solution from solving (4.2).
Theorem 4.3.3 There exists a unique revenue sharing contract,
f;(K*)
n"_ f j(K*) '
such that the Nash Bargaining Solution, the unique Strong Nash equilibrium, and the
system optimal solution coincide, i.e., KB (*) - KSN (/*) _ K*.
Proof of Theorem 4.3.3. Observe that (4.2) is equivalent to a single variable op-
timization,
N
max log (#3 pE[min(K, D)] - fi(K)) . (4.3)
Kl
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The first-order condition gives us
N #3p(D > KB) - (KB)
=p 0.f
(pE[min(KB, D)| - fi(KB() (4.4)
By Lemma 4.3.2, at Nash Equilibrium, KN <min1<k<n(Ak), where Ak solves
P(D > Ak) = fk(Ak)
#kP
This implies that
(4.5)
Suppose that there exists a solution -y to both the Nash Bargaining game and the
Nash equilibrium, i.e., 7 = KN(3) K B). Then -y must satisfy (4.4) and (4.5)
simultaneously, implying that
OjpP(D > -) - f(7y) = 0 for all i = 1, ... , n. (4.6)
If such ' exists, - = KSN(0), i.e. 7' is the unique Strong Nash equilibrium since
-y = A 1  ... min1kn(Ak) by (4.6).
Now summing (4.6) over all players and K=1 0i = 1, we have
(4.7)pP(D > 0.
By (4.6) and (4.7), we know that # must be of the following form,
, f/)
i n ,Ij = fj (-Y)
Moreover, note that by Lemma 4.3.1, (4.7) implies that -y = K* . Since K* is the
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#ipP(D > K N) - f,(K N) > 0, for all 7" = 1,-.., n.
.
z=1,...,n,
unique system optimal solution, there exists a unique revenue sharing contract
fJ(K*)
#* n = "K) i = 11 . .. In,i" f1(K*)'
such that Ky = * KSN(*) - KB GB*).
Theorem 4.3.3 shows that when resources are heterogeneous, there is a way to
rely on the revenue sharing contract to eliminate the incentive misalignment among
the players and induce the system optimal outcome. In addition, the way to do so
is the same when the players' behavior is predicted by a Nash equilibrium as well as
the Nash bargaining solution.
In addition, besides inducing the efficient decision, the optimal revenue sharing
contract in Theorem 4.3.3 also embodies the notion of proportional fairness. For an
investment level K*, player i bears a marginal cost f!(K*) and the aggregate marginal
cost is given by summing up the marginal cost of every player participating in the
joint venture, E fj(K*). Theorem 4.3.3 specifics that the marginal revenue ratio
which player i is entitled to receive (#h) should be equal to the proportion of his
marginal cost to the aggregate marginal cost (j (K*)/ E fj(K*)). In simple words,
"fairness" in this context suggests that every participant in a joint venture should be
awarded "proportionally" to the risk (cost) she has to undertake.
4.3.1 Numerical Examples
We conduct numerical studies to compare our approach with the existing approach
adpoted by some joint-ventures (such as MEEI). In the existing model, joint-ventures
set the their capacity investment level according to the long-run average demand, i.e.
KEX = E[D]. In addition, they split the revenue based on how much each party
invests in total capacity investment. More specifically, they set the revenue sharing
parameter to be
EX - fi (K EX)
1]n-=1 /j (KEX
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We consider a 2-player game with unit service price p = 1200. Assume that the
demand follows a normal distribution, and the cost functions to be quadratic, i.e.
fi,(K) =aiK2/2 + biKi + ci for i 1, 2. Without loss of generality, we let ai = 1,
a 2 = 0.5, b1 = b2 = 100 and ci = c2 = 0. Table 4.1 shows the simulation results.
Demand Player 1 Player 2 Total
Share Profit (x 105 ) Share Profit Profit (x 105 )
RS EXRS EX % RS EX RS EX % RS EX %
N(800,100) 63.8% 62.5% 2.19 1.70 29% 36.2 37.5 1.11 1.01 8.8% 3.30 2.72 21%
N(800,200) 63.5% 62.5% 2.06 1.40 47% 36.5 37.5 1.06 0.84 26% 3.12 2.24 39%
N(800,300) 63.3% 62.5% 1.86 1.10 69% 36.7 37.5 0.96 0.66 46% 2.83 1.77 60%
N(700,100) 63.5% 62.1% 2.12 1.77 20% 36.5 37.9 1.09 1.08 1.2% 3.21 2.84 13%
N(700,200) 63.3% 62.1% 1.92 1.47 31% 36.7 37.9 1.01 0.90 12% 2.93 2.37 23%
N(700,300) 63.0% 62.1% 1.69 1.17 45% 37.0 37.9 0.89 0.72 24% 2.58 1.89 37%
Table 4.1: Numerical results comparing the revenue-sharing contract (RS) with the
existing contract (EX).
The simulation results show that our approach outperforms the existing approach
by increasing the profit of both players. The profit increases in the variability of
the demand distribution. Moreover, we observe that the proportional sharing scheme
based on marginal costs (our approach) gives slightly more weight to the less cost-
effective player as compared to the proportional sharing scheme based on total costs
(the existing approach).
4.4 Homogeneous Resource-sharing Models
When resources are homogeneous, they are completely substitutable for one another.
The effective capacity is therefore the sum of the individual capacity invested by
each player. The alliances among airlines and car rental companies are some of the
applications of this model.
In a merger (system), the central planner tries to maximize the aggregate revenue
by collectively choosing the capacity investment K, i.e.,
n
7* maxpE[min(L, D)] - f2 (K).
where the total capacity investment L is the sum of all Kj's, i.e., L A Ke with e
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being the column vector with all one's.
Lemma 4.4.1 Define an auxiliary function
g(Z) A max pE [min(L, D)] - f1 (Ki ). s.t.
Ki -
L < L.
Then g(L) is concave in L where l£ is the budget on total capacity investment.
Proof of Lemma 4.4.1. Suppose L* is the optimal solution to the system problem.
It is easy to see that for all L > L*, g(L) = 7r*. For all L < L*, the budget constraint
becomes tight. It suffices to show that
h(l) -= min(
i=1
fi(Ki), s. t. ( Ki=|
is convex in L. For any A C [0, 1],
h(ALi + (1 - A)L2 ) =
Ah(L 1 ) + (1 - A)h(L 2 ) =
min fi(AKi + (1 - A) K,)
Ki,K1
SAt. Ki = L21, K, = L22,
min Ar
Kj,K'
s. Ki = L1
T i
fi (Ki) + (1 - A) >3(K'
i=1
By convexity of function fi for i = 1, . . . , n, for any Ki, we know that
fi(A Ki + (1 A)K') ;> Af (Ki) + (1 A).!i(K').
Taking the minimum with respect to the same constraints preserves the inequality,
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and
we have
h(AL 1 + (1 - A)L2) > Ah( 11) + (1 - A)h(L 2 ).
This completes the proof. D
In a joint-venture with a pre-negotiated revenue-sharing contract #3, player i tries
to maximize her profit by choosing her profit-maximizing capacity investment level
Ki based on other players' strategy K_i, i.e.
7N max 3ipE[min(L, D)] - fi(Ki,),Ti K,Ki;K-i
which leads to a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 4.4.2 The total capacity investment level in a joint-venture is no greater
than that in a merger (system), i.e., En KN E_, Kn .
Proof of Lemma 4.4.2. Suppose that. without loss of generality., K N > K*. Then
we have
Op - fj(KiN) p - fj'(K*) p - fj(K*)
3p - 3p p
Take F-1 on both sides (F- 1 is monotonely increasing, so the sign does not change),
then we have EnA K/v E L 1 K. F
The result in Lemma 4.4.2 does not depend on demand distribution or symmetry
among the players. It shows that the effective capacity in a joint venture is always
lower compared to a system optimum. However, when the players have asymmetric
costs, it is likely that some players over-invest as compared to their counterparts in
the optimal setting. In particular, the individual contribution depend on the revenue
sharing ratio 13.
In contrast to the heterogeneous resource sharing case where an optimal revenue
sharing method exists, one can show that there does not exist a fixed revenue sharing
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method which will induce the system optimal actions in the Nash equilibrium. In
other words, there does not exist # such that <rrN) =F.
In the rest of the section, we will investigate the following questions: (1) For a
fixed revenue sharing ratio , how is performance in a joint venture compared to the
optimum. (2) How to choose 0 such that we can have some performance guarantee.
We will first restrict ourselves to linear quadratic costs. We begin with a 2-player
game and extend our results to a n-player setting. In the end of this section, we will
consider n-player setting with general convex costs.
4.4.1 2-player game with linear-quadratic cost functions
Assume that the cost functions are linear-quadratic, i.e.,
a1(K1 + bi)2 a 2 (K 2 + b 2 ) 2
J i(Ki) a 2 + ci ' f2(K 2 ) - 2 + c2-22
Without loss of generality, assume that a1 > a 2 . Now define k 1 = K 1 + b1 and
K2 - K 2 + b2 , and their corresponding modified total capacity investment levels,
LN _ LN +b 1 + b2 , L* = L* + b1 +b 2 .
Lemma 4.4.3 For a 2-player game with any demand distribution D and linear-
quadratic cost functions, for all /1 < 0.5, the ratio of the total capacity investment
level in the system to that in the joint-venture is upper and lower bounded by
LN / 1a 2 + 2a 11> - >
L* a1 +a 2  2
Proof of Lemma 4.4.3. The lower bound is proven by Lemma 4.4.2. Now we show
how to obtain an upper bound by utilizing an intercept argument. By optimality
conditions, we have
D ip - a1 (K' - bl) /2P - a2 (K2N - b2 )P(D < Ki + K2N 
__2
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Figure 4-1: A graphical proof for Lemma 4.4.3.
By changing of variables,
P(D + bi+<b2 < N -2N _ 1 - a1 31 _ 2P - a 2 2N
-
31p /2P
Then #32a1 kN = /31a2 kN and we have
N _ 31a 2 + I2alN, or N _1a2+ 02a1N
Oia2 I#2ai 2
Thus, we have
P(~b+b <IN) ala2 (N.
S a12+2ai[ (4.8)
By the similar transformation of the first-order condition in the system optimal, we
have
P(D + b1 + b2 < *)- 1- aia2 (49)
p ai +a2)
As shown in Figure 4-1, the horizontal axis is the modified total capacity investment
level and the vertical axis is the cumulative distribution function of the demand. The
upward sloping curve (cumulative distribution function) represents the left hand sides
of (4.8) and (4.9), and the two downward sloping lines represent the right hand sides
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of (4.8) and (4.9). Thus, LN ard L* can be solved graphically. We also observe that
1* 1. C a1 + a2
LN LN A 0 1a 2 + /32 al
where the points C and A are the x-intercepts which can be evaluated from (4.8) and
(4.9). D
Lemma 4.4.3 shows that for a 2-player game with linear-quadratic costs, the ef-
fective modified capacity in a joint venture depends on both the cost asymmetry as
well as the revenue sharing ratio. However, the worst case, L* = 2LN, can happen
under two circumstances: (1) equal revenue sharing (#1 = #2) and independent of cost
asymmetry, and/or (2) with symmiretric players (a1 = a 2 ) and independent of revenue
sharing contracts (with the assumiption that #1 < 0.5. Intuitively, dividing revenue
equally among asymmetric entities sounds like a bad idea. It is surprising to see that
having symmetric players in a joint venture could lead to the worst outcome, and
having different revenue sharing contracts might not mitigate its impact. Note that
when #1 > 0.5, it is easy to construct examples that worst case becomes unbound.
Lemma 4.4.3 also highlights a notable difference between the homogeneous and
the heterogeneous resource pooling. Note that in Theorem 4.3.3 for the heterogeneous
resources, we have shown that the optimal revenue sharing rule suggests that every
player should be compensated proportionally to his share of the marginal cost to the
aggregate marginal cost. That if, if ai > a2 , the optimal way to share revenue must
follow that #1 > #02. Lemma 4.4.3 implies the exact opposite, i.e., in order to have
the worst case performance guarantee, given ai > a 2 , then #1 < #2!
The intuition is that for heterogeneous resource pooling, the effective capacity of
the entire system is constrained by a bottleneck capacity due to certain key players.
To induce these players to produce at K*, they have to be awarded such that they
are willing to produce at K* but not lower. Now consider homogeneous resource
pooling, every player can contribute to the effective capacity, the only difference is
the cost. Therefore, one should encourage the cost efficient player to produce more
and discourage those with higher cost. It is captured by a lower revenue sharing ratio
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for the player with higher marginal cost.
This observation on a 2-player game can be generalized to a n-player game as
shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4.4 Consider a n-player game with cost structure a1 > a2 ... > a,
and revenue sharing contract 01 2 -. - 0,. Under any demand distribution D
and any linear-quadratic cost functions, the ratio of the total capacity investment level
in the system to that in the joint-venture is upper and lower bounded by
aN
With n-players, the worst case in terms of the effective capacity is L* = n, i.e.,
the worst case of a joint venture decreases as the number of participants increases. The
result is intuitive as with more parties involved, it becomes increasingly challenging to
coordinate the joint venture. Similar to the 2-player game studied earlier, the worst
case occurs with symmetric players and/or equal sharing of the revenue when players
are asymmetric.
In the next theorem, we will show that the profit generated in a joint venture can
be bounded by the optimal profit.
Theorem 4.4.5 For a 2-player game with any linear-quadratic cost functions and
any demand distribution with mode m, we have
> - for all ai > a 2 and /1 E
7rFT 2 - 2mp + (a,1/a2 + 1) '
Moreover, the optimal 0* that maximizes the total joint-venture profit falls in the
following interval,
1' mp + 1
[a1/a2 + lV 2mnp + (a1/a2 + 1
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Proof of Theorem 4.4.5. By Lemma 4.4.3, we know that
LN _ 31a2 + 0 2 al KN0 - 1 or LN _ 1a2 + /2al 
RN
/2(1 2
The Nash profit functions can be expressed as functions of LN i.e.,
.Nr(/) = pE [nin(LN aia2 + a2a 2 
2
61 -- b2 , D) - 1  2  N2bi b2 Di -(.2 (a2#1+ a1#32)2 C1 - C2 - (4.10)
If we impose a budget constraint L < AN on the system optimal, the budget-
constrained system optimal profit can also be expressed as functions of LN i.e.,
= pE(min(LN -bl - b2 , D)] - ( a1a22(a 2 + 1)) L N 2 - C1 - C2 ,
Observe that g(LN) = w(#) when #1 . By Lemma 4.4.3, we know that for all
1 , 2. In addition, g(I) is concave in L by Lemma 4.4.1. Thus, we have
NrN
7T g(L*) -
No
2g(L*/2) 29(LN) 2
Now let D = D + bi + b2 . Since
P(D < LN
dLN
d 1 h
2 A N
LN ala2(al -a2)
p (#1a2+(1-#1)ai)2
(LN + (1a2+(1 )ai
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g(L N )
We have by (4.10),
d7rF(01)
d31
(1 - P(D < LN N ala2(al 1a2)
- 1ty1~ LN))L I(I3a2+(1 i0i)aiiT2
fb(LN) +1 ala2
p #1a2+(1 #1)ai
a 2a 2(1 - 2/31) N2_ 02 + a2a 2(1 -012 NL N
(a2+ aI(1 - /31))3 (A1a2 + (1 - /1)ai)2J d31
N 2  ( 2 a 2(al - a2)(al + a 2 ) 1(1 - 01) 2 2 -2(1)1 ) 
-+ a a2(1 
-21
(#1a2 + (1 - #1)ai) 3  p(# 1a 2 + (1 - f1)ai)ff(LN) + aja 2
If the mode of D is in, then 7r(#1) is decreasing in 31 for all
C mp + a 2  1~
[2mp + ai + a 2 2_
and iry(# 1) is increasing in !1 for all
E L 0, a 2
Iai+a2_
Thus, the optimal #1* lies in the following interval
S (12 ttP + (12
11 + (2 ' 2np + ai + (12_
This completes the proof. D
In Theorem 4.4.5, we propose an interval for which the aggregate Nash profit is
guaranteed to achieve at least half of the optimal profit. The interval depends on
the cost asymmetry between the two players and the mode of demand. In particular,
the interval shrinks as the two players have more similar cost structure, i.e., with two
fully symmetric players, the best revenue sharing ratio asks for an equal division of
the revenue. On the other hand, the interval widens as the mode of demand increases,
i.e., if the demand distribution is flatter, our proposed revenue sharing contracts have
more rooms for error in capturing the peak demand.
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For a n-player game, we show that an equal revenue sharing scheme could guar-
antee a worst case performance of at least 1/n of the optimal profit as shown in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4.4.6 For a n-player game with any linear-quadratic cost functions and
any demand distribution, if we choose #i , 1/n, i.e., dividing the aggregate revenue
equally among all the players, we have
T(#p) 1
T n
Proof of Proposition 4.4.6. From a 2-player setting, one can see that the profit
functions can be expressed as functions of L,
1rT(L) -- pE[min(L + b1 + b2, D)] - a aI _c1 - c2.(2(a2 + ai))
Note that it is equivalent to 7r(# 1,#12) when # = 2 = 0.5, where
7N () = pE[ini(LN + 1 + b2, D)] - (aa 2 I + 2 - Ci - c2
T -(nT T2(a 2 01 + a1 #32 )2  -
In Lemma 4.4.1, we have shown the concavity of 7T(I,). Then by making use of the
bound on investment level as shown in Proposition 4.4.4, we obtain the desired result.
4.4.2 n-player game with general convex costs
We consider n-player games with asymmetric convex cost functions. Denote f -
(fi(Ki))_1 as general convex cost functions. Let 7rN(f) and 7r*(f) be the Nash and
system profit of n players with respect to the general cost f, respectively. Define the
Price of Anarchy with respect to f as
POA(f) (f
7r*(f)
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We first show that POA(f) can be lower bounded by POA(f) where f is a set of
modified linear cost functions.
Proposition 4.4.7 The price of anarchy on the total profit of a joint venture is lower
bounded by
POA(f)= N - POA(f),7*(f) 7r* (f)
where f (f1..I) are linear cost functions such that f o = a- K, where a=
fj'(K7).
Proof of Proposition 4.4.7. By convexity of fi for all i = 1, . n, we know that
fi(K* ) > f,(KN) + fN(K7)(K* - Kj).
Therefore
pE [min(LN, D)] -
pE[min(L*, D)] -
("1 f (K,)
E,_ f (K7)
pE [min(LN, D)] - j(" f (K7)
- pE[min(L*, D)] - (f1(K) + f'(K[)(K[ -
Since
0 = fi(0) ;> f 1 (j) + f(K)(-A) = f (K ) - f(K )(K) <o
we add (4.12) onto both the numerator and denominator of (4.11),
pE[min(N 1))]N
pEAmin(L*, D)] -
Zn
i=1 fj(K,)(Ki[)
Now let k, and k be the Nash Equilibrium solution and the system optimal solution
with respect to the same problem but with the modified linear cost functions such that
=a -Ki where ai = fj(KN). Correspondingly, ETN 1 N and f* = _ R".
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POA(f) (4.11)
POA(f)
(4.12)
Since KN = KN (having the same set of first-order conditions), we have
pE[min(LN, D)] - ff(K7 )(KN) = pE min(LN, D)] -
i=1 i=1
Because ki is the optimal capacity investment level for the modified problem, it
implies that
pE[min(L*, D)] - f((KN)(K ) < pE[min(L*, D)] - aiki.
i=1 i=1
Thus, we have
pEmi(IND) -E"aikN 7__N
POA(f) > p ~E[min(LN, D)] - =n 1 > 7N POA(f).
pE[min(L*, D)] - n_1 aiK; -r*(f)
This completes the proof. D
By making use of Proposition 4.4.7, we can obtain a lower bound on the profit by
using the cost asymmetry factor and the ratio between the investment levels in the
Nash and the system optimum.
Lemma 4.4.8 Price of anarchy on the total profit of a joint venture is lowered
bounded by
N LN
POA(f)= > ~ ,-=fPr*(f) L
where the cost asymmetry factor is given by
mini a
<1
maxi a
Proof of Lemma 4.4.8. Assume that, without loss of generality, am = ai1  a 2
... < a = am. Define the set P = {j I aj = am}. If JPJ - s, s symmetric players
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F(x))
0 x
Figure 4-2: A graphical proof for Lemma 4.4.8.
invest in the system optimal solution and therefore * = sk for i E P.
POA(f) - (Y
P 0 N D -(x)dx+pILN FD(x)dT - amLN
1 atN _ I:2 N aLN
ZN + 
_N N 
_ am
N (,jN 
_ kN
1 * - aI*
a,, (n 1)LN LN
aA (n - 1)I* L*
where the cost asymmetry factor d = amrri/aAI < 1. This completes the proof. OI
Note that equal revenue sharing induces equal marginal costs for every player in a
Nash equilibrium, since /3i = a/ E_= aj. Therefore, & = 1, and the comparison
between the profit can be reduced to a comparison between the total investment
level, i.e, __ >
Next, we will present the how the profit in a joint venture can be bounded from
below by the system optimum. Define the demand spread
0
~ m max fD(x)
OM min fD (Y)
where x < IN * y L
118
Theorem 4.4.9
1 - of
POA(f) > & _
1 - nr + (n - 1)?'
where - maxi (aj/p, and > ; 1 measures the demand spread.
F(x)
1
0
1 -am/ p
x
Figure 4-3: A graphical proof for Theorem 4.4.9.
Proof of Theorem 4.4.9. First we lower bound the ratio of IN to ii*.
LN
L*
>N
LN ( =1  i ~ arm)/(Orp)
> (1 - D'_, ai/p)/Om
(1 - L'_1 ai/p)/OM + Zi 1i - iar)(OnP)
p - ZiI=1 fti + (Li-,1 Gi - }rri)O
p-naM
p - naM + (n - 1)aMO
1 - nf
1 - nf + (n - 1)f5'
where F = aM/p. This result then follows from Lemine 4.4.8. E
Note that when D is uniform, the demand spread 0 = 1, we have
1 - n
POA(f) > d _ .n
1 - r
Figure 4-4, 4-5 and 4-6 show the lower bounds on POA with uniform demand,
normal demand N(400, 100) and exponential demand exp(400), respectively. The
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lower bound on POA decreases as the number of players increases or the marginal
cost to price ratio increases. We also observe that the lower bound on POA has a
steeper rate of decrease when the demand spead is higher. Note that in our simulation,
the exponential demand has the highest demand spread (0 = 7.35), followed by the
normal demand (0 3.86) and then the uniform demand (0 1).
Lower Bound on POA
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Figure 4-4: Lower Bound on Price of Anarchy for Uniform Demand.
4.5 Conclusion
In this work, we study resource pooling and capacity planning in joint ventures under
uncertainties. We distinguish two types of resources pooling, based on whether the
resources are heterogeneous or homogeneous. When resources are heterogeneous, the
effective capacity in a joint venture is constrained by the lowest level of contribution
from one participant. We have shown that every participant is committed to make
an equal contribution in a joint venture with heterogeneous resources. We have also
shown that, there exists a same efficient and fair revenue sharing scheme in both
Nash equilibrium and Nash Bargaining solution. The optimal scheme rewards every
participant proportionally to his marginal cost. When resources are homogeneous,
however, there does not exist a revenue sharing scheme which induces actions to
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Lower Bound on POA
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0.2 - n = 4
0.1 -
0
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
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Figure 4-5: Lower Bound on Price of Anarchy for Normal Demand.
achieve the optimum. Nonetheless, we propose some methods to share revenue with
the worst case performance guarantee. The methods suggest that the reward should
be inversely proportional to the marginal cost of each participant with homogeneous
resources.
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Lower Bound on POA
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Figure 4-6: Lower Bound on Price of Anarchy for Exponential Demand.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this thesis, we have surveyed several recent work to develop provably near-optimal
approximation algorithms for operations management models. We would like to sum-
marize our results and point out possible future research directions.
Stochastic Lot-sizing Problems
We have developed new algorithmic approaches to compute provably near-optimal
policies for multi-period stochastic lot-sizing inventory models with positive lead
times, general demand distributions and dynamic forecast updates. The goal is to
coordinate a sequence of orders of a single commodity, aiming to supply stochastic
demands over a discrete finite horizon with minimum total expected cost, including
fixed ordering, holding and backlogging costs. The policies that are developed have
worst-case performance guarantees of 3 and typically perform very close to optimal in
extensive computational experiments. We also propose a 6-approximation algorithm
for the counterpart model under uniform capacity constraints.
We believe that these ideas will be effective to develop new near-optimal algo-
rithms to various core stochastic multi-echelon and multi-item inventory control mod-
els. In particular, we attempt to tackle the stochastic joint-replenishment problem.
In the joint-replenishment problem, we have a cross-docking warehouse that is not
allowed to hold any inventory, and multiple retailers each facing stochastic demands.
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A major set-up cost is incurred whenever the warehouse places an order from some
exogenous supplier, and a minor set-up cost is incurred whenever an order is shipped
to a retailer. Any order made by the warehouse has to be distributed among retail-
ers immediately since the warehouse is not allowed to hold any inventory. The goal
is to coordinate a sequence of orders over a discrete finite horizon to minimize the
system-wide expected cost, including set-up, ordering, holding and backlogging costs.
Another important future research direction is to study the performance of dual-
balancing or, more generally, cost-balancing policies under various assumptions on
the underlying demand distributions. As much as it is powerful to establish general
worst-case analysis, it is equally important to refine this analysis to various parametric
regimes of the underlying demand distributions and other key parameters of the
problem. We call this parametric worst-case analysis.
Revenue Management of Reusable Resources with
Advanced Reservations
We have studied a class of revenue management problems in systems with reusable
resources and advanced reservations. A simple control policy called the class selection
policy (CSP) is proposed based on solving a knapsack-type linear program (LP). We
show that the CSP and its variants perform provably near-optimal in the Halfin-
Whitt regime. The analysis is based on modeling the problem as loss network systems
with advanced reservations. In particular, asymptotic upper bounds on the blocking
probabilities are derived.
There are several issues that still remain open. From the comparison of the upper
bounds and the simulation results, it is clear that there is a gap between the empirical
blocking probabilities and the theoretical bounds. This gap is due to the approxima-
tion using infinite capacity systems. It opens an opportunity to tighten the upper
bound using another fictitious system between the original capacitated system and
the infinite capacity counterpart.
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We believe that these ideas can be effective to analyze dynamic pricing models
with advanced reservation. Consider a single-class time-homogeneous arrival process
of customers. Depending on the current state of the booking profile, the system offers
each arriving customer a price from a fixed menu. The customer accepts the offer
only if the price offered falls below her reservation price. A similar knapsack-type
linear program canl be used to guide the system to dynamically decide what prices to
offer.
Joint-ventures in Operations Management
We have examined the problem of capacity planning in joint ventures to meet stochas-
tic demand in a newsvendor-type setting. When resources are heterogeneous, there
exists a unique revenue-sharing contract such that the corresponding Nash Bargain-
ing Solution, the Strong Nash Equilibrium, and the system optimal solution coincide.
The optimal scheme rewards every participant proportionally to her marginal cost.
When resources are homogeneous, there does not exist a revenue-sharing scheme
which induces the system optimum. Nonetheless, we propose provably good revenue-
sharing contracts which suggests that the reward should be inversely proportional to
the marginal cost of each participant.
We will explore different cost structures and generalize the results as much as
possible. A viable approach is to use piecewise linear or quadratic functions to ap-
proximate any convex cost functions. We are also interested in mechanism design
that aligns the incentives of both parties to achieve system optimum profit. Another
important element of this study is test the validity and quality of our models using
empirical data.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 2
A.1 Proofs of Technical Lemmas and Theorems
LEMMA 2.4.1. Let W(RB) be the total cost incurred by the RB policy. Then we have,
T-L
E[We(RB)] < 3 - E[Zt]. (A.1)
t=1
Proof of Lemma 2.4.1. Using the marginal cost accounting in Equation (2.6) and
standard arguments of conditional expectations, we express
T-L
E[6(RB)] = E[HPB(Q) + H RB (QRB) +K .(QRB >0)] (A.2)
t=1
= E (E[HBI(Q B) + ± B(QB)K - (QRB >0) Ft]]
t-=1
T-L T-L
- 5 E[2Z B + PtK] < 3E E[ZPB].
t=1 t=1
The third equality follows directly from (2.13). To establish the first inequality in
(A.2) above, we shall show that Zt > PtK almost surely. That is, for each ft E F,
zt > ptK. Given any information set ft, all the quantities ,rt, 0t, (t, #t and pt defined
above are known deterministically. We split the analysis into two cases:
1. If Ot > K, then qt = qt (the balancing quantity) with probability pt = 1
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implying zt = Ot > K. The claim follows.
2. If O < K, then qtB = qt (the holding-cost-K quantity) with probability pt and
qB = 0 with 1 - pt. Thus, by Equations (2.10) and (2.11), we have zt = ptK,
and the claim follows.
This concludes the proof of the lemma. D
LEMMA 2.4.2. The overall holding cost and backlogging cost incurred by OPT are
denoted by 11OPT and H10  , respectively. Then we have, with probability 1,
HoPT ZHB.1(te S1HU32H), HOPT >ZB . (t & 1 1 J 1 m).(A-3)
t t
Proof of Lemma 2.4.2. The proof is identical to Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 in Levi et al.
(2007). D
LEMMA 2.4.3. The expected holding cost and backlogging cost incurred by OPT plus
the expected amount borrowed from the bank account A are at least [ _' E[ZPBI.
That is, The following inequality holds
T-L
E ((HOPT + UOPT) + A] > E E[Z I (A.4)
t-=1
Proof of Lemma 2.4.3. Using linearity of expectation, it suffices to show
T-L
[ijOPT + OPT] > 1 N B]. ( A.5)
t=1
Using Lemma 2.4.2 and standard arguments of condition expectations, we have
E[H o T ] > E [5 HERB . 1(t C71H U $2H) (A.6)
.t
- E[E[(HtB 1H U 2H)| Fj
= E [ ZB t 1H - 2H)1
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Similarly, we also have
E[YI 0 T ) > E [ ZPB 1(t E 1r- U 2)] (A.7)
It
Equation (A.5) follows from sunning up Equations (A.6) and (A.7). D
LEMMA 2.4.4. The following inequality holds
~T-L
E [A] < E [ K -(QPT > 0) (A.8)
I.t=1
In other words, the expected borrowing E[A] is less than the total expected fixed or-
dering cost incurred by OPT.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.4. First we define the reduced information set f- to be the
information up to period t excluding the randomized decisions of the RB policy over
[1. t - 1]. In particular, given the entire evolution of demand fT , the sequence of
orders placed by OPT is known deterministically. Let 1 < ti < t 2 < . . . < t', < T- L
be the periods in which OPT placed n = n I f7 orders sequentially. Let to = 0 and
tn,+1 = T - L + 1. We shall show that there are no problematic periods within (to, t1)
and that, for each i - 1,... r1, the expected borrowing within the interval [li 1i+1)
does not exceed K. That is,
(to, ti) n -,2u = o,(A9
zR Z/ .1+1 < K. (A. 10)
It is important to note that fT does not include the randomized decisions of the
RB policy. Thus, the set 32M is still random and so is the amount borrowed from
the bank. In particular, the expectation in Equation (A.10) is taken with respect to
the randomized decisions of the RB policy. Equations (A.10) and (A.9) imply that,
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for each fj,
E[Z ZtPB fl K . n I fT = K -n, (A.11)
and therefore
[ A] < K. 17[N] E K. (QOP T > 0) . (A.12)
t=1I
Thus, it suffices to prove Equations (A.10) and (A.9). Figure A-I gives a graphical
interpretation of Equation (A.10), i.e., we want to show that the fixed ordering cost
K incurred by OPT in period t, will cover the expected amount borrowed from the
bank in periods that belong to set 02m within the interval [ti, ti).
K
Period 1 eei I g
1 ti ti ti-1 --- tN T
I order point by OPT * non-problematic period o problematic period (T2M)
Figure A-1: Decomposition of the problematic periods in the set 352u into intervals
between ordering points of OPT
Proof of Equation (A.9). We first show that Equation (A.9) holds. Recall the
definition 2M = : 89 < K and XtB OPT XRB _ RB}. Since at the be-
ginning of the planning horizon, it is assumed that every feasible policy will have
the same initial inventory position, it follows that if period t is in 2M, OPT must
have placed an order and overtaken the inventory position of the RB policy. (The
two policies face the same sequence of demands.) However, (to, ti) denotes the set of
periods in which OPT has not placed any order yet. Thus, the intersection of these
two sets is empty.
Proof of Equation (A.10). Next we show that Equation (A.10) holds. Recall
that fT denotes an entire evolution of the system excluding the randomized decisions
of the RB policy. Given the entire evolution of demands fT, construct a decision tree
based on the randomized decisions of the RB policy. The root node corresponding to
period 1 contains the information set fi - f E fj. The tree is built in layers, each
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corresponding to a period, where the number of nodes in layer t is 2 -1 numbered 1 =
1 . . , 2t-1. In particular, a node 1 in period (layer) t corresponds to some information
set ft E t which includes the realized reduced information set ]J- C f', and the
realized randomized decisions up to period t - 1 of the RB policy. Therefore it is
known whether under this state period t belongs to the set ' 7 2M or not.
The edges in the tree represent the different (randomized) decisions that the RB
policy may make with their respective probabilities. Each path from the root to
a specific node corresponds to a sequence of realized randomized ordering decisions
made by the RB policy. For example, consider again some node 1 in period (layer)
t in which the RB policy will order q-tB units with probability pti and nothing with
probability 1 - pti; then the node 1 in period t (denoted by ti) will have two edges to
two children nodes in the next period I + 1 each containing its distinctive ordering
information. Conceptually one can think about the decision tree as a collection of
independent coins, each corresponding to a node in the tree. The coin corresponding
to node I at layer (period) t has probability of success (ordering) pti.
1-P3d nn
.1Pit nn ....
1-P2b nn pn
1-Pla pn P3d pn Ptf n
P2b p
pn 1-P3e nn
1-Pti pn ....
PP 1-P2e n
nn Pe pn " pn
P ~nn 
....
Period P2c nn ....
I a . 8 0
1 2 3 "" t t+1 - T
Figure A-2: An example of a general decision tree
Next we partition the nodes in the tree into problematic nodes (pn nodes), i.e.,
nodes that correspond to a pair (t, ft) for which t E 2M, and non-problematic nodes
(nn nodes). An example of a general decision tree is illustrated in Figure A-2.
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Focus now on a specific time interval (ti, ti+1 ). Suppose we have constructed the
tree from period 1 to T; the number of nodes and paths are clearly finite (possibly
exponential). Let the set W to be the set of all possible outcomes of the randomized
decisions in all nodes in layers within the interval [1, t, - 1] and in all the nn nodes
within the interval [1, T]. In particular, each g E W corresponds to a specific set of
outcomes in all nodes in layers (periods) within the interval [1, t, - 1] and in all the
nn nodes in the tree. Using the terminology of coins proposed before, g corresponds
to the outcome of the respective subset of coins corresponding to all nodes within
[1, t, - 1] and all nn nodes within [1, T].
Conditioning on some g E W induces a path from the root of the tree (in period
1) up to the earliest pn node, say j, where j corresponds to the period (layer) of
that node. Here we abuse the notation ignoring the index of the node within layer
j. (Namely, the exact value will be je for some e.) It is straightforward to see that
j > li. If j falls outside the interval [ii, i+1)., i.e., j > /j+1, it follows that there are
no pn nodes within the interval [ti, tj+1 ), and there is no borrowing over the interval.
Assume now that j falls within the interval [ti, ti+1 ) (j can possibly be in period
(layer) ti). We will show that the expected borrowing does not exceed K. That is.,
E Z B g < K. (A.13)
se[jat+) U M7,1
The proof of Equation (A.10) will then follow.
Recall that node j corresponds to some information set fj E /F. It follows that the
RB th ore. tstarting inventory position xi and the corresponding holding-cost-K quantity qB
are known deterministically. Conditioning on g, the only uncertainty in the evolution
of the system depends on the randomized decisions made in pn nodes within [J. 'i+1).
Consider the sub-tree induced by conditioning on g. The non-problematic nodes (nn
nodes) in the sub-tree have only one outgoing edge that corresponds to the decision
(order/no-order) specified by g to that node. The problematic nodes (pn nodes)
have two outgoing edges corresponding to the order/no-order decisions, respectively.
(Recall that g does not specify the decisions in these nodes.) Moreover, each pn node
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_ -( -..- nodes that require no further borrowing
paths specified by some g
1-Pj.1.b nn
+3 - - - - other paths not specified by g
nn' P+2
1Pja P+3f
pn P+1.b 1-Pj+3,e 
_
Pia 1 -P+2,c nn 1-pj+4,g pn ....
pn P+3,e pn
Pjal 21 P+ 4 ,g
Period
j j+1 j+2 j+3 j+4 ti+,-1 - T
Figure A-3: An example of a decision subtree: focus on the interval [ti, ti+1 ) and some
g E f, j is the earliest period in which a problematic node (pn) occurs. According to
g, there are two possible outcomes whenever a problematic node (pn) is reached, and
there is only one possible outcome whenever a non-problematic node (nn) is reached.
If a problematic node (pn) orders, there will not be further borrowing until the next
order of OPT in period ti+1-
S E [j, ti+1 ) is associated with the probability ps of ordering. (We again abuse the
notation introduced before and omit the index e of the node within the layer/period.)
An example of a decision subtree specified by some g E W is illustrated in Figure A-
3. Any sequence of randomized outcomes corresponding to the decisions in the pn
nodes induces a path of evolution of the system. The resulting cumulative borrowing
from the bank account A, corresponding to this path, is equal to K times the sum of
probabilities associated with the pn nodes in this path. (For each pn node s in the
path, the borrowing is equal to pK = z,.)
Next we claim that the sub-tree defined above includes at most one pu node in
each layer (period). This follows from the fact that any path between two pn nodes
r, s such that j < r < s < tj+1 in the tree includes only no-ordering edges of pn
nodes. To see why the latter is true, observe that if an order is placed by the RB
policy in a pn node, the resulting inventory position of the RB policy is higher than
OPT. Since both policies face the same sequence of demands, the RB policy will
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not have higher inventory position than OPT at least until the next order placed
by OPT. This excludes the existence of pn nodes in subsequent periods until OPT
places another order, i.e., beyond period /i± - 1.
In light of the latter observation, we re-number all the pn nodes in the sub-tree as
1, 2, . .., M (where 1 corresponds to j, specified before). Moreover, it follows that the
probability to arrive at node m = 1. M and borrow pmriK is equal to ]7J= "_(1 -ps).
(This probability corresponds to no-ordering decisions in all the pn nodes prior to m.)
The total expected borrowing is then
( M n-1
K- p M+1 (1 - p) pm Pk) . (A. 14)
m=2 S=1 k=1
Observe that the probability to borrow exactly K - E" Pk is equal to
m--1
Pm) pm (A.15)
Moreover, we have already shown that the expression in (A. 14) is bounded above by
K (see Lemma 2.4.5). This concludes the proof of the lemma. E
LEMMA 2.4.5. Let {pi} satisfy the condition 0 < p, < 1 for all 1. Then the following
inequality holds,
p + (1-p,)p k i1 (A. 16)
1=2 (s=1 k=1
Proof of Lemma 2.4.5. We construct an increasing sequence {am,.} where
m =p) + P (1 ps)) P1 ( pk . (A.17)
1=2 ts=1 k=1
For each m, if we replace p, by 1, we get
2m'-1 1-1 m-1 m'-1
ari =P + ( (1-p)) (±p)+ (i(1-- p ) (1+ tPk
1=2 P=1 k=1 S=1 k=1
(A. 18)
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such that am < am. Next we will show by induction that am, < 1 for all m from which
the proof of the lemma follows. It is straightforward to verify ai, d2 < 1.
that am < 1 for some m C Z+, we will show that <m 1.
1=2 S=1
=am-1+ f1
.S=1
mr-1
8=1
(1-Ps) Pi (P + (f(i-
(k=1 +s(=1
rSn ±
Prs ( Pk) + (P1- Ps)
k=1 S=1
Ps)) (1
m-1
= am-1+ H
(S=1
(1 -Ps) ) (1
Hence the claim follows by induction.
m
+k
k=1
Pk )
Ps) )
)(1
rm~
(1-pm) + pm Pk
k=1 I
a -1
k=1
]
LEMMA 2.6.1. Let W(I?1H) be the total cost incurred by the IB policy. Then we have,
T-L
(A.19)E[%W(/I 3)] <3. E[ZPB].
t=1
Proof of Lemma 2.6.1. Using the standard arguments of conditional expectations,
we express
E[W(RB)]
T-L
-)7 E[HtR(Q/'B) + f!RB(QRB) + K - I QRB > 0)
t=1
(A.20)
T-L
- 7[E[ JRB(QRB) + fBRB(c2RB) + K -I (QRB > 0) Pt]]
t=1
T-L
< SE2ZB +PtK]
t= 1
T-L
< 3( E[ZB].
t=1
To establish the two inequalities in (A.20), we shall show that ZRB > E[HPB(QfB)
Ft], Z/" = E[IlRB(Q B) Ft] and Z >" 2 PtK almost surely. Given any information
set ft, we know the inventory level xt and all the quantities O, #t O , pt defined above
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Assume
1+rtpE
k=1
k=1)
-
Camr+1
are also known deterministically. We split the analysis into two cases:
1. If Ot > K, then qt" = qt (the balancing quantity) with probability pt = 1
implying z/B =t > K. In addition, we have zB B - t._
E[fB(qt) ft]. The claim follows.
2. If O8 < K, then q/?B = min{qt, u} with probability pt and q/RB = 0 with 1
pt. Thus, by the construction of the probability pt, we have zR ptK =
E[n B(q ft and tB ptK = E[HpB(B ft E[Ht"(q ft , and
the claim follows.
This completes the proof of the lemma. F
LEMMA 2.6.2. The overall holding cost and backlogging cost incurred by OPT are
denoted by HOPT and 11OPT respectively. Then we have
t
OPT ] B E (t (E a",
E HOPT+(K.0(Q2PT>0) E YZB. (t 2Hj
Proof of Lemma 2.6.2. The proof of (2.42) and (2.43) is identical to Lemma 4.2
in Levi et al. (2007) and Lemma 2 in Levi et al. (2008d) respectively. The proof of
(2.44) is identical to Lemma 5 in Levi and Shi (2009). Next we shall show that (2.45)
holds true. Recall that
- t:e Kad PT > XPB +min{f QB. u}}. (A. 21),12H t t < K and Yto'   R
In other words, -7 2H consists of periods in which the balancing cost is less than K
and the inventory position of OPT after ordering exceeds even XRB + min {(B, U}
We split the analysis into two cases.
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1. If QRB < u, the RB policy will order the holding-cost-K quantity QB incur-
ring exactly K expected marginal holding cost. Since OPT has more physical
inventory than the RB policy, OPT had already ordered these units before thus
incurring more holding cost.
2. On the other hand, if QJ B > U, the RB policy will order the capacity u incurring
less than K marginal holding cost. We shall show that the fixed ordering costs
incurred by OPT cover this cost. It suffices to show that the number of orders
placed by OPT over the interval [1, 1] is at least the number of orders in which
RB orders up to capacity a over [I, t]. We prove the claim by contradiction.
Suppose otherwise, the number of orders placed by OPT over the interval [1, t]
is m and the number of orders in which RB orders up to capacity u over [L. t] is
n and r < n. The maximum inventory position of OPT in period t is x 1 +m u,
whereas the minimum inventory position of the RB policy in period t is x 1 +n- u.
This contradicts to the fact that OPT has higher inventory position than the
RB policy in period I where t E -2H. Hence the claim holds.
This completes the proof of the lemma. D
A.2 Performance of the proposed algorithms
The first two columns specify the test instances, namely, fixed ordering cost K, per-
unit holding cost h, per-unit backlogging cost p and demand rate vector A. The third
column shows the cost incurred by the optimal policy. The fourth column shows
the optimal parameters of parametrized RB policy. The fifth column shows the cost
incurred by the parameterized RB policy. The sixth column shows the cost ratio
of the parameterized RB policy to the optimal policy. The seventh column shows
the cost of unparameterized RB policy (i.e., the original policy without parameter
optimization). The eighth columns shows the cost ratio of the unparameterized RB
policy to the optimal policy.
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Demands Cost of Optimal Cost of Cost Cost of Cost
(K,h,p) (Ao, Al, A2 ) OPT (#*, y*, 7*) param. RB Ratio unparam. RB Ratio
(0,1,9) (4,1,4) 46.85 (*,2,*) 49.18 1.0497 58.30 1.2444
(0,1,9) (4,1,2) 46.39 (*,2,*) 49.30 1.0627 55.24 1.1908
(0,1,9) (4,1,1) 46.20 (*,2,*) 47.81 1.0348 54.26 1.1745
(0,1,9) (3,1,2) 41.02 (*,2,*) 41.41 1.0095 49.40 1.2043
(0,1,9) (2,1,3) 32.88 (*,2,*) 34.42 1.0468 41.51 1.2625
(0,1,9) (1,1,4) 24.74 (*,2,*) 26.40 1.0671 31.40 1.2692
(5,1,9) (4,1,1) 102.66 (0.2,2,9) 108.28 1.0547 135.37 1.3186
(5,1,9) (1,1,4) 86.47 (0.2,2,9) 90.70 1.0489 128.70 1.4884
(5,1,1) (4,1,1) 71.35 (0.4,1,1) 75.42 1.0570 84.13 1.1791
(100,1,9) (5,1,0) 427.81 (0.9,*9) 451.68 1.0558 605.10 1.4144
(100,1,9) (4,1,1) 424.81 (0.9,*9) 449.65 1.0585 601.29 1.4154
(100,1,9) (3,1,2) 421.76 (0.9,*,9) 443.12 1.0506 595.10 1.4110
(100,1,9) (2,1,3) 418.63 (0.9,*,9) 443.64 1.0597 611.48 1.4607
(100,1,9) (1,1,4) 415.49 (0.8,*,9) 437.36 1.0526 618.36 1.4883
(100,1,9) (0,1,5) 412.29 (0.8,*,9) 435.65 1.0567 593.88 1.4404
Table A.1: Numerical results with lead time L = 0 and finite horizon T = 12.
Demands Cost of Optimal Cost of Cost Cost of Cost
(K,h,p) (Ao,A 1 ,A2 ) OPT (*. -y*, r*) param. RB Ratio unparam. RB Ratio
(0,1,9) (4,1,4) 93.81 (*,2,*) 98.32 1.0481 120.14 1.2807
(0,1,9) (4,1,2) 88.27 (*,2,*) 94.25 1.0677 108.24 1.2262
(0,1,9) (4,1,1) 85.48 (*2,*) 90.21 1.0553 93.97 1.0993
(0,1,9) (3,1,2) 80.04 (*,2,*) 89.73 1.1211 90.40 1.1294
(0,1,9) (2,1,3) 73.98 (*1.5,*) 84.42 1.1411 90.99 1.2625
(0,1,9) (1,1,4) 70.96 (*1.5,*) 81.40 1.1471 87.60 1.2345
(5,1,9) (4,1,1) 137.66 (0.2,2,9) 153.97 1.1185 161.10 1.1703
(5,1,9) (1,1,4) 121.47 (0.2,2,9) 140.26 1.1525 148.47 1.2223
(5,1,1) (4,1,1) 78.18 (0.4,1,1) 90.42 1.1566 97.47 1.2467
(100,1,9) (5,1,0) 434.30 (0.9,*,9) 479.03 1.1030 614.17 1.4142
(100,1,9) (4,1,1) 431.87 (0.9,*,9) 466.33 1.0798 611.96 1.4170
(100,1,9) (3,1,2) 429.41 (0.9,*,9) 453.24 1.0555 551.00 1.2832
(100,1,9) (2,1,3) 426.86 (0.9,*,9) 451.17 1.0570 644.13 1.5090
(100,1,9) (1,1,4) 424.25 (0.9,*,9) 466.43 1.0994 623.56 1.4698
(100,1,9) (0,1,5) 421.56 (0.9,*,9) 461.65 1.0951 595.40 1.4124
Table A.2: Numerical results with lead time L = 2 and finite horizon T = 12.
Demands Cost of Optimal Cost of Cost Cost of Cost
(K,h,p) (AoAi,A 2 ) OPT (#*, -y* *) param. RB Ratio unparam. RB Ratio
(0,1,9) (4,1,4) 57.71 (*,2,*) 58.23 1.0090 61.92 1.0730
(0,1,9) (4,1,2) 57.71 (*,2,*) 58.36 1.0113 60.94 1.0560
(0,1,9) (4,1,1) 57.71 (*,2,*) 58.30 1.0102 60.38 1.0463
(0,1,9) (3,1,2) 50.19 (*,2,*) 51.49 1.0259 53.62 1.0683
(0,1,9) (2,1,3) 41.27 (*,2,*) 41.96 1.0167 43.63 1.0572
(0,1,9) (1,1,4) 30.55 (*,2,*) 30.88 1.0108 31.66 1.0363
(5,1,9) (4,1,1) 128.17 (0.2,2,9) 133.91 1.0448 166.10 1.2959
(5,1,9) (1,1,4) 101.70 (0.2,2,9) 107.34 1.0555 148.85 1.4636
(5,1,1) (4,1,1) 86.07 (0.4,1,1) 90.51 1.0516 104.24 1.2111
(100,1,9) (5,1,0) 535.14 (1.1,*,9) 566.23 1.0581 663.61 1.2401
(100,1,9) (4,1,1) 533.51 (1.1,*,9) 570.65 1.0696 659.29 1.2358
(100,1,9) (3,1,2) 529.77 (1.1,*,9) 566.09 1.0686 682.76 1.2888
(100,1,9) (2,1,3) 523.94 (1.1,*,9) 555.57 1.0604 729.15 1.3917
(100,1,9) (1,1,4) 520.03 (1.0,*,9) 550.36 1.0583 744.45 1.4316
(100,1,9) (0,1,5) 516.05 (1.0,*,9) 550.65 1.0670 711.22 1.3782
Table A.3: Numerical results with lead time L = 0 and finite horizon T = 15.
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Demands
No. (AO, A, A2 ) OPT (#, -y, r) RB Ratio OPT (, -y, 71) RB Ratio
Capacity 3 6
1 (6,0,0) 1027.0 (1, 1,50) 1141.5 1.111 275.9 (1,1, 10) 326.1 1.182
2 (3,3,0) 840.9 (1, 1,50) 914.9 1.088 207.2 (1, 1, 10) 251.8 1.215
3 (0,6,0) 681.9 (1, 1,50) 756.9 1.111 180.5 (1, 1, 10) 237.9 1.318
4 (0,3,3) 552.2 (1, 1,50) 584.4 1.058 169.9 (1,1,10) 218.2 1.284
5 (0,0,6) 446.7 (1, 1,50) 474.3 1.061 154.6 (1, 1,10) 205.1 1.327
Capacity 9 12
1 (6,0,0) 166.4 (1, 1, 1) 243.4 1.462 162.8 (1, 1, 1) 223.4 1.372
2 (3,3,0) 154.6 (1, 1, 1) 223.6 1.446 153.3 (1, 1, 1) 216.8 1.414
3 (0,6,0) 132.1 (1, 1, 1) 210.7 1.595 129.7 (1, 1, 1) 185.9 1.433
4 (0,3,3) 129.4 (1, 1, 1) 197.9 1.529 129.2 (1, 1, 1) 180.0 1.393
5 (0,0,6) 119.8 (1, 1, 1) 174.7 1.458 118.9 (1, 1, 1) 168.4 1.416
Capacity 3 6
6 (6,0,0) 1279.0 (1, 1,50) 1606.1 1.256 526.7 (1,1,10) 625.0 1.186
7 (3,3,0) 1093.0 (1, 1,50) 1224.8 1.121 450.3 (1,1,10) 537.1 1.192
8 (0,6,0) 934.5 (1, 1,50) 1104.5 1.182 410.6 (1,1,10) 513.3 1.250
9 (0,3,3) 804.7 (1, 1,50) 857.6 1.065 377.7 (1,1,10) 486.2 1.287
10 (0,0,6) 698.6 (1, 1,50) 761.0 1.089 343.3 (1, 1,10) 437.9 1.275
Capacity 9 12
6 (6,0,0) 351.9 (1, 1,10) 474.6 1.349 305.8 (1, 1,10) 404.2 1.321
7 (3,3,0) 327.3 (1, 1,10) 403.1 1.231 286.6 (1, 1,10) 392.3 1.368
8 (0,6,0) 287.3 (1, 1,10) 389.0 1.354 250.5 (1, 1,10) 321.3 1.282
9 (0,3,3) 273.2 (1, 1,10) 367.2 1.344 241.3 (1, 1,10) 311.1 1.289
10 (0,0,6) 249.6 (1, 1,10) 406.0 1.626 220.0 (1, 1,10) 284.4 1.292
Table A.4: Numerical results for the capacitated model: h - 1, p = 9, c = 2, T = 10;
K = 10 for experiments 1 to 5, K = 50 for experiments 6 to 10
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 3
B.1 Proof of Ergodicity
In this section, we prove the existence and uniqueness of stationary distribution for the
Markov chain induced by the class selection policy (CSP). Let requests for resources
from a common resource pool of capacity C < oc arrive at time points {r , -0O <
n < oo}. By observing the system at the moments of request arrivals, we define
a discrete time process I, A (Nfc), Li, Di. Si, i - 1,2, . . . Nc)) where NiC) is the
number of active (reserved) requests in the system at the moment of nth arrival T,
Li is the elapsed time from the arrival of the ith request to r7, DI and Si represent
the reservation time (between arrival and actual service) and service time of the i1.
request, respectively. Note that Li < Di + Si for i = 1, 2,... Nnc). The discrete-time
Markov chain I, describes the entire booking profile at the moment of nth arrival T.
We use a discrete version of Theorem 1 in Sevastyanov (1957) to prove the existence
of a unique stationary distribution for {In}, which we state next for completeness.
Theorem B.1.1 A Markov chain homogeneous in time has a unique stationary dis-
tribution which is ergodic if, for any e > 0, there exists a measurable set S, a proba-
bility distribution R on Q, and n1 > 0, k > 0, K > 0 such that
* kR(A) < P, (x, A) for all points x E H and measurable sets A c H; for any
initial distribution Po there exists no such that for any n > no,
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e P,,(H) > 1 - c,
* P,(A) < KR(A) + c for all measurable sets A C H.
Proof of Ergodicity. The proof follows similar arguments as in Lu and Radovanovic
(2007b) and Sevastyanov (1957). Define set H(a, b, c, d) as
II (a, , c, d) A {Nl 0 ) < a, 0 < Li < b.0 i < c. 0 < Si < d} . (B.1)
for some positive finite constants a, b, c., d. Now we show that for any C > 0., there
exists H(a, b, c, d) e I, such that for any initial distribution Po there exists no such
that for all n > no,
P, (H (a, b. c, d)) > 1 - c. (B.2)
Note that
P > a + IP U {L, > b} , N( 1 < a]
+P U {Di > c}, N( < a
iGENo'C
(B.3)
+P U {S, > d}, N( <
iP N O(C)
> b] + aP [Di > c] + aP [S, > d],
where Na21 represents the number of active requests at T, that originated from n
arrivals at ro.. T, ,-_ and the rest of active requests at r., NOg, -N(C - N(C are
those that were active at the initial point To and are still active in the system at the
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P,(ft(a, b, c, d)) <
moment of nth arrival. Next, since
P [N) + N > a]
< P [N > a
< P [N > ]
< P[ N_ ]
+P [ Nri > 1
I [Do + So > r,
[Nor=m P 1 [Do + So > (1+rPO
mr=o
+P [Tr, - To < (1 - ci)nIE(ri - To))],
where 0 < c1 < 1 is an arbitrary constant and we used N(' > N__ a.s. where N 3
is the active requests under infinite capacity system.
Next we prove that there exists a = ao large enough such that (B.4) is bounded
by 6/4. By virtue of Little's Law, we know that EN,(o) < oc and therefore, uniformly
for all n > 0,
imn P [Nr(t)
a->oo L
(B.5)
Next, note that I [Do + S > (1 - ci)nE(T - To)] < 1 [Do + S? > (1 - Ei)E(Ti - To)]
a.s., and that for any fixed n,
P It [Do + So > (1
< P 1 [o + S'o > (1I
ci)nE(Ti - To)] >
(1 )E(TI - To)] > 4 0
(B.6)
as ( -+ 00,
which by the monotone convergence theorem implies that, uniformly for all n > 0,
(B.7)limn P No,
m>=o
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(B.4)
ro] >
TO)] >
"NO'r
+ P
- Ci)nE(T1 -
> a - 0.
2
= m P I [Do + So > (1 - c1)nE(71l - ro)] > a
i= 
-
Finally, by the Weak Law of Large Numbers, for all n large enough,
P [Tn - T0 < (1 - c1)nE(T - ro))] < E/12. (B.8)
Thus, by (B.5) and (B.6), for an arbitrary 0 < c < 1, there exists no < o and ao < 0c
large enough such that for all n > no,
P [N)> < /12 (B.9)
I [Sf + Do > (1 - Ei)nE(r1 - To)] > a] < C/12.
..1
Now since EL, < o, EDj < 00 and ES, < o, there exists bo, co and do such that
P [L > bo] <
4ao P [D> co] 4ao P [Si, > do] < .4ao
Thus, by (B.8), (B.9), (B.10) and (B.11), we have
C. (B.12)
Next, we show that there exists ni > 0 and k > 0 such that for all points x E
H(ao. bo, co. do) and measurable sets A E H(ao. bo, co, do), the following inequality
holds
P, 1 (x, A) > kI?(A). (B.13)
Let Fv(v) denote a cumulative distribution function of a random duration V, i.e.
P [V < v]. Next, for any ni,
P1 ("x, A) > I(x, wo) P)2 (wo, A)., (B.14)
where n 2 = ni - 1. Let x = (m,l11 ... .lm, di .... dm.. . , Sm) C H(ao. bo, co. do).
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and
-P [NO,
mn=O
(B.10)
(B.11)
= m] P
P' i(a, b, <, d)c5
-> P(//(a. b, c. d1)) '> 1I
Then,
PI(x, wo) > P [T1 - To > A, all m requests depart iII (To, Ti)] (B.15)
> P [T - To > co + do] = 1 - Fa(co + do) - e co+do)
where Fa(u) represents cumulative inter-arrival distribution of a renewal process {T},
i.e. Fa(u) - P [i - To < u]. Next, we derive a lower bound for P, (Wo, A) for some
n2 large enough such that
C
P[T -2 > co + do] 1- -. (B.16)2
Note that the condition imposed on n 2 is possible due to the Weak Law of Large
Numbers, since for any c > 0 and all n 2 large enough with co + do < (1- e)E(T12 - To),
E
P [rr2 - ro > co + do] > IPl(r 2 - T > (1 - )E(T,, - To)] > 1 - -. (B.17)
Next, pick any x' = (m', l'. 1 ',, d', ... s'.,) E A. Define ' + dx' 
('., l + di'. . . . P, + d1',, d' + dd', .. d'r, + dd' ,, s' + ds' .... , s' , + ds where
dli, ... , d1',, dd', ... , dd',, ds. ds' , are infinitesimal elements. Then the transi-
tion probability into state (', '+ dx') starting from we can be lower bounded by the
probability of the event that there are exactly m' arrivals between Ti and Tr1 2 whose
arrivals times are determined by ( Tn2 - - diP , 2 - l)fori=1,...,', adnoneof
these m' arrivals concluded at time T. 2 and there were no other arrivals. Therefore,
r'
1  rrt
Pn2 (Po, (' + dx')) > e-\ A, 2  [1 - FD+S,D,S(l 1 , di. si)] . (B.18)
where FD+S,D,S(-) is the joint cumulative probability mass function. Now define
probability distribution
R A n' [Si
R(A) ii] ! J7 [I - FD+s,D,S(li, di, .si)] ,(B. 19)
R (A) v JXCA M
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where v is a normalization constant. Thus, we have
Pn2 +1 (x, A) > e- A(co+do)-1 'R(A). (B.20)
Finally, it is left to show that there exists K > 0 such that for every initial distribution
Po, for all n large and for any measurable set A c S(ao, bo, co, do),
P,(A) < K R(A) + e. (B.21)
By (B.16), for all n > n2,
P, (A) P [H,, C A,Tr -T 0 > co + do] + P [7, -T 0  co + do] (B.22)
P [Hn c A,Tn - o > co + do] +
< 1cA { i! 171[1- FD+S,D,S(li, di, si)} + e
< v- 1 R(A)+e.
Wc havc verified the conditions stated in Theorem B.1. 1 and thus the process {/ /17}
has a unique stationary distribution as well implying the existence of the stationary
blocking probability. D
B.2 Proofs of Technical Lemmas and Theorems in
Section 3
LEMMA 3.3.5. Consider a random walk defined by a sequence of independent random
variables Ej = 1 with probability p and -1 with probability q - 1 - p. Let S,,
_1 Ei. Define M. C [0,u] U{oo} to be maximum level attained by the random
walk (i.e., M = max, 5. Given that 0 < p < q < 1 (downward drifting), then the
probability that the random walk ever hits above level b is P (M. > b) = (p/q)b.
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Proof of Lemma 3.3.5. Define the stopping time T as follows,
T = inf {t > 1 : St < -a or St > b}.
It is straightforward to check the following two conditions,
Vt C T.
The Wald's identity (see Gallager (1996))
G (0) T'
[#(0)]"
is a martingale where the moment generating function #(6) E(e 0 ) > 1. First we
compute 0 that solves the equation E(e0 ) = 1, i.e.,
E(eO) = peO + qe0 = 1 q-> e5 =
p
By Optional Sampling Theorem (see Gallager (1996)),
[ ( )TE I- E eST] -- E esul = 1.
This leads to
P(ST > b) E(eos- ST > b) +-(1 - P(S, > b)) E(eOs ST < -a)
Thus, we have
P(S, > b) = 1 - EaEb- E(,
1 - ea
eOb - e-Oa
1-a
1- ( ")
(\ b( U
Let S" a ST be the stopping time location of the process. Let Ba be the event that
the random walk hits b before -a. Observe that P(13,) - P(S" > b) and also note
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(B.23)
(B.24)
(B.25)
(B.26)
(B.27)
(B.28)
E(-r) < oo, E(|Etai -- Et| | Ft) < 2,
that Bi C Bj+1 for all i. Define B = U'lt Bi, i.e., there exists an i that the random
walk hits b before -i. Therefore P(Moo 2 b) - P(B). By properties of probability
measures, we have
P(Moo > b) = P(U B) = lim P(B ) = lim (_) = (B.29)
a- -j4 oca--o ) -a) q7 (.
This completes the proof. D
LEMMA 3.3.6. Consider the counterpart system with an infinite number of servers,
a customer arriving at the system at time 0 in steady state, observes that the pre-
arrivals follow a non-homogeneous Poisson input process with piecewise rate rl(r) at
time r
A. if r < 0,
A(1 - FD( r - 1)), if r > 0,
where FD is the cumulative probability mass function of D and FD( r -
Edo fD(-) = ZFrl >
Proof of Lemma 3.3.6. Lemma 3.3.6 is a generalized version of Lemma 3.3.2. For
r < 0, consider the time interval ([r] - 1, [r]]. By arguments similar to those used
in Lemma 3.3.2, for each I E [0. u), the interval ([r] - 1 - 1, [r] - 1] generates a
stream of pre-arrivals over ([r] - 1, [r]] that follow a Poisson process of rate yA.
These processes are independent of each other and the overall merged process has
rate A = -yoA + 71A + ... +7 A.
For [r] = i for i E [1, u], then the pre-arrivals prior to / over ([r] 1. [r]] are
induced by arriving customers over the intervals ([r] - 1 - 1, [r] - 1], for I E [i, U],
and the total rate is 'yjA + y 11A + ... + %A. Note again that the rate 7A is induced
from the Poisson arrival stream of customers over ([r] - 1 - 1, [r] - 1] who wish
to start in 1 units of time. Since we only consider pre-arrivals prior to t, the terms
yj_-AY,- 2 A,..., 70 A are missing. D
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LEMMA 3.3.7. Consider the counterpart system with an infinite number of servers, if
a customer comes at time 0 in steady state and requests service (S = 1) determinis-
tically to commence in 1) units of time () E [0,u]), the conditional virtual blocking
probability is given by, for all i E [0, U],
P P (B I D = i) P max N+i(1 - r; Ai+ 2 ) + Ni+2(r; Ai+ 3 )} > C
(rEo,1] J
where N, is a Poisson counting process with rate Ai = A(1 - FD(i - 2)), and i is a
mirror image of Ni with the same rate.
Proof of Lemma 3.3.7. By Lemnma 3.3.6, for each i E [1, u], the pre-arrival process
Nj over the interval (1 - 2, i - 1] follows a Poisson process with rate Ai - r(i - 1) =
A(1 - FD(i - 2)). This implies that over the interval (i - 1, i], the customers depart
the system following a Poisson process with rate Ai (a shift of Ni by 1 unit of time).
Let Rs be the mirror image of the departure process induced by Ni over (i - 1, i],
and therefore R1 has the same rate Ai. The rest of arguments is identical to that of
Lemma 3.3.3. ]
THEOREM 3.3.8. The conditional long-run virtual blocking probabilities have the fol-
lowing asymptotic upper bounds: for each i E [0, u] (the service distribution S = 1
deterministically), Pi < (b(-J).
Proof of Theorem 3.3.8. First we assume that -y0 > 0. By Lemma 3.3.7, we have
that A, > A2 and Ai > Aj+ 1 for each i E [2, u]. By Theorem 3.3.4, it follows that,
in Po = <D(-O); lim Pi = 0, for i E Li, a].
Therefore P, < <b(--) holds given that '0 > 0. In fact, we can relax the assumption
of 'y0 > 0. If '0 = 0, it implies that over the interval (0, 1] (recall that the customer
arrives at time 0 in steady state), the departure rate is equal to the pre-arrival rate,
i.e., 1 - A2 A. Theorem 3.3.4 cannot be applied under this case. However, the
fact that 'y0 = 0 implies that no arriving customers will start the service right away.
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Therefore, we do not have to consider the probability PO in the expression of P. Let
i' be the minimal index such that -ye' > 0 and -y = 0 for i E [01i' -1], by the same
argument, we can ignore the probabilities P,...., . Instead, again by Theorem
3.3.4, we have
lim P <(-) lim Pi = 0,. i + 1Iu]
A-o Aoo
Thus, Pi < ((-3) still holds and this completes the proof. E
LEMMA 3.3.9. Let N/ and N/ be defined as above. Then, for each j E [ 1,v] and each
i C [1, u], N/ and N|' are Poisson processes with the same rate
i-j-1
A3 =ijA 1 - E ) Aj(1 - Fj(i -j - 1)). (B.30)
1=0
Moreover, N/is independent of N, for i or j j'.
Proof of Lemma 3.3.9. For each set j E [1, v], and i c [1. u], the pre-arrivals
prior to t (i.e., N/) over (i - - 1, - j] are induced by arriving customers over the
intervals (i - j - 1 - 1, i - j -1] for 1 - max(0, i - j)... ,u, and the total rate A] is
therefore
' ax(0,i-j)A- + ... + - = A - i1 =) Aj(1 - FA(i - j - 1)). (B.31)
Note again that the rate -y is induced from the Poisson arrival stream of customers
over (i 'j -1 i-j - 1] who wish to start in I units of time. It follows from Poisson
splitting arguments that N/ and N, are independent of each other for (i. j) # (i', ').
Note that they are generated by pre-arrivals in disjoint intervals. E
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B.3 Analysis of Price-driven Customer Arrivals
For the model with price-driven demand we use the following nonlinear program
(NLP1):
M
M
s.t. 3 Y. aijkAijk(rk)j < C, (B.33)
k=1 i,j
0 < ajk <l1 Vi,j,k,
0 rk < 1. Vk.
In particular, it can be verified that any optimal solution of (NLP1) has only non-
negative prices. Also, observe that for any fixed prices r1 ,..., rM, the corresponding
solution of {nijk} has the same knapsack structure defined in Section 2 above. Let
(r*. a*) = {rk, aijk } be the corresponding optimal solution. Note that if one can solve
(NLP1) and obtain the solution (r*, a*) then one can construct a similar CSP that
will be amenable to the same performance analysis discussed in Section 3 above. How-
ever, solving (NLP1) directly may be computationally hard. Next, we show that under
relatively mild assumptions imposed on the functions A,(r1), ... , Am (r), one can re-
duce (NLP1) to an equivalent nonlinear program that is more tractable; we denote it
by (NLP2). (By equivalent we mean that they have the same set of optimal solutions.)
Consider (NLP2) as follows:
M
max rkAijk (rk)j, (B.34)
k=1 i j
M
s. t. Aijk (rk)j < C. (B .3 5)
k=1 i,j
0 rk < 1, Vk.
It can be readily verified that as long as Aijk(rk) is nonnegative (and decreasing) it
is always optimal to have nonnegative prices, so the nonnegativity constraints can be
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dropped.
Theorem B. 3.1 The programs (NLP1) and (NLP2) are equivalent.
Proof of Theorem B.3.1. First, we show that for each solution {rk} of (NLP2),
we can construct a solution of (NLP1) with the same objective value. Specifically, con-
sider solution {r', a'.k} such that r' = rk and aJk - 1 if and only if E Aik rk j >
0. It can be verified that the resulting solution is feasible for (NLP1) and has the
same objective value.
Next, we show how to map optimal solution {r*,ak} of (NLP1) to a feasible so-
lution of (NLP2) with the same objective function. For each i = 1,... , M' - 1, set
rk = r, and for each i = M' + 1,..., M set set rk - ro,. It is clear that, for each
i M' - 1, the resulting contributions to the objective value and constraint (3.2) are
the same as in (NLP1). Consider now possibly fractional v'M. The respective contri-
bution of class A' to the objective value is Zj r~f$n,*,Aim(r*,)j. Similarly, the
contribution to constraint (3.2) E a jM A r,)j. Thus, it is sufficient to show
that there exists a price rN, such that E rM y,(rii)j ( ri, uM , AMA(rl,)j
and E, Aijm,(rMi)j ajjlAijM' (r,)-
Since E r , Aijm,(r* j j r a* M,A 2jMl(r*,)j, we know that there exists
& [rmi, roo) such that J FAjjM'(,T) - ' rMcejM,AijM,(r*y,)j by the properties
of AjM, (rm,). Note that r > r*,, and therefore, we obtain Ei r*, Aij,(i)j
Z~irm (r)j - Zj rM ocY ,Aijm,(r*,)j. Therefore, we have that A ijM()j <
a MAijM'(r*, which concludes the proof of this theorem. El
Theorem B.3.1 implies that instead of solving (NLP1) we can solve (NLP2). How-
ever, (NLP2) is computationally more tractable and can be solved relatively easy in
many scenarios. Specifically, Lagrangify (dualize) constraint 3.2 with some Lagrange
multiplier 0 and consider the unconstraint problem
max ( rk - q)A 2ik(rk)j,
rkC[E,roo) 1<k<M i,j
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which is separable in r 1 ,..., rM. In fact, one aims to find the minimal 0 for which
the resulting solution satisfies constraint 3.2. This can be done by applying bi-section
search on the interval [0. p]. The complexity of this procedure depends on the com-
plexity of maximizing E1k<M Zij(rk - e)Aijk(rk)j for each 1 < k < M. It is not
hard to check that there are at least two tractable cases: (i) Aijk(rk) is a concave func-
tion on [0. r,,), for each 1 < k < Al; (ii) Aijk(rk) is convex, but rkAJik(rk) is concave
function on [0, rx), for each 1 < k < M.
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 4
C.1 Nash Bargaining Game
A n-person Nash Bargaining game consists of a pair (Ar, w), where M C R n is a
compact and convex set and w E IV. Set Nr is the feasible set and its elements give
utilities that the n players can simultaneously accrue. Point w is the disagreement
point - it gives the utilities that the n players obtain if they decide not to cooperate.
Game (Ar, w) is said to be feasible if there is a point v E A such that v1 > w1 and
V2 > w2 . The solution to a feasible game is the point that satisfies the following four
axioms,
1. Pareto optimality: No point in Ar can weakly dominate v.
2. Invariance under affine trans formation of utilities
3. Symmetry: The numbering of the players should not affect the solution.
4. Independence of irrelevant alternatives: If v is the solution for (Ar, w), and
S C R" is a compact and convex set satisfying w E S and v E S C A, then v
is also the solution for (S, w).
Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) If game (A, w) is feasible then there is a
unique point in Ar satisfying the axioms stated above. This is also the unique point
that maximizes 1(,(vi - wi) over all v M N.
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